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Abstract  
 
This study examines the role of board social and human capital in assessing the market value 
of firms in the UK context. As the world economy has shifted from manufacturing to service 
and knowledge-based economies, attributes such as knowledge, expertise, skills, ability and 
reputation are increasingly fundamental to the success of business enterprises. There is a 
growing consensus that these attributes are an increasingly valuable form of capital, asset or 
resource, despite their intangibility. In accounting, there are a number of problems arising from 
the accountability of non-physical, non-financial capital. Firstly, some forms of capital and 
certain assets are neither recognised nor presented in the statement of financial position. 
Secondly, some accounting practices relating to intangible assets are very conservative, 
resulting in undervalued assets and overstated liabilities. Consequently, there is an increasing 
gap between the book value and market value of firms. This gap restricts the relevance of 
information presented in financial statements and suggests that there is something missing in 
financial statements. This is the research problem being addressed in this study.  
While prior literature demonstrates that it has proven difficult to operationalise intangible 
forms of capital, there has been significant empirical attention and theoretical development in 
social and human forms. This thesis aims to contribute to accounting theory and practice by 
exploring the impact that board social and human capital have on firm market value. In light 
of extant research, it is hypothesised that social and human capital possessed at board level are 
positively related to the market value of firms. This study employs the Ohlson’s (1995) residual 
income valuation model to test the impact of social and human capital using a sample of UK 
firms listed on the FTSE All Share index for a period of 10 years (2001-2010). Social and 
human capital measures are derived from interlocking directorate ties and detailed biographic 
information of board directors. This study benefits from Pajek and Ucinet network packages to 
generate network maps and calculate positional metrics such as centrality and structural hole 
measures. 
Keywords: Social capital, Human capital, Firm valuation, FTSE All Share, Board of directors, 
Social network theory 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study explores the role of social and human capital in explaining the market value of firms. 
This thesis advances research on organisational social and human capital by examining how, 
over time, market performance in terms of equity price is affected by interlocking directorates 
and knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics of directors on a firm’s board. This 
research is motivated by the debate on non-recognition of intangibles in financial statements. 
Current systems of accounting and financial reporting are often criticised for being insufficient 
to support business models that are largely driven by innovation and intangibles (Davison, 
2010; Zeghal and Maaloul, 2011). The accounting problem regarding intangibles emerges from 
the need to provide relevant and faithfully represented information on the intangible dimension 
of businesses. Over the last two decades, a large number of accounting researchers have 
focused on investigating the empirical relation between firms’ market values (or changes in 
values) and specific accounting figures to identify whether the use of such figures can improve 
financial reporting. Since current accounting standards provide a narrow framework to deal 
with intangibles and are often inadequate in recognising a wider range of intangibles such as 
social and human capital, this study links two major research streams to investigate to what 
extent non-physical, non-financial forms of capital (social and human capital) are value-
relevant. 
This chapter provides an overview of social and human capital, and a background to the board 
of directors and market-based accounting research. It clarifies the theoretical context, illustrates 
the general focus of the study, describes the aims and the objectives of the research, emphasises 
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the academic interest and significance of the study, and concludes with a description of the 
thesis structure. 
1.2 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
1.2.1 Introduction 
This section briefly presents the theoretical foundations for the research, namely social and 
human capital, corporate governance and board of directors, and market-based accounting 
research.  
1.2.2 Social and Human Capital 
This thesis focuses on social and human capital as two distinct but interrelated forms of non-
physical, non-financial capital, which have been subject to significant theoretical development 
and empirical interest in many disciplinary areas including management, marketing, 
entrepreneurship, economics, accounting and finance. Social capital refers to the ability of 
actors to secure benefits by “virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” 
(Portes, 1998: 6). Extant organisational research has confirmed the importance of social capital 
in various contexts, including acquiring information and integrating knowledge (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Newell, Tansley and Huang, 2004; Uzzi, 1997), innovation (Gabbay and 
Zuckerman, 1998; Laursen, Masciarelli and Prencipe, 2012; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), 
leadership development (Leitch, Mcmullan and Harrison, 2013) and enhancing firm 
performance (Cao, Ding and Zhang, 2016; Maurer and Ebers, 2006; Stam, Arzlanian and 
Elfring, 2014; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997).  
Human capital, on the other hand, concerns knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics 
of an individual, which provides that individual with positive outcomes (Coff, 2002). At the 
organisational level, human capital refers to “the aggregate accumulation of individual human 
capital that can be combined in a way that creates value for the unit” (Wright and McMahan, 
2011: 95). Research in organisational theory and strategy has widely adopted this macro 
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perspective and examined the link between human capital and organisational performance 
(Coff 1997, 1999; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Kroll, Walters and Wright, 2008; Wright, McMahan 
and McWilliams, 1994).  
There is a growing body of research that examines human and social capital possessed at board 
level (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). Since boards’ actions and activities are perceived 
as influencing organisational performance and outcomes (Chen, 2014; Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), organisational human and social capital are often 
captured by examining the individuals that comprise the board of directors (Stevenson and 
Radin, 2009). This body of research focuses on demographic, human and social capital 
attributes of corporate boards and refers to these attributes as an increasingly important form 
of capital despite their intangible nature. To effectively capture social capital embedded in 
corporate boards, studies have often focused on organisational ties built through interlocking 
directorships (Lester et al., 2008). Interlocking directorships are perceived as strategically 
important given that organisations exchange ideas, resources and practices through such ties 
(Chandler et al., 2013). Acknowledging the increasing importance of intangible forms of 
capital, the following section provides a brief introduction to the literature on board of directors 
and board interlocks.  
1.2.3 Corporate Governance and Board of Directors 
Over the last two decades, research on corporate boards, director selection and performance 
has gained significant prominence in a variety of disciplines including management, 
accounting and finance (Withers, Hillman, and Cannella, 2012). This research stream broadly 
focuses on the composition of directors’ demography, human capital and social capital, and 
explores how these attributes influence outcomes at individual and organisational level 
(Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). Despite having been explored from various perspectives, 
literature on corporate boards lacks a strong consensus as to what an optimum board should 
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look like (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). To extend the 
understanding of boards’ social attributes, scholars have used social network theory to 
investigate the link between directors’ social capital and performance at individual and/or 
organisational level (e.g. Patel and Terjesen, 2011; Stam, 2010; Tian, Haleblian and 
Rajagopalan, 2011). A network perspective on boards of directors provides researchers with 
valuable insights into notions of power, trust and legitimacy by enlightening the dynamics of 
corporate behaviour and influence both within organisations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), and 
the sharing of resources and dissemination of information and strategies across organisations 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001).  
Extant empirical research has typically focused on exploring the impact of board attributes 
such as social capital on firm-level outcomes, strategy and operating performance (see 
variously Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Machold et al., 2011; Pugliese et al., 2009; Stevenson 
and Radin, 2009). To date, most research has been conceptual and the link between 
characteristics of corporate boards and market value has received limited attention (e.g. Haynes 
and Hillman, 2010; Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012; Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). 
The work of Zajac and Westphal (2004) provided a social constructionist view of financial 
market behaviour by maintaining that theories of capital markets have been dominated by a 
financial economics perspective in which the stock market’s reaction is deemed a reliable, 
historically invariant indicator of the efficiency benefits gained (Zajac and Westphal, 2004: 
434). More recently, the number of studies adopting a sociological perspective on capital 
markets has been rising, with scholars emphasising the significance of how investment 
behaviour is driven by the social dynamics of financial markets1 (Beunza, Hardie and 
MacKenzie, 2006; Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007; Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012; 
                                                             
1 See Vollmer, Mennicken and Preda (2009) for a review of advances in the emergent field of social studies of 
accounting and finance.   
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MacKenzie 2006). Following this research stream, this thesis seeks to contribute to the 
sociology of markets and organisations by exploring the link between organisational human 
capital, organisational social capital that is created and developed through interlocking 
directorate ties and firm market value.  
1.2.4 Market-based Accounting Research 
Capital markets-based research in financial accounting has a history of more than five decades 
and researchers’ interest continues to increase as a consequence of the current issues in 
financial reporting. In general, market-based accounting research examines the relationship 
between accounting information and key market variables, such as the share price of a firm, 
the rate of return on its shares over a given period, or the systematic risk of its shares. 
Fundamental areas in market-based accounting research include value relevance studies, event 
studies and accounting disclosure studies. This study benefits from and contributes to the 
literature on value relevance research and examines the value relevance of information on 
firms’ social and human capital stocks in the UK context. There are two primary motivations 
for the progress of valuation research in addressing financial reporting issues (Barth, 2000). 
Firstly, investors constitute a large group of financial statement users and are mostly interested 
in information that can assist them in evaluating the underlying economics of a firm and making 
sound investment decisions. Secondly, researchers can construct their research designs on a 
solid foundation, which has been advanced by a large amount of research on valuation (Barth, 
2000).  
Over the last two decades, a large number of accounting researchers have focused on 
investigating the empirical relation between firms’ market values (or changes in values) and 
specific accounting figures to identify whether the use of such figures can improve financial 
reporting and therefore contribute to the development of accounting standards. This category 
of research, inspired by standard-setting objectives to a certain extent, is referred to as the 
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value-relevance literature (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). In value-relevance literature, the 
majority of studies include an explicit statement of their standard-setting motivations but in 
other studies, this motivation is implicit. This thesis also aims to make a contribution to the 
improvement of standard setting through an examination of the value relevance of information 
on firms’ human and social capital possessed at board level.  
Akin to any type of research, the value-relevance literature is based on a number of underlying 
theories: efficient market hypothesis (EMH); capital asset pricing model (CAPM); and 
arbitrage pricing theory (APT). There are two different theories of accounting and standard 
setting that are used by value-relevance studies to formulate hypotheses: (1) direct valuation 
theory, and (2) inputs-to-equity valuation theory (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). In direct 
valuation theory, accounting earnings are expected to either measure or be highly associated 
with changes in or levels of equity market value (via permanent income). Underlying this 
theory is the assertion that the book value of equity is also expected to either measure or be 
highly associated with equity market values. Since the disparity between market and book 
value of a firm’s equity has long been subject to considerable debate, the relative stock price 
relations of alternative accounting earnings or equity book value provide a fruitful area of 
investigation for accounting researchers. 
In inputs-to-equity valuation theory, the fundamental objective of accounting is to provide 
information on inputs, which can be used in valuation models by investors. Underlying this 
theory, empirical studies that find an accounting figure or a potential accounting figure to be 
useful in valuing firm equity could provide insights to improve financial reporting. Such a 
deduction entails a valuation model and an assumed relationship between the accounting 
number and the variable included in the valuation model. An inputs-to-equity valuation 
approach is adopted in this study. Network measures, namely centrality and structural hole 
measures, are used as a proxy for organisational social capital, and organisational human 
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capital is captured through an examination of directors’ demographic characteristics. This 
study examines whether information on organisational social and human capital, being other 
information in the Ohlson (1995) Model, helps to explain the market value of firms.   
1.3 FOCUS OF THE STUDY 
Since 1980s, there has been an increased interest in the contribution of executives to the 
organisational outcomes (Bryman, 1992; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Shropshire, 2010; Tang, 
Crossan and Rowe, 2011). The interest in boards of directors has become more evident in the 
UK and the US than elsewhere, where boards are placed at the heart of a number of accounting 
scandals involving major public companies and corporations (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). One 
of the basic propositions in social network theory is that social dynamics play an important role 
in driving investment behaviour (Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006; Hardie and 
MacKenzie, 2007; Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012; MacKenzie, 2006). This study examines 
whether organisational social capital in the form of board connectivity and organisational 
human capital possessed at board level have a significant impact on firm market value.     
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The primary aim of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between organisational 
social capital, organisational human capital and market value of firms in the UK context. This 
study also aims to explore the demand for well-connected and high human capital directors. 
Furthermore, it offers valuable insights into what a successful board looks like.  
In broad terms, the research objectives can be stated as follows: 
1) An investigation of the demand for director social and human capital in the UK context.  
2) An investigation of the relationship between organisational social capital, human capital and 
firm market value in the UK context. 
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3) An investigation of the relationship between organisational social capital, human capital and 
firms’ market value during times of crisis. 
1.5 STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis makes a contribution to the management and accounting literature by conducting 
an interdisciplinary research that links intangible forms of capital to firm valuation in order to 
explore the impact non-physical, non-financial forms of capital have on market value of firms. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that develops an integrative 
framework that considers the impact of non-physical, non-financial capital (namely social and 
human capital) on the market value of firms through the use of a residual income valuation 
model. The framework comprises both demographic and social attributes of board members 
and links these attributes to firm market value as an organisational outcome. Unlike other 
studies, which focus on CEOs or top management teams (TMTs), this study focuses on boards 
of directors given their importance to the firms and their strategies. 
Following the sociological perspective on capital markets; this study benefits from the 
literature on social construction of market value and social network theory. This study also 
differs from prior studies in that a number of network measures, namely centrality and 
structural hole measures, are used to determine which network positions are the most 
advantageous to firms. Prior research explored the impact of board connectivity on 
performance indicators such as average annual return and return on assets growth (Larcker, So 
and Wang, 2013), and total stock return, market to book ratio and return on assets (Horton, 
Millo and Serafeim, 2012).  
Furthermore, the proposed theoretical framework is empirically tested for a sample of UK firms 
listed on FTSE All Share index for a period of 10 years (2001-2010). This study adds to the 
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UK literature on the link between board connectivity2 and firm performance by examining a 
longer and more recent time period, which also comprises the period leading up to the 2008 
global financial crisis. This time period makes this analysis interesting as it allows the 
identification of differences between the impacts of social and human capital on firms’ market 
value that was/is observed during financial crisis and non-crisis periods. Hence, this study aims 
to provide meaningful insights into the relationship between social and demographic attributes 
of board members and firms’ market value with important implications to academics and firms 
in board processes. Despite failing to provide a comprehensive understanding of the internal 
aspects of board decision-making, this study offers a better understanding of and useful 
suggestions for effective director selection, which is outlined in section 9.4.2 of Chapter Nine.    
This study also makes a methodological contribution. It adds to extant literature on value 
relevance research by examining the value relevance of information on organisational social 
and human capital in the UK. Network measures are used to capture social capital at 
organisational level. Organisational human capital, on the other hand, is captured through an 
examination of directors’ demographic characteristics. Social and human capital proxies are 
included as “other information” in an extension of the Ohlson (1995) model, and their impacts 
on firm market value are tested for a period of ten years (2001-2010).  
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS AND ORDER OF PRESENTATION 
This thesis is structured in eight chapters in order to reflect the main aim and objectives of this 
study.  
Chapter One introduces the overview and the background of the study. It presents its aims and 
research objectives and also refers to academic interest and significance of the study.  
                                                             
2 Horton, Millo and Serafeim (2012) examine the impact of director connectivity on directors’ compensation 
levels and firms’ overall performance for a sample of UK firms during the period from 2001 to 2007. 
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Chapter Two examines thoroughly the existing literature in the area of social and human capital 
and boards of directors. It presents the main issues of the study: the origins of social capital 
theory; definitions of social capital, organisational social capital, social network theory and 
social network analysis; the origins of human capital theory; definitions of human capital, 
organisational human capital; dimensions of organisational human capital; and conceptual and 
empirical contributions to human capital theory. Furthermore, it proposes a theoretical model. 
Chapter Three explores the demand for social and human capital with a particular focus on 
well-connected and skilled board directors. The chapter provides a review of the costs 
associated with acquiring and/or maintaining higher levels of social capital as well as enjoying 
the benefits acquired through the board interlocks. Extant research on the increasing need for 
high-skilled directors in the era of knowledge and technology is discussed in the remainder of 
the chapter.  
Chapter Four begins with a review of the reflections on alternative perspectives in accounting. 
It then goes on to examine the concept of intangibles in accounting and accounting treatment 
for intangible assets based on the UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Following the review, the remainder of 
the chapter focuses on the market-based accounting research and sheds light on the value-
relevance literature with a particular focus on the Ohlson (1995) Model.  
Chapter Five is dedicated to hypotheses development. First, hypotheses are presented on the 
demand for social and human capital at the individual level. Second, the chapter presents the 
hypotheses on the demand for director social and human capital at the firm level. Third, 
hypotheses are developed relating to the association between board social and human capital 
and firm market value. The chapter concludes with a summary of the hypotheses that will be 
tested in this study.  
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Chapter Six describes the key aspects of research design, focusing on the foundations of the 
Ohlson (1995) Model and its empirical specifications in the UK. The chapter starts with a 
rigorous theoretical examination of accounting-based equity valuation models and goes on to 
explore how the Ohlson Model is developed on the foundations of Residual Income Valuation 
Model. Next, the chapter concentrates on the role of ‘other information’ (v term) in explaining 
market prices and examines the different specifications of v term based on prior empirical 
research. Following the examination of empirical specifications of the v term, advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each estimation method are discussed. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by providing a benchmark model to examine the role of ‘other information’ in the 
context of this study. 
Chapter Seven provides insights into the accounting research and illustrates the proposed 
methodology for the analysis. Next, the chapter elaborates on the research design used to test 
hypothesised relationships in the statistical model(s) specified in Chapter Six. The major 
themes in this chapter comprise accounting research, research design, sample and data, and 
operational measures. 
Chapter Eight presents and discusses descriptive statistics and multivariate statistical methods 
used in data analyses. Results of main effects models are discussed in relation to hypothesised 
relationships. Furthermore, results for financial crisis and non-crisis subsamples are presented 
and discussed in this chapter. The remainder of the chapter presents sensitivity checks and 
concludes with a summary of the findings.  
Chapter Nine summarises the key findings from the analyses and highlights the contributions 
and limitations of the study. The chapter also discusses the implications of the study relating 
to academic and management practice. Finally, it makes a number of suggestions for further 
research and concludes by offering new insights into board of directors’ research.  
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1.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The introductory chapter serves as a plan for the thesis. It presents a background of the research 
area and introduces the aims and research objectives. It underlines the contribution of the thesis 
and concludes with presenting the structure of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the basis for understanding non-financial forms of capital by examining 
social and human capital as two widely acknowledged forms. These forms have been subject 
to significant empirical attention and theoretical development in a wide range of social science 
disciplines such as management, marketing, entrepreneurship, economics, accounting and 
finance. As the world economy has shifted from manufacturing to service and knowledge-
based economies, attributes such as knowledge, expertise, skills, ability and reputation are 
increasingly fundamental to the success of organisations. Recently, these attributes have been 
given significant prominence at board level (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). Despite their 
intangibility, there is a growing body of research that refers to demographic, social and human 
capital attributes of corporate boards as an increasingly valuable form of capital (also referred 
to as board capital3).  
This thesis seeks to examine whether social and human capital embedded in corporate boards 
are linked to the market value of firms. Market value (per share) is defined as the current quoted 
price at which investors buy or sell a share of common stock at a given time. It is also referred 
to as the “market price”. Market value reflects what investors think a firm is worth. Given the 
increasing importance of intangible forms of capital as key drivers of firm value, market price 
has been selected as the dependent variable in this study.  
Social and human capital are determined as key variables in this study for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, extant empirical research provides supporting evidence on the impact of human capital 
                                                             
3 Building on the earlier work of Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Haynes and Hilman define board capital as “the 
composite of the human and social capital of the board of directors, is intended to capture the ability of the board 
to provide resources to the firm” (Haynes and Hillman, 2010: 1145). 
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on corporate outcomes (Kroll, Walters and Wright, 2008; McDonald, Westphal and Graebner, 
2008; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). Human capital is the earliest form of non-physical, 
non-financial capital, which has been theoretically developed and empirically tested. Secondly, 
social capital, defined as the benefits acquired through a network of relationships, has received 
considerable attention as another crucial form of non-physical, non-financial capital possessed 
at board level (Lester et al., 2008; Stevenson and Radin, 2009; Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 
2010). Thirdly, prior research on board capital highlights that simultaneous analyses of human 
and social capital have been limited (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian and 
Rajagopalan, 2011). Hence, social and human capital, as two distinct but interrelated forms of 
non-physical, non-financial capital, have been selected and analysed as the key constructs in 
this study.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: the chapter begins with social capital 
theory and comprises the origins of social capital theory, definitions of social capital, 
organisational social capital, social network theory and social network analysis. Then, the 
chapter goes on to explore the origins of human capital theory, organisational human capital 
and dimensions of organisational human capital. The chapter concludes with conceptual and 
empirical contributions to human capital theory.      
2.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY 
2.2.1 The Origins of Social Capital Theory 
The concept of social capital has been applied in a wide range of social science disciplines, 
including economics, sociology and politics (Coleman, 1988; Gabbay and Leenders, 1999; 
Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Lee, 2009; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), to understand a wide 
range of social phenomena such as schooling and education, public health, community life, 
democracy and governance, economic development and problems arising from collective 
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action (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Furthermore, early usage of the concept in an economics 
context appears to explain the differences among individuals in acquiring access to 
opportunities through their personal ties (Loury, 1977). Portes (2000) emphasises the diffusion 
of social capital into different fields by noting that “the concept of social capital is arguably 
one of the most successful ‘exports’ from sociology to other social sciences and to public 
discourse” (Portes, 2000: 1). Social capital theory fundamentally derives from the idea that 
individuals or communities can obtain positive outcomes from their involvement and 
participation in groups. Despite being anchored in early sociological thinking, it is important 
to explore how social capital theory has evolved over the last few decades and why the concept 
has become increasingly popular in recent years (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Johnson, Schnatterly 
and Hill, 2013; Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011). Hence, rather than exploring the 
foundations of social capital theory in classical literature, this chapter goes on to examine 
theoretical and empirical developments by contemporary theorists of social capital.   
2.2.2 Definitions of Social Capital 
Social scientists have proposed several definitions of social capital in an attempt to clarify what 
is meant by this “wonderfully elastic term” (Lappe and Du Bois, 1997: 119). Despite its general 
use, the term ‘social capital’ has been assigned very different meanings by different authors 
and there is only limited consensus in extant literature as to what should be understood by the 
term ‘social capital’ (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997). Social capital 
theorists have provided different definitions of social capital. Distinguishing between the 
substance, sources and effects of social capital is critical to prevent ambiguity and tautology 
arising from contradictory definitions (Robison, Schmid and Siles, 2002). Proposed definitions 
of social capital demonstrate divergence in relation to their central focus, being placed on the 
substance, sources or effects of social capital. While these definitions have some attributes in 
common, they comprise subtle differences (Adler and Kwon, 2002). In their extensive review, 
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Adler and Kwon (2002) examine various definitions of social capital and categorise them 
depending on whether their focal point is on internal, external, or both types of linkages. These 
categories and related definitions of social capital are presented in Table 2.1 (see Appendix I).  
- Insert Table 2.1 about here - 
As demonstrated in Table 2.1, the definitions of social capital primarily vary depending on 
whether they focus principally on (1) the relations an actor maintains with other actors (external 
ties), (2) the structure of relations among actors within a collectivity, or (3) both types of 
relations (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  In the first group, the external ties of an actor relate to 
“bridging” forms of social capital which regard social capital as a resource or sum of resources 
embedded in an actor’s ties to other actors. In the second group, the internal ties within a 
collectivity relate to “bonding” forms of social capital which deem social capital inherent in 
collective actors’ characteristics. In the third group, relations among actors are defined without 
a specific reference to internal and external distinction. These three perspectives are core to 
understanding the different conceptualisations of social capital and are further discussed below.  
Putnam (2000) suggests that bridging social capital is useful for “getting ahead” whereas 
bonding social capital is particularly important for “getting by”. The bridging view on social 
capital focuses on a focal actor’s ties to external parties and refers to social capital as a resource 
or set of resources that can be obtained through such ties in the network (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 
1992; Knoke, 1999). The general consensus in social capital debate is that bridging social 
capital emerges in open and heterogeneous networks, whereas dense and homogeneous 
networks build and cultivate bonding social capital (Burt, 1992; Burt, 1997a, 1997b; Coleman, 
1988; Putnam, 2000). The idea intrinsic to bridging forms of social capital is not considered as 
new. The bridging view shares some similarities with Granovetter’s (1973) work on The 
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Strength of Weak Ties4 which also emphasises the significance of weak ties in providing access 
to different resources and new information through bridging otherwise disconnected groups or 
individuals. This work is further advanced by Burt to develop his theory of structural holes, 
where social capital is seen as “a function of brokerage opportunities in a network” (Burt 
1997a: 340).  . 
Definitions with an emphasis on the bridging aspect (external linkages) have often been 
adopted to explore whether social capital can explain the differences within individuals’ career 
success and access to different sources of information and regional development (Burt, 1997a; 
Narayan, 1999; Woolcock, 1998).  Although the bridging view is often used to conceptualise 
social capital as a private good (Belliveau, O’Reilly and Wade, 1996; Burt, 1997a; Useem and 
Karabel, 1986), it is also emphasised that outward linkages can be of great importance to the 
creation of collective benefits for organisations, societies and communities.  
In contrast to the bridging view, the bonding view focuses on a collective’s inward linkages as 
the primary source of social capital. The proponents of the bonding view define social capital 
as embedded in the internal characteristics of a collectivity (both structural and relational) 
which enhance coordination and co-operation within the collectivity, and therefore generate 
mutual benefits (De Carolis, Litzky and Eddleston, 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; Payne et al., 2011; 
Putnam, 1995). The central assertion in bonding social capital is that there are sufficient levels 
of associability and trust among individuals or groups within a collectivity to ensure the pursuit 
of collective goals (Lee, 2009; Szreter and Woolcock, 2004). In the bonding view, the social 
solidarity developed and cultivated through the social capital within a collectivity is an 
                                                             
4Granovetter (1973) maintains that there can be vast strength in weak ties, specifically among higher socio-
economic groups. His research demonstrates that weak ties play an important role in upper-level professional and 
managerial employees’ opportunities for mobility through connections such as distant relatives or remote 
acquaintances. Distant relatives or acquaintances, compared to close friends, tend to move in different circles of 
connections, and therefore are more likely to create advantages. Granovetter (1973) also highlights that weak ties 
existing in low socio-economic groups are not necessarily linked to other networks, thus do not exert great 
influence on opportunities for mobility (Knoke, 1990; Marsden and Lin, 1982; Wellman, Carrington and Hall, 
1988). 
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important element which leads to the pursuit of collective goals and positive outcomes, such 
as improvement in economic and employment conditions of different ethnic groups, poverty 
reduction, and declines in gender and race inequality (Narayan, 1999). However, it is worth 
noting that the benefits of social capital are balanced between the needs of the individual and 
the needs of the collective (e.g. organisations) through various dynamics as emphasised in the 
studies of Cao, Simsek and Jansen (2012) and Leena and Van Buren (1999). 
The third group comprises of definitions which do not distinguish between internal and external 
dimensions of social capital. This approach is adopted in the definitions provided by Adler and 
Kwon (2002), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), Pennar (1997) and Woolcock (1998). Adler and 
Kwon (2002) argue that this neutrality can be more beneficial in analysing the concept of social 
capital since both bridging and bonding aspects are likely to influence individual or collective 
actors’ actions in a network. On the other hand, some studies5 maintain that there should be a 
separation between the bridging and bonding aspects of social capital to develop a better 
understanding of how social capital functions in specific contexts (Edelman et al., 2004; 
Newell, Tansley and Huang, 2004). 
This thesis adopts the definition provided by Burt (1992: 9) which refers to social capital as 
“friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use 
your financial and human capital”. Burt’s definition is adopted based on a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the central aim of this thesis is to examine whether non-financial, non-physical forms 
of capital, which are not included in the financial statements, contribute to the market value of 
the firm. Burt’s (1992) definition allows social capital to be conceptualised as a valuable 
                                                             
5 One of these studies that advocate the separate treatment of bridging and bonding social capital is Newell, 
Tansley and Huang (2004). They argue that bonding social capital is “a prerequisite for using the knowledge that 
team members may access from their individual networks outside the project team, since knowledge integration 
must involve dialogue and negotiation” (Newell, Tansley and Huang, 2004: 55). In other words, for the public 
good of a collective, bonding social capital among the individuals or groups within the collective is deemed to 
facilitate the use of resources and information acquired through bridging social capital.  
 
 
19 
 
instrument that complements and enhances the use of financial and human capital through the 
opportunities received. Secondly, this definition identifies the source of social capital as 
“friends, colleagues, and more general contacts” and focuses on the structure of actors’ social 
ties. This focus provides a sound basis for the use of social network theory and, in particular, 
for the use of interlocking directorates in this thesis. 
Thirdly, Burt (1992) provides a definition of social capital that focuses on the external 
dimension of social capital. This is particularly important since this thesis explores the impact 
of organisational social capital that is developed and accumulated through the structure of 
organisations’ external ties. Despite adopting an external focus, it is worth emphasising that 
the internal dimension of organisational social capital is also vital to understanding how 
organisations derive benefits from the social relationships existing among actors within the 
organisation. Another reason for adopting Burt’s conceptualisation of social capital lies in the 
fact that the effects of social capital are recognised in two dimensions, namely information and 
control. Based on these dimensions, the consequences of organisational social capital are 
examined more efficiently and network measures are selected accordingly.  
Finally, this definition allows this thesis to explore the importance of social capital, a 
theoretically and empirically well-developed form of non-physical, non-financial capital, as a 
significant element in determining the market value of firms. It provides a working definition 
that considers individual benefits accrued as a consequence of possessing particular ties in a 
network. This view allows board directors to be conceptualised as individuals who receive 
opportunities through interlocking directorates and also offers advantages at organisational 
level (as well as the individual level). Since this thesis aims to examine the link between social 
and human capital possessed at the organisational level and the firm market value, the next 
section goes on to explore organisational social capital and its dimensions.    
 
 
20 
 
2.2.4 Organisational Social Capital 
Despite the dominance of social capital studies at the individual level, the number of studies 
analysing the concept at the organisational level is rapidly growing (Nakamura and Yorks, 
2011; Pirolo and Presutti, 2010; Shipilov, Li and Greve, 2011; Subramaniam and Youndt, 
2005). The management literature includes several studies on the concept of social capital and 
its applications, with recent work exploring social capital across a wide range of organisations 
and organisational practices6 (Edelman et al., 2004). These studies offer insights into the 
concept of social capital embedded in different types of organisations such as schools, 
hospitals, non-profit organisations, family and private-sector firms (Leana and Pil, 2006; 
Ommen et al., 2009; Presutti and Boari, 2008; Schneider, 2009; Zahra, 2010). This section 
focuses on organisational social capital in private-sector firms as the primary unit of analysis 
given that this thesis seeks to examine the role of social capital in assessing the market value 
of firms.  
Organisational social capital (referred to hereafter as OSC) is a term introduced by Leana and 
Van Buren (1999: 540) who define the term as “a resource reflecting the character of social 
relations within the organisation, realised through members’ levels of collective orientation 
and shared trust”. They argue that organisational social capital provides benefits for both the 
organisation and its members in various dimensions including the value creation and 
enhancement of the skills of the employees. Leena and Van Buren’s (1999) argument is along 
the same lines as the fundamental conceptualisation of social capital theory which posits that 
                                                             
6 Social capital research in an organisational context embraces studies on human resource development practices 
(Belliveau, O’Reilly and Wade, 1996; Fernandez, Castilla and Moore, 2000; Podolny and Baron, 1997), internal 
organisational activities and processes (Bouty, 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000), the interconnectedness of 
human and social capital (DeFilippi and Arthur, 1996) and its role in exchange relationships and strategic alliances 
(Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000; Kraatz, 1998; Tsai, 2000; Uzzi, 1997). The role of social capital has also been 
investigated in the field of entrepreneurship (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; De Carolis and Saparito, 2006; Mosey 
and Wright, 2007), innovation (Fountain, 1998; Maskell, 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), knowledge management 
and the knowledge economy (Hoffman, Hoelscher and Sherif, 2005; Lang, 2004; Maskell et al., 1998; McElroy, 
Jorna and van Engelen, 2006).  
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social capital, despite being embedded in social relations among individuals, also belongs to 
the collective to whom it provides direct benefits through enhancing collective action (Griffith 
and Harvey, 2004). It is worth noting that the original conceptualisation of organisational social 
capital was built upon internal social relations, which led to conceptual developments that 
viewed it as both internal and external.  
Another definition of organisational social capital is provided by Leenders and Gabbay (1999, 
2001) through a more specific framework. They employ the term corporate social capital and 
define it as “the set of resources, tangible or virtual, that accrue to a corporate player through 
the player’s social relationships, facilitating the attainment of goals” (Gabbay and Leenders, 
1999: 3). In their definition, “corporate players” refer to the organisations and organisational 
members. Gabbay and Leenders (2001) maintain that distinguishing between the sources and 
consequences of social capital is crucial to identifying the level of analysis, which is deemed a 
fundamental requirement, particularly for studies examining social capital in the organisational 
context. Furthermore, Leenders and Gabbay7 (1999) emphasise that social structure may 
produce both positive and negative consequences for corporate players, and thus make the 
distinction between “corporate social capital” and “corporate social liability”. 
Organisational social capital comprises both internal and external dimensions as social capital 
resources are derived from both intra- and inter-organisational ties (Arregle et al., 2007; Yli-
Renko, Autio and Tontti, 2002). Akin to Gabbay and Leenders’ (2001) argument, Borgatti and 
Foster (2003) also emphasise the importance of identifying the level of analysis in social capital 
(social network) research for methodological issues. In a similar manner, research by Payne et 
                                                             
7 Leenders and Gabbay refer to social capital as an individual and organisational asset, and introduced the term 
“social capital management” to embrace the processes through which social capital is actively and intentionally 
accumulated for the use of individuals and organisations. The strong emphasis on the separation of social capital 
sources (social structures) and outcomes have led to a growing interest in exploring social capital at meso-level, 
which exists between the micro level of individual social networks and the macro level of regional, national or 
global social networks.  
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al. (2011) identifies four sub-categories8 to analyse social capital studies in relation to their 
level of analysis (individual vs. collective) and to the locus of activity (internal vs. external).  
These sub-categories include (a) social capital of individuals with internal ties, (b) social capital 
of collectives with internal ties, (c) social capital of individuals with external ties, and (d) social 
capital of collectives with external ties (Payne et al., 2011: 494). In their classification, the 
“level of analysis” is based on the micro-macro division whereas the “locus of activity” 
dimension is built on Adler and Kwon’s (2002) notions of internal and external ties, which 
clarify the ties and relationships through which actors acquire social capital resources.  
From this point of view, internal organisational social capital concerns actors who build and 
cultivate social capital through their social relationships with other actors within the 
organisation. On the other hand, external organisational social capital relates to actors who 
develop and harness social capital through their social ties and relations with other actors who 
are embedded in external social structures. Many of the same debates relating to bonding and 
bridging dimensions occur within the area of organisational social capital as individual social 
capital. As emphasised previously, bridging/bonding distinction is important and useful for 
developing a better understanding of how social capital functions in specific contexts.   
Despite distinguishing between internal and external dimensions, in essence, this division may 
be contingent upon the size of an organisation and the context in which it is embedded. For 
example, in the case of multinational firms, the network of relationships between two firms 
operating in different locations can be considered as external social capital since such ties are 
built among different parties and individuals working in culturally different environments. On 
the contrary, such relationships can be referred to as internal social capital since individua ls 
                                                             
8 A similar categorisation of social capital and liability is suggested by Gabbay and Leenders (2001) who label 
the four types of connection based on the level of structures and outcomes: structure at individual level, structure 
at organisational level, social capital (liability) at individual level, and social capital (liability) at organisational 
level.  
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linked to each other through two divisions of a multinational firm must possess shared values, 
goals and global vision as part of being a multinational organisation (Hitt, Lee and Yucel, 
2002).  
As highlighted earlier, this thesis focuses on external organisational social capital since the 
central argument in this thesis is that board directors’ access to external resources and 
information networks can leverage firms’ market value. Despite acknowledging that internal 
organisational social capital may have important implications on firm performance and/or 
value, this thesis focuses only on the external dimension for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
understanding social relationships within boardrooms entails a detailed examination of the 
formal and informal ties among directors. Such an examination would require gaining access 
to boardrooms, which has proven difficult for most researchers (see Leblanc and Schwartz, 
2007). Secondly, this thesis aims to examine the impact of social capital on firm market value 
over a period of 10 years to understand how social capital effects evolve over time. Hence, 
exploring internal relationships among board members during each financial year would 
require a long-term data collection project, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thirdly, 
this thesis concentrates on the social capital as one of the non-physical, non-financial forms of 
capital, which is not included in the financial statements, but is likely to contribute to the firm 
value through its provision of access to resources through virtue of relationships. Therefore, 
the sample for this analysis is specified as the firms listed on FTSE All Share index, which 
disclose information in their annual reports and whose market values are publicly available. 
Based on the size of the sample, measurement and interpretation of internal organisational 
social capital are, to a certain extent, problematic. Furthermore, it is assumed that such internal 
factors are not communicated to investors in capital markets, and therefore are less likely to 
have a direct impact on the market value of firms. Following this rationale, internal dimension 
of organisational social capital is excluded from this study.   
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Board of Directors and Market Value 
Over the last two decades, research on corporate boards, director selection and performance 
has gained significant prominence in a variety of disciplines including management, 
accounting and finance (Withers, Hillman and Cannella, 2012). Policy statements such as the 
Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998) and the Higgs 
Review (2003) have focused on the role and responsibilities of corporate boards and 
highlighted the special contribution that non-executive directors make in developing firms’ 
strategy, managing risks and scrutinizing their performance. 
This research stream broadly focuses on the composition of directors’ demography, human and 
social capital, and explores how these attributes influence outcomes at the individual and 
organisational level (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). Despite being explored from various 
perspectives, literature on corporate boards lacks a strong consensus as to what an optimum 
board should look like (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). To 
extend the understanding of boards’ social attributes, scholars have used the social network 
theory to investigate the link between directors’ social capital and performance at the individua l 
and/or organisational level (e.g. Patel and Terjesen, 2011; Stam, 2010; Tian, Haleblian and 
Rajagopalan, 2011). A network perspective on boards of directors provides researchers with 
valuable insights into the notions of power, trust and legitimacy by revealing the dynamics of 
corporate behaviour and influence both within the organisations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), 
and the sharing of resources and dissemination of information and strategies across the 
organisations (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001).  
Extant empirical research has typically focused on exploring the impact of board attributes 
such as social capital on firm-level outcomes, strategy and operating performance (see 
variously Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Machold et al., 2011; Pugliese et al., 2009; Stevenson 
and Radin, 2009). To date, most research has been conceptual and the link between 
 
 
25 
 
characteristics of corporate boards and market value has received limited attention. Exceptions 
include Haynes and Hillman (2010), Horton, Millo and Serafeim (2012) and Johnson, 
Schnatterly and Hill (2013). The work of Zajac and Westphal (2004) provides a social 
constructionist view of financial market behaviour by maintaining that theories of capital 
markets have been dominated by a financial economics perspective, in which the stock 
market’s reaction is deemed a reliable, historically invariant indicator of the efficiency benefits 
gained (Zajac and Westphal, 2004: 434). More recently, the number of studies adopting a 
sociological perspective on capital markets has been rising, with scholars emphasising the 
significance of how investment behaviour is driven by social dynamics9 (Beunza, Hardie and 
MacKenzie, 2006; Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007; Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012; 
MacKenzie, 2006). Following this research stream, this thesis seeks to contribute to the 
sociology of markets and organisations by exploring the link between organisational social 
capital created and developed through the interlocking directorate ties and firms’ market value.  
Antecedents and Consequences of Organisational Social Capital  
Despite the large number of studies concentrating on the outcomes of social capital (including 
organisational social capital), there are relatively few studies that primarily explore the 
antecedents of social capital (Payne et al., 2011). In a study of the creation of social capital in 
organisations, Bolino, Turnley and Bloodgood (2002: 507) note that, “although organisational 
researchers have acknowledged the role of social capital in the effective functioning of 
organisations, they have paid relatively less attention to how organisations might build social 
capital”. Instead, the majority of the work at the organisational level has focused on inter-
                                                             
9 See Vollmer, Mennicken and Preda (2009) for a review of advances in the emergent field of social studies of 
accounting and finance.   
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organisational networks10 and analysed the formation and evolution of ties among the 
organisations (Borgatti and Foster, 2003).  
Empirical studies in the OSC literature have fundamentally focused on the link between social 
capital as a valuable asset and firm-level outcomes, such as firm performance and competitive 
advantage. Extant research has sought to understand how and why social capital possessed at 
the organisational level contributes to the firm value (Maurer and Ebers, 2006). There are 
various propositions on the positive consequences of organisational social capital. It is argued 
that OSC can enhance firm performance through the development of intellectual capital 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Leana and Van Buren, 1999), the creation of human capital 
(Coleman, 1988), access to resources (Park and Luo, 2001; Florin, Lubatkin and Schulze, 2003; 
Van Wijk, Jansen and Lyles, 2008; Yiu and Lau, 2008), the acquisition and creation of 
knowledge (Yli-Renko, Autio and Tontti, 2002), strategy selection (Acquaah, 2007; Yoo et al., 
2009), increased innovation (Salman and Saives, 2005), employee mobility (Somaya, 
Williamson and Lorinkova, 2008) and entrepreneurial orientation (Stam and Elfring, 2008). 
Organisational social capital developed through individuals’ ties to external parties can also 
yield negative consequences (social liability) for the organisations. This thesis makes another 
contribution to existing literature by considering the negative aspects of social capital that are 
rarely investigated, and also by embracing the idea that organisations may be negatively 
affected by possessing higher levels of social capital. For instance, findings of the research by 
Snyder, Priem and Levitas (2009) demonstrate that illegal innovations such as backdating of 
options are diffused through the interlocking directorates. The example of information 
                                                             
10 Borgatti and Foster (2003: 1000) explain: “... there is much more work on network antecedents than people give 
the field credit for, and the volume is increasing rapidly. The work is not very visible in part because there isn’t a 
single area of research called ‘network change.’ Rather, work on change is embedded in the various substantive 
areas (e.g. Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Madhavan, Koka and Prescott, 1998; Shah, 2000). For example, the 
majority of recent work on inter-organisational networks is about explaining how and why organisations form ties 
and select partners (whether interlocking directorates or alliances or supply chains)”. 
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diffusion recalls the role of bridging social capital in providing access to information about 
new technologies or innovations possessed by external linkages. However, gaining resources 
and information from open and heterogeneous networks does not always result in positive 
outcomes for the organisations. Similarly, Maurer and Ebers (2006) argue that the development 
and value of social capital can evolve over time and that it may turn into a liability. Their 
findings suggest that strong normatively grounded ties to cohesive contacts and network 
closure lead to lower adaptability, and consequently to cognitive lock-in within the 
organisations.  
Furthermore, it is argued that higher levels of social capital may be detrimental to 
organisational success. Lee (2007: 22) maintains that “as the number of direct ties increases, 
network costs may outweigh the benefits derived from network resources”, thus transforming 
social capital into social liability. Extant research has also highlighted that a firm may 
experience deterioration in the quality of its directors’ performance since well-connected 
directors are expected to be involved in other positions on different boards (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Fich and White, 2001; Loderer and Peyer, 2002). For instance, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) argue that firms with busy boards, those in which the majority of outside 
directors are engaged in three or more directorships, are likely to suffer from poor corporate 
governance. As a result of weaker governance, they find that these firms experience lower 
profitability, declines in market-to-book ratios and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance. Another study by Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim (2010) finds that directors serving on 
multiple boards lead to value-destroying acquisitions when the number of outside board seats 
surpasses a certain threshold. The rationale for the decline in value is that multiple directorships 
have an impact on the quality of managerial oversight, and thus lead to agency conflicts in 
acquisition decisions. Hence, the effect of multiple board directorships is moot.  
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Another consequence of organisational social capital with negative implications is that 
information acquired through board networks can be misleading and inaccurate, and therefore 
may lead to declines in shareholder value (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). This is particularly 
significant in knowledge sharing processes. A study by Levin and Cross (2004) highlights the 
importance of the relational and structural characteristics of social capital for effective 
knowledge transfer, and argue that perceived trustworthiness mediates the link between strong 
ties and receipt of useful knowledge. Prior literature has also acknowledged that, in trusting 
relationships, the amount and value of exchanged knowledge is greater in relation to the 
knowledge transfer under uncertainty and conflict (Andrews and Delahaye, 2000; Penley and 
Hawkins, 1985; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Furthermore, trust decreases the costs arising from 
the knowledge transfer by reducing the conflicts and the need to verify the information at the 
individual and organisational levels (Currall and Judge, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 
1998). Hence, trust plays an important role in the efficient use of the information acquired 
through networks.    
2.2.5 Dimensions of Organisational Social Capital  
Despite the abundance of studies examining the concept of social capital and its distinct forms 
and/or dimensions, there are few studies that analyse the dimensions of organisational social 
capital as well as their separate and combined effects on organisational outcomes (Andrews, 
2010). Based on prior research (Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 2000), 
organisational social capital is examined as a multidimensional concept which comprises both 
structural (social networks) and attitudinal (norms) aspects of social capital. While scholars 
such as Leana and Van Buren (1999) focus on the normative aspects11 (reciprocity, collective 
goal orientation and shared trust) of organisational social capital as facilitators of value 
                                                             
11 Leana and Van Buren (1999) note that normative recommendations for developing social capital vary across 
extant approaches to social capital since these approaches adopt different perspectives in defining social capital 
and focus on different levels of analysis. 
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creation, empirical studies such as Pirolo and Presutti (2010) and Yoo et al. (2009) draw 
attention to the structural aspects (network ties and network configuration) of OSC to 
understand their impacts on firm-level outcomes.  
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) framework on dimensions of social capital is adopted by a large 
number of researchers who attempt to examine the concept in different settings (see Andrews, 
2010; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) identify three distinct but 
interrelated dimensions of social capital, namely structural, cognitive and relational 
dimensions. The structural dimension relates to “the pattern of relationships between the 
network actors and can be analysed from the perspective of network ties, network 
configuration, and network stability12” (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005: 152). The cognitive 
dimension concerns the need for a common context and shared language/narratives to create 
and sustain social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The third dimension, the relational 
aspect of social capital, is related to the normative qualities of social relationships between the 
actors and embraces the key aspects such as trust and trustworthiness (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Putnam, 1993), norms and sanctions (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1995), obligations and 
expectations (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Granovetter, 1985), and identity and identification 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Merton, 1968). 
This thesis focuses on the structural dimension of organisational social capital for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, this study aims to understand whether inter-corporate relations developed 
through the interlocking directorates have a significant impact on firm value. Secondly, since 
one of the aims of this thesis is to examine the differences between the market value and book 
value of firms, and the sample identified for this analysis consists of listed firms with large 
                                                             
12 In Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s framework, the third element of structural dimension is identified as “appropriable 
organisation”. Inkpen and Tsang (2005) substitute this element with “network stability” based on the argument 
that network types largely differ in respect of their stability, which they consider as having significant implications 
for firm-level outcomes. 
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market capitalisations, researching the cognitive and relational aspects of social capital in each 
firm could be challenging given their number and size. Thirdly, the structural dimension of 
social capital allows the identification of individuals’ personal and organisational ties, which 
is crucial for quantifying their social capital. Given the aims of this thesis, the following section 
will discuss the structural dimension of organisational social capital and related key concepts.  
Structural Dimension of Organisational Social Capital 
The structural dimension of organisational social capital refers to the sum of network ties, 
network configuration, and network appropriability in a social structure (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998, Bolino, Turnley and Bloodgood, 2002). The structural domain is deemed to 
concern actors’ social networks and their impacts on a range of organisational outcomes (Adler 
and Kwon, 2002; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). Scott (1991:182) highlights “the social 
networks in which enterprises are embedded, and the importance of viewing these networks as 
arenas of power”. In fact, analyses on corporate (inter-organisational) networks date back to 
1980s when scholars started focusing on interlocking directorates to explain inter-corporate 
influence and power, co-optation mechanisms and channels of communication (Fennema and 
Schijf, 1979; Koenig and Gogel, 1981; Mariolis and Jones, 1982; Scott, 1979; Soref, 1979; 
Useem, 1980). 
Despite the lack of an explicit definition in the literature13, corporate networks can be defined 
as the sum of formal and informal linkages between companies at an industry, country or global 
level. Akin to any type of network, network ties and configurations are regarded as central 
elements of corporate networks since they influence the propensity of companies to harness 
social capital benefits or to encounter its negative consequences. In corporate networks 
literature, extant research has focused on the value of director ties as the potential sources of 
                                                             
13 With respect to the issue of defining corporate networks, Beckman (2010: 120) notes: “First, the boundary 
question: what are corporate networks? I use the term synonymously with inter-organisational or inter-firm 
relationships and focus primarily (although not exclusively) on horizontal linkages between firms”.   
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network relations which promote the flow of relevant, better quality and timely information 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002). From this perspective, a director’s network position is identified in 
relation to a desirable pattern of ties, “such as having a sparse ego-network or being located 
along the shortest path between otherwise unconnected actors” (Borgatti and Foster, 2003: 
1004). 
Reflecting the contrast between bonding and bridging, there are two fundamental views 
regarding an actor’s (director’s) position in the network: network closure and structural holes. 
The first view derives from Coleman’s (1988, 1990) closure argument. In the closure argument, 
Coleman’s key assertion is that closed (dense) networks create and enhance social capital.  
Coleman (1990) identifies two primary benefits of a closed network: access to information and 
the observance of norms and sanctions. The first benefit relates to the diffusion of information 
between network actors (individuals, groups or organisations) who are tied to each other 
through various types of social relationships (friendship, partnership, alliance etc.). Coleman 
(1990) argues that information is circulated more rapidly in closed networks and provides better 
communication among network members which can facilitate favourable outcomes such as 
stabilising prices in markets (see Baker, 1984). The second benefit of closed networks, which 
is more accentuated by Coleman (1990), concerns the facilitation of norms and effective 
sanctions. Coleman (1990) maintains that close ties, in which trustworthiness is taken for 
granted, provide assurance for any transactions that occur between actors. Therefore, individua l 
risk embedded in social relations is neutralised by the existence of norms and effective 
sanctions which monitor and guide the behaviour of network actors. In the case of corporate 
actors, trustworthiness and reduced risk arising from the network closure lead to the sharing of 
higher quality information14 across the organisations (Lee, 2007). 
                                                             
14 The quality of information shared between two parties who have a mutual third-party contact is more likely to 
be high. This is emphasised by Granovetter (1992: 44) who refers to the consequence of distorting information as 
“unbearable when (the mutual third party) uncovers the deceit and tells one another”.  
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Despite being one of the most important contributions to the social capital and social network 
theory, Coleman’s notion of network closure has not been the only perspective on the 
importance of strong ties. Almost ten years after his weak-ties hypothesis, Granovetter (1982) 
also focuses on the strength of strong ties and underlines the consequences of strong ties for 
the actors in the network. In his seminal article, Granovetter (1973) conceptualises strong ties 
as social networks that are created through a high degree of emotional closeness and 
reciprocity, and comprise a high degree of redundant information. In his review of research on 
the strength of weak ties hypothesis, Granovetter (1982: 113) argues that “weak ties provide 
people with access to information and resources beyond those available in their own social 
circles; but strong ties have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily 
available”. Following this idea, he suggests that individuals in insecure positions are more 
inclined to develop strong ties to reduce uncertainty and to increase protection. From this 
perspective, Granovetter’s (1982) strong ties are similar to Coleman’s (1990) network closure 
in which the behaviour of network actors is guided and monitored by the existence of norms 
and sanctions. It is important to note that Granovetter’s (1982) strong ties differ from network 
closure in being characterised by frequent interaction as opposed to a pattern of dense, mutually 
interconnected relationships as highlighted by Coleman (1990).  In his later work, Granovetter 
(1992) also expands upon how trust and norms that are cultivated in dense networks enhance 
the functioning of sanctions deriving from structural embeddedness (Burt, 2000).  
Despite focusing on the positive consequences of network closure, it is important to 
acknowledge that network closure also has negative consequences. As emphasised in Coleman 
(1990), strong social norms (e.g. elite norms) cultivated in cohesive groups may impose 
negative externalities such as exclusion of non-members and strong behavioural pressure on 
members of such groups. These negative consequences are also identified by Portes (1998). 
The exclusion of outsiders is highlighted by Portes who states that “the strong ties that bring 
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benefits to members of a group commonly enable it to bar other from access” (Portes, 1998: 
15). Furthermore, Portes (1998) refers to the excess claims on group members as another 
negative consequence of social capital (closure). Portes (1998) states that a network of 
interconnected relationships may give rise to a “gigantic free-riding problem” which emerges 
when less diligent group members demand more on successful members as a result of the 
existing normative structure15.  
Portes (1998) identifies two more negative consequences, namely restriction on individua l 
freedoms and the downward levelling of norms. In closed networks, individuals’ actions and 
receptivity to outside contacts are constrained by strong solidarity, which in turn may have a 
negative impact on the flow of new ideas into the group16. On the other hand, downward 
levelling pressures relate to counter efforts arising from group solidarity to keep members of a 
group in the same situation as their peers. Such pressures emerge as a reaction to “the partial 
breakdown of this last source of sanctioning capacity” (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1344). 
Despite theoretically being discussed at the individual and group level, such negative 
consequences may also arise for organisations maintaining a network of dense ties.  
An alternative and equally important view on an actor’s network position is Burt’s (1992, 
1997a) structural hole argument. In contrary to the network closure argument, which advocates 
the creation of social capital through high density networks embracing high levels of 
reciprocity and mutuality, Burt’s structural holes approach suggests that “social capital is 
created by a network in which people can broker connections between otherwise disconnected 
segments” (Burt, 2001: 31). According to the structural hole theory, network actors (individua ls 
or organisations) derive benefits from being connected to many actors who are themselves 
unconnected to other actors in the network. In other words, actors create and enhance social 
                                                             
15 This is also discussed in Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). 
16 See Gargiulo and Benassi (1999). 
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capital through bridging structural holes in a network, which is known as brokerage (Burt 1992, 
1997a, 2001, 2007). Burt’s idea of structural holes stems from Granovetter’s (1973) earlier 
work on the strength of weak ties. Burt (1992) criticises the weak tie theory and emphasises 
the importance of bridging property of ties rather than their strength (Krackhardt, 1999; Seibert, 
Kraimer and Liden, 2001).  
Burt (1992, 1997a) argues that networks rich in structural holes provide actors with two 
primary benefits, namely information and control. Burt’s conceptualisation of social capital 
benefits comprises two of Adler and Kwon’s (2002) social capital outcomes, which are 
information, influence and solidarity. Burt (1997a) identifies information benefits as access, 
timing and referrals. For instance, a firm bridging a structural hole (connecting firms) is 
deemed to have access to more and unique information since it brokers the flow of information 
between otherwise disconnected firms in the network. Furthermore, firms with brokerage 
positions are considered to have early access to information which can be of great importance 
to identifying and extending valuable opportunities17 (information arbitrage). The last key facet 
of information benefits comprises referrals, which Burt (1997a) refers to as the likelihood of 
being engaged in a variety of opportunities (e.g. promotion, alliance or investment 
opportunities) on account of having a diverse network.  
The second benefit derived from bridging structural holes concerns the control over the 
relationships and resources including information. Based on sociological thoughts developed 
by Simmel (1955) and Merton (1968), Burt (1992) emphasises that actors (individuals or 
organisations) with brokerage positions are the ones who draw control benefits from spanning 
structural holes. Burt (1992: 30-32) draws on Simmel’s (1950) concept of tertius gaudens18 to 
                                                             
17 See Burt (2004) for a detailed discussion of information arbitrage. 
18 Simmel (1950) calls one particular triad type the tertius gaudens, or “the third who enjoys,” based on the inherent 
benefit of a position between two disconnected parties. These two parties, because of their unfamiliarity with each 
other, can be manipulated to the third party’s benefit. Simmel’s use of the tertius gaudens concept therefore refers 
to an active separation of the two parties tied to the third. 
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explain the social activity that occurs around the structural holes. Burt maintains that social 
networks rich in structural holes present opportunities through a tertius gaudens strategy, by 
which an actor positioned between two disconnected parties, can manipulate or exploit those 
parties to the actor’s benefits (Obstfeld, 2005).  
Network actors who bridge structural holes can exert control over their non-redundant ties and 
resources embedded in such ties. Furthermore, brokers (e.g. firms) foster negotiation power 
through their positions in the network, which allows them to acquire more favourable terms 
(Burt, 1992; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Woolcock, 1998). Overall, individuals and 
organisations are deemed to increase their added value through information and control 
benefits, which reinforce each other and accumulate over time (Burt, 2004; Hite and Hesterly, 
2001; Thieme, 2007). 
Social capital developed through the network brokerage may also give rise to negative 
consequences as well as positive. Open networks are likely to suffer from the lack of trust, and 
therefore may be detrimental to firms’ market performance (Shipilov and Li, 2008). In 
networks rich in structural holes, broker’s connections may avoid engaging in resource sharing 
or intense collaboration as a result of having suspicions about the broker’s intentions. Unlike 
closed networks, the opportunistic behaviour of a broker would not be disseminated to all 
mutual third parties and its misbehaviour would not be sanctioned in open networks (Walker, 
Kogut and Shan, 1997). Such social dynamics, particularly in the case of alliances, will have a 
negative influence on the sharing of resources, knowledge and information among Bolino, 
Turnley and Bloodgood (2002: organisations (Gulati, 1995).  
Another negative consequence of network brokerage relates to the costs (time and other 
resources) of bridge building and maintaining structural holes (Burt, 1992). From a brokerage 
perspective, the accumulation of social capital is largely contingent upon the creation and 
maintenance of bridges between otherwise disconnected actors. Consistent with the dynamics 
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of rapidly decaying opportunity structures (Burt, 2002b), brokerage benefits are shown to be 
short-lived and temporary.  
In a study of project teams over a 12-year period, Soda, Usai and Zaheer (2004) observe the 
strongest impact of bridging ties in the present network of connections. However, this impact 
does not persist over time. Similarly, Baum, McEvily and Rowley (2012) demonstrate that 
benefits derived from hybrid network positions are greatest when old closure ties are combined 
with very young or very old bridging ties. Both studies put an emphasis on the age of bridging 
ties as a key indicator of the longevity of brokerage benefits (McEvily, Jaffee and Tortoriello , 
2012). Based on a prior study by Antcliff, Saundry and Stuart (2007), a framework for 
conceptualising inter-organisational networks is provided in Table 2.2.  
- Insert Table 2.2 about here - 
2.2.6 Social Network Theory 
Social capital research is further advanced by social network researchers who have taken the 
lead in measuring social capital created and developed through the social ties. This idea is 
broadly referred to as social network theory, and has been extended by various scholars such 
as Baker (2000), Brass et al. (2004), Burt (2005), Cohen and Prusak (2001), Cross and Parker 
(2004) and Lin (2001). Borgatti and Halgin (2011) define network theory as “the mechanisms 
and processes that interact with network structures to yield certain outcomes to individuals and 
groups” (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4). Social network theorists have contributed to extant 
social capital research through their formalisation and empirical analyses of theories associated 
with the concept of social capital. These theories comprise social resources theory (Lin 1990), 
weak tie theory (Granovetter 1993), and structural holes theory (Burt 1992). Seibert, Kraimer 
and Liden (2001: 221) highlight the importance of not referring to these theories as mutually 
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exclusive, “as competitive model testing implies, but (they) can function together because they 
focus on different points in the process of accumulating social capital”. 
Extensive efforts of social network theorists can be classified into two main categories, namely 
structuralist versus connectionist (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). This classification is based on 
how network studies treat ties and their functions. The first category, the structural approach, 
relates to the work of network theorists whose focus is on the structure (configuration) of ties 
in the ego-network. The structuralist puts emphasis on the pattern of connections rather than 
the content of ties. The most prominent examples of structural approach include Burt (1992) 
and Coleman (1990). On the other hand, the connectionist approach focuses on the resources 
that flow through the social ties, and is often embedded in the literature on social support (e.g. 
Walker, Wasserman and Wellman, 1994) and entrepreneurs (e.g. Baron and Markman, 2003; 
Shane and Stuart, 2002). In the connectionist approach, an actor is deemed successful when 
he/she can draw on the resources (such as information, money, power and material aid) 
controlled by his/her alters (Borgatti and Foster, 2003).  Given that the aim of this thesis is to 
explore the link between external organisational social capital and the market value of firms, a 
structural approach is adopted to measure social capital created and developed through the 
interlocking directorates.  
Social Network Analysis and Board Interlocks 
Extant literature widely recognises that social capital effects flow from information, control 
and solidarity, and that network structures play an important role in determining the extent to 
which such benefits could be acquired (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Social network analysis (SNA) has been the primary tool to empirically test and construe the 
relationships in a social network. In social network analysis, social “ties” are regarded as the 
fundamental data, and each actor is defined in relation to her/his ties in a network. A network 
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is typically defined as “the pattern of ties linking a defined set of persons or social actors” 
(Seibert, Kraimer and Liden, 2001: 220). Actors are referred to as “nodes”, and can be 
individuals, groups or organisations19. The focal actor in network analysis is called the “ego” 
and other actors to whom the ego is tied, are described as “alters” (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982).  
The applications of social network analysis are found in various fields such as inter-personal 
networks (Wellman et al., 2006), inter-corporate networks (Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012), 
political and policy networks (Koger, Masket and Noel, 2009), social movements (Burt and 
Uchiyama, 1989; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990), innovation (Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008; 
Tsai, 2001), and entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Kim, 2007; Jack 2005). Corporate networks in 
the form of interlocking directorships are regarded as one of the earliest and principal areas in 
which social network analysis has been applied to explore the structure of inter-corporate 
relations and its impact on organisational outcomes (Scott, 2011). Sociology and management 
literature comprise various examples of theoretical and empirical research on board interlocks 
(e.g. Dalziel, Gentry and Bowerman, 2011; Hillman, 2005; Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 
2013; Shropshire, 2010; Yue, 2012). 
Early work on interlocking directorships comprise studies exploring resource dependence 
theory and class perspectives in which such ties are referred to as a means of managing 
organisational dependencies (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and of sustaining 
power and control for social elites (Dumhoff, 1967; Palmer, 1983; Pennings, 1980; Useem, 
1979). Both research streams are predominantly motivated by the objective to identify the 
antecedents of board interlocks (Palmer, 1983; Pfeffer, 1972; Zajac, 1988), although some of 
                                                             
19 It is worth distinguishing between Social Network Theory and Actor Network Theory. Originating in studies of 
science, technology and society, actor network theory (also known as the sociology of translation) advocates a 
socio-philosophical approach in which human and material factors are considered together in the same analytical 
view. The theory is advanced by the work of Callon (1986) and Latour (1999, 2005).                            
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this early work examines board interlocks to anticipate similarity in organisational behaviours 
(Mizruchi, 1989).  
Initial studies on board interlocks are followed by a research stream which adopts an 
informational perspective (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). Through this perspective, interlocking 
ties are seen as a way of reducing uncertainties, and sharing information about effective and 
acceptable corporate practices among organisations. This stream of research uses board 
interlocks to explore the adoption of organisational structures (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 
1993), CEO pay premiums (Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein, 2001), joint venture formation 
(Gulati and Westphal, 1999), the diffusion of poison pills (Davis, 1991), corporate acquisition 
behaviour (Haunschild, 1993), and the use of imitation strategies in general (Westphal, Seidel 
and Stewart, 2001). In particular, the benefits of interlocking directorate ties in reducing 
uncertainty are highlighted in studies exploring the importance of board interlocks in dynamic 
and uncertain environments (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997).  
The majority of extant research on board interlocks has focused on financial performance and 
corporate governance outcomes such as director selection, director remuneration and CEO 
succession. Therefore, the link between the external ties of an organisation and its market value 
is relatively underexplored. This is one of the gaps that this thesis aims to address through 
analyses of longitudinal data.  
This section concludes the present discussion of social capital, as the methodology chapter will 
introduce widely used network measures and how they are operationalised in the empirical 
analyses presented in this thesis. The chapter now moves on to the concept of human capital 
and explores the origins of human capital theory and organisational human capital. Following 
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a review of the dimensions of organisational human capital, the chapter concludes with the 
conceptual and empirical contributions to human capital theory. 
2.3 HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
Following a detailed examination of social capital theory, the remainder of this chapter focuses 
on human capital theory and central themes within the concept. Prior literature has maintained 
that human and social capital are two distinct but related forms of capital (Coleman, 1988; 
Schuller, 2001). The link between human and social capital is explored by Coleman (1988) 
who argues that whilst social capital plays a crucial role in the creation of human capital, 
investments that build human capital are fundamentally different. Schuller (2001) also focuses 
on the complementary role of human and social capital, and provides a framework for 
considering the relationships between these two forms. Similarly, Burt (1997a) argues that 
social capital is the contextual complement to human capital because  “while human capital 
refers to individual ability, social capital refers to opportunity” (1997a: 339).  
Therefore, in the absence of social capital, accumulated human capital is insufficient for 
acquiring superior returns. In the case of corporate boards, this thesis argues that a firm’s 
market performance is a function of directors’ skills, abilities and knowledge, as well as 
network advantages they bring to the firm’s board. Hence, this study aims to perform a 
simultaneous examination of the impact of human and social capital (possessed at the board 
level) on the market value of firms. The next section will discuss the origins of human capital 
theory and introduces organisational human capital.  
2.3.1 The Origins of Human Capital Theory 
Human capital theory was formally developed in the 20th century, but the origins of its 
conceptualisation can be traced back to centuries ago (Kiker, 1968). The most eminent 
economists who wrote on the subject of human capital were Adam Smith (1776), John Stuart 
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Mill (1848) and Alfred Marshall (1948). Since then, the human capital debate has gone beyond 
the theoretical arguments and has been assessed by using empirical methods that are 
conventionally applied to the capital machinery. The conceptualisation and development of 
human capital theory are ascribed to the efforts of economists20 since the associated 
investments, economic benefits and growth are deemed to be the fundamentals of economic 
thought (Sweetland, 1996). The initial writings on human capital were produced by economists 
of education such as Becker (1964, 1976), Mincer (1962) and Schultz (1971, 1981) who 
investigated the economic benefits derived from the investments in individuals. This stream of 
literature was primarily based on empirical research which challenged the central proposition 
that economic success is dependent upon the growth of physical capital (Stiles and 
Kulvisaechana, 2003). Becker (1964: 1) argues that physical capital “explains only a relatively 
small part of the growth of income in most countries”. Hence, the pivotal idea of human capital 
theory emerged: that investments in people yield economic benefits for individuals and society.   
Although human capital investments can comprise education, health and nutrition, the primary 
focus has been on the investments in education, which are assumed to contribute to the health 
and nutrition status of individuals as well as their knowledge, skills and abilities (Schultz, 
1963). Studies on human capital distinguish between different types and means of education to 
explore the impact they have on individuals at micro-level, and on the society and economy at 
macro-levels (Becker, 1975; Becker, 1993; Psacharopoulos, 1973; Schultz, 1971).  
Different forms of education include formal education at primary, secondary and higher levels 
(Cohn and Geske, 1990), informal education at home and at work (Schultz, 1981), job-specific 
                                                             
20 Since 1971, five Nobel prizes have been awarded to scholars who were recognised for their contribution in the 
field of human capital theory (Becker, 1993; Wright, 1992). Scholars who received the Nobel merit were Theodore 
W. Schultz and Gary S. Becker, the two most prominent scholars of human capital theory; Milton Friedman and 
Simon Kuznets (1945), who explored the link between investments in education and income; and Robert M. Solow 
(1957), whose work provided a basis for understanding the relevance of education in the aggregate production 
function.  
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training and apprenticeships (Mincer, 1974) and specialised vocational education at secondary 
and higher levels (Corazzini, 1967). Human capital literature provides robust empirical 
evidence supporting the link between education and productivity (Denison, 1962; Denison, 
1967), earnings growth (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1971) and economic growth (Psacharopoulos, 
1973). 
Human capital has also been fundamental in explaining why earnings vary across individua ls 
(e.g. Blundell et al., 1999; Levy and Murnane, 1992; Mincer, 1958; Mincer, 1970). Individuals’ 
higher earnings are justified based on the argument that employees who invest in education 
and training will improve their skills and abilities, and therefore will be more productive than 
those who are less educated or trained. This perspective can also be applied to explore 
organisational-level returns derived from education and training completed by organisational 
members (Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 2006; Blundell et al., 1999; Dimov and Shepherd, 
2005). 
2.3.2 Organisational Human Capital 
Akin to social capital research, studies on human capital have long debated the distinction 
between individual and collective human capital. While the human capital concept 
fundamentally emerged and was developed at the individual level, the concept has also been 
perceived as an attribute of the collective and analysed at a unit-level (team, organisation or 
country) in various disciplines (Wright and McMahan, 2011). The majority of human capital 
research has adopted a micro perspective that focuses on individual differences and individua l-
level outcomes driven by the existence of such differences. Despite having micro-level 
foundations, human capital research has not been confined to individual-level analysis (e.g. 
Coff, 2002; Felin and Hesterly, 2007; Hitt et al., 2001). Rather, drawing from a micro 
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perspective, human capital researchers have attempted to build a multilevel model to analyse 
human capital at various levels (see Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011). 
At the individual level, human capital concerns knowledge, skills, abilities and other 
characteristics of an individual, which provides that individual with positive outcomes (Coff, 
2002). In general, this micro perspective is more dominant in research areas such as human 
resources management (Kuvaas, 2008), organisational behaviour (Muse et al., 2008), industrial 
and organisational psychology (Crook et al., 2011) and strategic human resources management 
(Becker and Huselid, 2010). On the other hand, at collective (organisational) level, human 
capital is defined as “the aggregate accumulation of individual human capital that can be 
combined in a way that creates value for the unit” (Wright and McMahan, 2011: 95). This 
macro perspective has often been adopted in organisational theory and strategy literature in 
which human capital is perceived as a valuable resource that can yield sustained competitive 
advantage and superior performance (Coff, 1997; Coff, 1999; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
Wright, McMahan and McWilliams, 1994; Hatch and Dyer, 2004).  
In contrast to micro-level human capital research, which fundamentally draws from differential 
psychology, macro-level human capital research has been reinforced by economics in which 
human capital is treated as a unit-level resource without in-depth consideration of cognitive 
and non-cognitive variations of individual differences (Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011). One of 
the reasons for following such an approach is the difficulty in acquiring and analysing 
cognition-related data for every unit (organisation or country), particularly when examining 
long-term patterns of association between human capital and the outcomes at the unit level.  
Based on the definition provided by Wright and McMahan (2011), this thesis identifies 
organisational human capital (referred to hereafter as OHC) as the aggregate accumulation of 
directors’ human capital on a firm’s board, which contributes to firm market value through 
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decision-making and monitoring processes. Dimensions of organisational human capital and 
issues relating to its measurement are discussed in the following sections.  
2.3.3 Dimensions of Organisational Human Capital 
General Human Capital 
General human capital refers to an individual’s wide range of knowledge, skills and abilities 
that are acquired through his/her formal education and prior work experience and can be 
applicable to a variety of occupations (Becker, 1975). Human capital scholars have long argued 
that increasing levels of education and experience are expected to enhance performance 
outcomes at both individual and organisational level (Boxman, De Graaf and Flap, 1991; 
Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Gimeno et al., 1997). General human 
capital is often measured by employing a number of proxies such as years of formal education, 
years of work experience (after graduation), years of management and supervisory experience, 
individuals’ age, gender and race (Bates, 1990; Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Cooper, Gimeno-
Gascon and Woo, 1994; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Hitt et al., 2001; Jones, 2001; Pennings, Lee 
and Van Witteloostuijn, 1998; Preisendorfer and Voss, 1990). However, it is worth noting that 
some of these measures have been questioned with respect to their validity in particular 
settings. Controversial debates, particularly those associated with the validity of human capital 
measures, will be revisited in the remainder of this chapter.   
Human capital research often refers to education as one of the fundamental components of the 
concept (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008). Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo (1994: 
376) define education as a source of “knowledge, skills, problem-solving ability, discipline, 
motivation and self-confidence”. In relation to social capital, highly educated individuals are 
also deemed to have invested in valuable social contacts through their education, from which 
they can acquire access to different resources (Arenius and DeClercq, 2005; Shane, 2003).  
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Prior work experience is referred to as the second key component of general human capital.  
Individuals with prior work experience are regarded as having the capability to integrate and 
accumulate new knowledge (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2008; Weick, 1996).  
Previous work experience is believed to provide individuals with a range of business-related 
skills and abilities which may enable them to be more productive (Parker, 2006), obtain access 
to diverse social networks (Kim, Aldrich and Keister, 2006), monitor diverse functions 
(Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994) and solve complex problems (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003). Although prior work experience is referred to as the number of years an individual has 
been in employment, this component has also been associated with individuals’ achievement 
levels. Gimeno et al. (1997) argue that management or supervisory experience and previously 
held full-time jobs can be better indicators for experience components of general human 
capital. Being exposed to different job settings is believed to enhance the extent of an 
individual’s work experience, and subsequently his/her general human capital.  
Human capital research also refers to an individual’s demographic characteristics as 
components of his/her general human capital (Bates, 1990, Gimeno et al., 1997; Preisendorfer 
and Voss, 1990). Age, gender and race are used to operationalise individuals’ general human 
capital in different contexts. Studies examining the link between age and performance 
indicators are inconclusive (Fairchild and Li, 2005; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2010). These 
inconclusive findings are identified as a gap in human capital research and will be addressed 
in this thesis.     
Specific Human Capital 
Specific human capital refers to the other dimension of human capital that concerns “education 
and experience with a scope of application limited to a particular activity or context” (Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005: 6). Specific human capital differs from general human capital in that 
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investments in specific human capital can only yield value in a particular context due to its 
limited applicability (Gimeno et al., 1997). Hence, while knowledge and skills that an 
individual has attained through formal education and prior work experience can be applied to 
a number of occupational alternatives, skills and knowledge acquired through education and 
experience in a specific domain can only be used when the individual performs activities and 
tasks within that domain. As a consequence, specific human capital is deemed to be less mobile 
than general human capital (Becker, 1975). 
Human capital research has explored the role of specific human capital in different contexts. 
In theoretical and empirical literature, this dimension of human capital has been examined as 
industry-specific (Parent, 2000; Sullivan, 2010), firm-specific (Slaughter, Ang and Fong Boh, 
2007), entrepreneurship-specific (Baptista, Karaoz and Mendonca, 2007; Bosma et al., 2004), 
occupation-specific (Groen, 2006; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009), location-specific 
(Krupka, 2009; Winters, 2011), and task-specific human capital (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004; 
Zarutskie, 2010). Use of the terms general and specific human capital can vary across different 
analyses. For instance, Pennings, Lee and Van Witteloostuijn (1998) refer to industry-specific 
human capital as general human capital, and use graduate education in accounting and industry 
tenure to operationalise this dimension in their study. Despite the existence of a number of 
studies employing these terms on a different scale, human capital literature exhibits a high 
degree of consensus on the usage of these terms.  
Specific human capital, akin to general human capital, is typically developed through 
investments in education, training and experience (Becker, 1993). While individua ls’ 
investments in all types of education contribute to their general human capital, only some of 
them enable those individuals to develop specific human capital (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). 
Therefore, education or training in a distinct subject area provides individuals with specific 
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skills, abilities and knowledge which are transferable to a particular industry, firm or 
occupation (Groen, 2006).  
Specific work experience is regarded as a key indicator for specific human capital in all 
contexts (e.g. industry-specific, firm-specific or task specific). Individuals with specific work 
experience are deemed to possess tacit knowledge and a set of valuable skills in a particular 
context. While firm-specific experience (firm tenure) enables partners of a professional service 
firm to cultivate their human capital stocks through the accumulation of tacit knowledge (Hitt 
et al., 2001), industry-specific experience assists non-executive directors in providing high-
quality services rooted in their “tacit knowledge of the opportunities, threats, competitive 
conditions, technology and regulations specific to an industry” (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009: 
986).  
 
2.3.4 Conceptual and Empirical Contributions to Human Capital Theory 
Educational Level 
Investments in education and training play an important role in the accumulation of human 
capital at both individual and organisational level (Becker, 1975). As previously emphasised, 
education provides individuals with knowledge, skills and abilities as well as valuable contacts 
that may enable them to obtain access to unique information and resources (Arenius and 
DeClercq, 2005; Shane, 2003). In management literature, individuals’ educational levels are 
associated with the possession of cognitive skills and abilities (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996; Smith, Collins and Clark, 2005). Individuals with high 
educational attainments are considered as being more capable of acquiring, processing and 
transmitting information and generating more creative ideas for their organisations (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989; Gradstein and Justman, 2000; Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 2010). Extant 
research has also argued that CEOs or executives with higher levels of education are likely to 
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possess greater propensity to receive new ideas and undergo change (Boeker, 1997; Datta and 
Rajagopalan, 1998; Datta, Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2003; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Consistent with theoretical implications on education, empirical studies widely refer to 
individuals’ educational achievements as a proxy for human capital stocks of an organisation. 
While the impact of board human capital on firm performance is relatively under researched 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004), there 
have been extensive empirical investigations examining the links between CEO (Castanias and 
Helfat, 1991, 2001; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) and TMT (Cohen and Dean, 2005; Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005; Le, Kroll, and Walters, 2013) human capital and organisational outcomes.  
Highly educated CEOs or executives are perceived as contributing to organisational legitimacy 
(Cohen and Dean, 2005), organisational innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Thomas, Litschert and Ramaswamy 1991), firm survival (Bruderl, Preisendorfer 
and Ziegler, 1992; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Pennings, 
Lee and Van Witteloostuijn, 1998), firm growth (Norburn and Birley, 1988) and strategic 
change (Datta, Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2003). In human capital literature, the most frequently 
used educational level proxies are years of schooling (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Young and 
Tsai, 2008) and highest educational degree (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
Educational Specialisation 
Human capital research concerns overall education as an indicator of general human capital, 
while education in a particular context is deemed to indicate specific human capital which has 
a peculiar value to a particular firm, industry or activity (Becker, 1975; Gimeno et al., 1997). 
It is acknowledged that education in a particular domain assists individuals in enhancing their 
knowledge base and improving their skills that can directly be applied to work-related actions 
and decisions (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). Prior literature has also referred to specific human 
capital developed through educational specialisation as functional or educational background 
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(Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and functional area knowledge and skills 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  
Functional area knowledge and skills of directors on a firm’s board are identified as 
“knowledge and skills (that) span the traditional domains of business, including accounting, 
finance and marketing, as well as those domains that pertain to the firm’s relationship with its 
environment, such as law” (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 495). From this point of view, 
educational specialisation in the form of holding a business and/or law degree is expected to 
provide board members with relevant knowledge base, skills and functional expertise which 
may enable them to exercise better strategic leadership for their organisations through their 
control and service tasks. On a firm’s board, control tasks relate to a set of duties such as 
monitoring the firm’s activities, assessing firm performance, monitoring the CEO’s actions and 
decisions and other control-related activities (Huse, 2005; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; 
Stiles and Taylor, 2001). On the other hand, a board’s service tasks involve evaluating and 
counselling the firm’s strategic decisions, maintaining and enhancing organisational 
legitimacy, communicating and informing the firm’s external environment, coordinating the 
interests of shareholders, stakeholders and public, and providing support for firm management 
(Daily and Dalton, 1994; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Hung, 1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Professional qualifications are referred to as a further indicator of specific human capital 
developed through educational specialisation. Prior literature has acknowledged that 
individuals holding qualifications from externally recognised and validated professional bodies 
are highly valued, particularly in dynamic and competitive business environments (Storey, 
Watson and Wynarczyk, 1995; Watson et al., 1994). From a specific human capital perspective, 
individuals who have undergone professional training are expected to possess a greater 
knowledge base, advanced skills and capabilities and professional expertise, which are likely 
to enhance their performance in related tasks. 
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In accounting literature, executives with professional qualifications are deemed to improve the 
quality of internal control systems and enhance investors’ confidence in companies’ financial 
reporting (Li, Sun and Ettredge, 2010). There is empirical evidence establishing a positive and 
significant relationship between having qualified directors on a firm’s board and the market 
reaction to “good news” (Cai, Keasey and Short, 2006). It is also argued that share price 
reactions are sensitive to a number of board characteristics, including professional 
qualifications (Yermack, 2006). Although studies on corporate boards have widely emphasised 
the importance of board expertise as one of the key antecedents of effective board performance 
(Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009; Payne, Benson and 
Finegold, 2009; Ruigrok, Peck and Keller, 2006), the relationship between qualified board 
members and performance outcomes still remains a challenging open question and one to 
which this thesis aims to respond.  
Educational Quality 
Human capital theory posits that individuals who have educational backgrounds from high 
status institutions are able to derive additional benefits from having studied at such institutions 
(Becker, 1964). Scholars have long argued that educational credentials have a distinct impact 
on individuals’ earnings (James et al., 1989; Kingston and Smart, 1990; Solomon, 1975; 
Trusheim and Crouse, 1981) and status attainment (Karabel and McClelland, 1987; Tinto, 
1980; Useem and Karabel, 1986) since such credentials reflect stocks of human, social and 
cultural capital (Lee and Brinton, 1996).  
Educational attainment from elite institutions is deemed to contribute to an individual’s human 
capital in three different aspects (Long et al., 1998; Useem and Karabel, 1986). The first aspect 
relates to the quality of an individual’s knowledge base that he/she develops through his/her 
education at a prestigious institution (also referred to as scholastic capital). Individuals who are 
graduates of elite universities are perceived to have acquired higher levels of explicit 
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knowledge (greater knowledge base) in the course of their studies (Palia, 2000, 2001) 
Furthermore, individuals with such educational credentials are regarded as possessing superior 
intellectual capacity to learn and accumulate tacit knowledge (Hitt et al., 2001).  
The second aspect involves elite social networks that an individual develops and maintains 
through his/her personal contacts, who are also members of such elite institutions (Kim, 2005; 
Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009; Yoo and Lee, 2009). Prior research has argued that 
individuals’ elite connections can be seen as an important organisational resource since 
organisations may benefit from such connections in various aspects (D’Aveni, 1990; D’Aveni 
and Kesner, 1993). Consistent with the resource dependence theory, board members with elite 
social ties are deemed to contribute to their organisations by providing access to diverse 
resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory was developed by Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) who argue that “when an organisation appoints an individual to a board, 
it expects the individual will come to support the organisation, will concern himself with its 
problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 
163). From this perspective, educational attainment from elite institutions can be regarded as 
overlapping between forms of human and social capital given that, in addition to accumulating 
higher stocks of human capital, individuals derive further social capital benefits from having 
studied at an elite institution.  
The third aspect concerns how educational attainment from an elite institution is perceived on 
the basis of reputation and prestige (Useem and Karabel, 1986). Based on the earlier works of 
Baltzell (1958), Clement (1977), Domhoff (1967) and Mills (1956), D’Aveni (1989: 587) 
maintains that “association with elite universities creates more credibility and prestige than 
does association with less visible schools”. Studying at a prestigious educational institution 
provides an individual with elite credentials which contribute to the legitimacy of the firm 
where the individual serves as a CEO or board member (Bennett, 2009; Daily and Johnson, 
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1997; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; Selznick, 1957). As Bazerman and Schoorman (1983: 
211) note, “an organisation’s reputation can be affected by who serves on the board of directors 
and to whom the organisation is seen to be linked”. Prior literature has also argued that board 
members’ provision of legitimacy and reputation improves firm performance by signalling 
credibility to potential investors (Certo, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005). Educational attainment 
from distinguished institutions is deemed to confer prestige that enhances individua ls’ 
credibility, and can be of great importance to organisational success through the provision of 
diverse resources.  
Experience 
Human capital theory suggests that post-school investments such as work experience enhance 
individuals’ human capital stocks through the accumulation of cognitive abilities and 
knowledge (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Previous work experience is deemed to provide 
individuals with a range of business-related skills and abilities that enable them to increase 
productive and efficient activity (Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 2001; Parker, 2006), monitor 
diverse functions (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994) and solve complex problems 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Furthermore, prior work experience in a particular context 
provides individuals with access to diverse social networks (Certo, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Kim, Aldrich and Keister, 2006), tacit knowledge required for understanding current 
dynamics in an industry or sector (Arthur, 1994; King and Zeithaml, 2003; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, 2009) and familiarity and internal knowledge that nourish group functioning 
and decision-making (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Westphal and Bednar, 2005). 
Extant research has operationalised prior work experience (broad labour market experience) 
by using a number of indicators. The most frequently used indicator is the number of years of 
prior work experience (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; Colombo, Delmastro and 
Grilli, 2004; Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Evans and Leighton, 1989). Although prior work 
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experience is mostly referred to as the number of years that an individual has been in 
employment, this component is also associated with individuals’ achievement levels. 
Therefore, two further indicators have been proposed to operationalise work experience as an 
indicator of general human capital. These indicators include the number of jobs previously held 
(Addison and Portugal, 2002; Gimeno et al., 1997; Veum, 1995) and the number of years of 
previous managerial or supervisory experience (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Kim, Aldrich and 
Keister, 2006). Similarly, these indicators21 have also been employed in various analyses to 
operationalise specific human capital (Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Kor and Misangyi, 2008; 
Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011).  
Industry-specific Experience 
Previous studies on human capital refer to industry experience as a proxy for specific human 
capital (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; Neal, 1995; Pennings, Lee and Van 
Witteloostuijn, 1998; Zarutskie, 2010). Extant literature comprises several empirical studies 
that present evidence suggesting that individuals with prior experience in a particular industry 
(or sector) decrease the failure rates (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992), contribute to 
firm survival and growth (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994; Siegel, Siegel and 
Macmillan, 1993) and enhance organisational success (Bates, 2005). Industry-specific 
experience is deemed to increase individuals’ human capital since prior work experience in a 
particular industry provides individuals with higher levels of tacit knowledge and a variety of 
skills in both technical and commercial dimensions (Colombo and Grilli, 2005).  
In management literature, it is argued that executives possessing long-term industry experience 
accumulate larger stocks of knowledge concerning competition, opportunities, regulations and 
other conditions within a specific industry (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Kor, 2003; 
                                                             
21 In human capital literature, the number of previously held positions (e.g. managerial or board positions) and the 
number of years of specific work experience (e.g. industry, firm or task-specific) are used as proxies of specific 
human capital.  
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Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009) and tend to have more influence on their firms’ strategy than 
their peers with less experience (Boeker, 1997; Mintzberg, 1983). Directors who have had work 
experience in a particular industry, in which their successive firms operate, are expected to 
have developed a distinct understanding of the industry dynamics and, therefore, of their firms’ 
operations (Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996; Vancil, 1987).  
Human capital literature comprises numerous studies that examine the role of director or CEO 
industry-specific experience in different contexts such as firm’s liability of newness (Kor and 
Misangyi, 2008), firm growth (Kor, 2003; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009), inter-organisationa l 
alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), firms’ internationalization (Barroso, Villegas 
and Perez-Calero, 2011), outcomes of corporate acquisition (Kroll, Walters and Wright, 2008) 
and new CEO selection (Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011). In light of existing research, 
board members with industry-related experience are expected to contribute to firm value by 
providing better advice and counselling on firms’ strategic decisions and conferring social 
capital benefits derived from their industry-related connections. Furthermore, it is argued that 
firms signal strong credibility to the market by having directors with extensive industry-
specific expertise (Certo, 2003; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  
Despite the virtues of industry-specific experience, it is important to acknowledge that directors 
with extensive industry expertise may also be detrimental to firm performance 
(Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong, and Kor, 2013). Shared industry knowledge may lead to 
tunnel vision or reinforcement of industry recipes (Spender, 1989). Directors’ possession of 
similar views on industry conditions may result in groupthink (Janis, 1972), and diminish the 
diversity of ideas and functional task conflict necessary for effective governance 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). From a social capital perspective, extant research highlights 
that intra-industry ties lead to conformity to industry norms whereas inter-industry ties promote 
new ideas and change (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). In particular, older and well-
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performing firms may be more inclined to possess self-satisfaction, inertia, groupthink and 
strategic persistence than change and growth (Janis, 1982; Kisvalfi, 2000). Although analysing 
the impact of directors’ industry expertise may be useful to shed light on the current debate, 
due to the limitations on the availability of data, this thesis does not explore the link between 
directors’ industry-specific experiences and the market value of firms.  
Firm-specific Experience 
According to human capital theory, individuals develop firm-specific human capital 
throughout the period that they work in an organisation. Firm (organisational) tenure is 
regarded as a key indicator for firm-specific human capital, which denotes an individua l’s 
accumulated knowledge of a particular organisation and its operations (Becker, 1975; Hatch 
and Dyer, 2004; Pennings, Lee and Van Witteloostuijn, 1998; Weiss, 1995). Yet research on 
TMTs has investigated the effects of organisational tenure from a group dynamics perspective 
(e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Grimm and Smith, 1991; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Prior research on organisational tenure of TMTs demonstrates 
that the length of director or TMT tenure may affect organisational processes and decisions in 
both positive and negative ways (Goll and Rasheed, 2005). 
With regard to positive effects of organisational tenure, it is argued that organisational 
members (directors) with long tenures accumulate knowledge concerning each other’s skills, 
limitations and idiosyncratic skills (Kor, 2006; Penrose, 1959) and develop internal social 
capital. This in turn enables the development of interpersonal trust, shared norms, language 
and routines which are deemed to improve group-functioning (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999; Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). Furthermore, 
individuals with long tenures are expected to have developed a better grasp of organisational 
procedures and policies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) as well as the organisation’s external 
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environment which is seen as a valuable resource for the implementation of firm’s strategic 
decisions (Bergh, 2001; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993).  
On the other hand, prior research on TMTs suggests that executives with long organisational 
tenures are less likely to make changes to a firm’s strategies and configurations (Gabarro, 1987; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), collect and process new 
information (Miller, 1991), adopt a risk-taker approach (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and 
have a willingness to develop new ideas and directions (Miller, 1993). It is also argued that 
long-tenured executives are associated with the status quo (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), strategic 
inertia (Boeker, 1997) and risk aversion (Herrmann and Datta, 2005). The underlying reason 
stems from the fact that long-tenured executives are more likely to have greater commitment 
to company history, procedure and processes (Katz, 1982; March and March, 1977), to engage 
in previous company strategies (Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson 1993), and to depend 
on routine information sources and past experience (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Miller 
(1991) maintains that CEOs with long organisational tenures tend to become “stale in the 
saddle” since they fail to make crucial organisational changes to adapt to the external 
environment.  
Extant research on TMT demographics has often used tenure heterogeneity rather than the 
tenure length. This thesis does not employ heterogeneity measures as prior studies have widely 
used these measures to explore the link between board diversity and organisational outcomes. 
In extant literature, findings on the impact of directors’ organisational tenures are inconclusive, 
which is identified as a gap in knowledge. This study intends to address these questions and 
inconsistencies through a longitudinal examination of a large dataset and to shed further light 
upon the current debate in human capital research.    
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Age 
Human capital research has employed age as a proxy measure for an individual’s human capital 
since increased age is associated with increased experience and thus, higher stocks of human 
capital (Becker, 1964; Conyon et al., 2001; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992). It is argued that 
an individual’s age is an important factor in decision-making since it affects the entire process 
from beginning to the end (Kirchner, 1958). For instance, Taylor (1975) finds that individua ls 
at an older age spend more time on making decisions, search for more information and are 
more hesitant about their decisions and therefore are keener to review them. In the same 
manner, prior research demonstrates that, as individuals get older, they are more inclined to 
prefer established routines (Carlsson and Karlsson, 1970; Chown, 1960) and less inclined to 
confront the system of formal rules and authority in effect (Child, 1974). 
Consistent with early research on managerial age, upper echelons literature has argued that 
executive age, as well as other characteristics, influences how a firm’s situation is perceived 
and how pertinent decisions are made (e.g. Guthrie and Datta, 1997; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Tihanyi et al., 2000). Studies on TMTs have viewed age as a proxy for director and/or 
CEO experience and also as an indicator for directors’ and/or CEO’s tendency to take risks and 
undergo change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). It has long been argued that younger executives 
have greater propensity for risk-taking than their older counterparts who tend to place more 
importance on their career and financial stability (Child, 1974; Hart and Mellons, 1970). 
Furthermore, older executives are deemed to have greater commitment to the status quo 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Stevens et al., 1978) which leads to reluctance toward any 
organisational change. Hence, managerial youth is associated with corporate change and 
growth (Herrmann and Datta, 2005; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
In addition to propensity for change and risk-taking, executive age has also been linked to 
information gathering and processing capacity. Prior research has maintained that increased 
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managerial age is likely to decrease the amount of physical and mental energy devoted to firm 
decisions (Child, 1974). Older executives are thought to possess fewer abilities to learn new 
ideas and behaviours and integrate information in decision-making (Chown, 1960). On the 
other hand, it is argued that older executives are associated with rationality in decision-making 
(Goll and Rasheed, 2005) since they tend to search for more information and provide a more 
accurate analysis of related information than their younger counterparts (Taylor, 1975). While 
increased managerial age is linked to advanced experience (Anderson et al., 2004; Cornett et 
al., 2003) and rational decision-making (Goll and Rasheed, 2005), prior research demonstrates 
that director age affects firm growth and strategic change in a negative way by limiting firms’ 
capacity to renew and expand (Child, 1974; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992). Since existing literature provides no clear and significant relationship between director 
age and firm value and/or performance, it is a challenging task to assess how firms are 
influenced by directors’ age on their boards but one that the present research aims to clarify.  
Elite Titles  
Prestige, in its most general sense, can be described as having status. D’Aveni (1990: 121) 
defines prestige as “a multidimensional construct that can be established by various status 
characteristics associated with membership in elite social circles”. Elite educational 
connections, top-level positions in business, military or government institutions and 
participation in corporate networks are examples of such characteristics (D’Aveni, 1990). 
Contrary to D’Aveni’s conceptualisation of prestige which is anchored in objective measures 
such as education, experience and social ties, sociology refers to prestige as a subjective 
concept (Certo, 2003). In sociology, empirical research on prestige is built on the basis of a 
firm belief that prestige is a hierarchy of occupational positions (see Wegener, 1992). 
According to the dominant view in sociology, prestige is dependent upon how other individua ls 
perceive occupational and social positions and to what extent such positions are valued. 
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Therefore, there has been a broad stream of research attempting to create prestige scales 
through various surveys to identify individuals’ perceptions of different occupations 
(Goldthorpe and Hope, 1974; Hodge, Treiman and Rossi, 1966; Wegener 1992). In a similar 
manner, a recent study by Kirchmaier and Kollo (2006) maintains that directors’ possession of 
honorary titles such as “Lord, Sir or The Rt. Honourable” and academic titles such as 
“Professor” are public indicators of director competence and prestige.  
Although prior literature is replete with studies examining the importance of boards and non-
executive directors on firm performance, the impact of prestigious directors on firm value has 
been less extensively studied. An existing study on the role of prestige and social networks 
established through prestige is the one by Kirchmaier and Kollo (2006), which examines 
whether prestige and social circles possessed by non-executive directors have a significant 
impact on firm value in the UK context. While they present evidence of value creation by 
prestigious non-executive directors in UK firms with larger boards, they find that prestige has 
no significant impact on value creation in firms with smaller boards. Kirchmaier and Kollo’s 
work (2006) examines the relationship between the firm value and prestige signalled only by 
non-executive directors, whereas all prestigious board members are likely to contribute to firm 
value by enhancing organisational legitimacy, participating in social networks and establishing 
various social ties which may enable them to obtain access to diverse and unique resources. 
Due to the limitations on data availability, this study does not test the relationship between 
directors’ possession of elite titles and firm market value.  
 
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter begins with an examination of social and human capital theories, explores related 
key themes, and provides the theoretical basis of the research conducted and documented in 
this thesis. The main body of the literature review comprises the origins of social capital theory, 
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definitions of social capital, organisational social capital, social network theory and social 
network analysis, the origins of human capital theory, organisational human capital, 
dimensions of organisational human capital, and conceptual and empirical contributions to 
human capital theory. A theoretical framework linking social and human capital, two 
theoretically and empirically established forms of non-physical, non-financial capital, is also 
included in this chapter.  
Following Burt (1997a), this study maintains that social capital is the contextual complement 
to human capital. In the case of corporate boards, this thesis argues that a firm’s market 
performance is a function of its directors’ skills, abilities, and knowledge as well as network 
advantages they bring to the firm’s board. Therefore, this study aims to perform a simultaneous 
examination of the impact of organisational social and human capital, two significant forms of 
non-physical, non-financial forms of capital, on the market value of firms. The following 
chapter will examine the demand for social and human capital in the UK context and provide 
a review of the extant literature.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEMAND FOR SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter focused on the theories of social and human capital and examined the 
origins, dimensions, conceptual and empirical contributions for both concepts. This chapter 
explores the demand for social and human capital with a particular focus on the demand for 
well-connected and skilled (high human capital) directors.  
3.2 THE DEMAND FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL   
Social capital is embedded in social networks. Scholars such as Mobius (2001) and Pollitt 
(2002) have examined the notion of social capital in a supply-demand framework. In this 
framework, individual actors have some demand for social capital. In particular, the actors have 
demand for the services provided (acquired) by (through) social capital such as having access 
to the support in times of need. Actors acquire access to the services by establishing links to 
other members in the network. Hence, the level of supply of social capital is determined by the 
joint investments of all actors in establishing links within the network.  
Shifts in the demand for the services of social capital over time can be observed as a result of 
the changes in actors’ characteristics. Similarly, the opportunity cost of time to invest in social 
capital can increase over time as new opportunities to consume free time evolve and more 
individuals (particularly women) participate in the work force (Mobius, 2001). In their study 
of social capital, Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) find that changes in individua l 
characteristics and the opportunity cost of time affect the equilibrium level of social capital. At 
a community level, Putnam (2000) and Costa and Kahn (2001) also examine the impact of 
demographic trends, shifts in income inequality and changes in the opportunity cost of time, 
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and they find that these factors are the predictors of the demand for and the provision of social 
capital. 
While the value to firms of enhancing their firm’s specific social capital is evident (Pennings 
et al., 1998), it is also argued that firms may benefit from the investments in general social 
capital (Pollitt, 2002). When markets fail and transaction costs are high, social capital can 
contribute to firm performance by providing access to information and reducing the costs of 
contracting and coordination (Schoorman et al., 1981). Failure to recognise and explicit ly 
incorporate the concept of social capital as an input into business operations may limit an 
understanding of how firms use social capital to generate economic benefits. In support of this 
view, Johnson, Suarez and Lundy (2002) find that social capital markets are not perfect and 
firms’ demand for social capital is partly determined by their endowments of social capital.  
Furthermore, their results suggest that firms can benefit from extending their networks and by 
reinforcing their existing ties to other actors in the network.  
3.3 THE DEMAND FOR WELL-CONNECTED DIRECTORS 
Board interlocks are deemed to serve corporations well as they link major boards and directors 
into social networks that form the basis of business communities (Carroll, 2004; Domhoff, 
1975; Useem, 1984). Firms perceive well-connected directors as assets to the corporation as 
largest firms can communicate and disseminate information and best practices through board 
interlocks (Useem 1984). Well-connected directors are seen as opinion leaders who play an 
important role in setting the agenda and exercise influence for change (Scott 1991, Stokman et 
al., 1985; Useem, 1984). Directors acquire power ‘not through direct intervention in the 
discretionary decision-making of corporate boards, but through their ability to set the 
parameters of the corporate environment within which all large enterprises must act’ (Scott 
1991: 188). 
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In extant literature, there are no clear predictions of firms’ demand for well-connected 
directors. As discussed in preceding sections, prior research in organisational sociology, 
economics and finance underlines the potential benefits and costs associated with being well-
networked. Firms can benefit from having a well-connected board in several dimensions. 
Firstly, well-connected directors have access to information on industry trends, market 
conditions and regulatory changes through board interlocks, which will assist them in strategic 
decision-making (Mizruchi, 1990; Mol, 2001). Secondly, board interlocks provide firms with 
benefits of social relationships and reduce information asymmetry when designing contracts 
(Schoorman et al., 1981). Both aspects could help firms improve the terms of their contracts. 
Thirdly, well-connected directors have ties to important and useful contacts that can be 
beneficial sources of useful business relationships (e.g. clients, suppliers) or sources of other 
economic benefits and resource exchange (see Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2008; Nicholson 
et al., 2004). Fourthly, board interlocks can facilitate information diffusion through which 
value-enhancing business innovations and corporate practices, such as corporate financial 
policies (Fracassi, 2016), dividend policy (Bouwman and Xuan, 2010), and private equity deal 
exposure (Stuart and Yim, 2010), can propagate. Fifthly, firms can benefit from boardroom 
networks as a channel of communication and resource exchange with others, which can lead to 
the development of collusive competitive behaviour and generate economic benefits for a set 
of closely linked firms (Pennings, 1980). Finally, consistent with legitimacy theory, firms with 
greater connectedness are likely to have higher visibility and improved investor perceptions of 
firm quality and reputation (Chuluun, Prevost and Puthenpurackal, 2014; Fang and Peress, 
2009; Merton, 1987).  
There are also costs associated with the board interlocks as well as the benefits acquired 
through them. Early studies of director connectivity find that a director’s possession of multiple 
seats (busyness) reduces his/her monitoring effectiveness and shareholder wealth (Core et al., 
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1999; Fich and White, 2003; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). This is 
attributed to limited attention and less time that a well-connected director could devote to 
his/her advising and monitoring duties in each firm. Holding multiple board positions also 
raises questions over the independence of board decisions and several studies link board 
interlocks to the spread of poor corporate practices, such as option backdating (Armstrong and 
Larcker, 2009; Bizjak et al. 2009; Snyder et al., 2009) and accounting irregularities (Chiu, Teoh 
and Tian, 2013). In addition to poor corporate practices, it is argued that board interlocks could 
lead to the transmission of misleading or incorrect information which may result in value-
decreasing strategies and investments (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). Finally, despite affecting 
the shareholder value positively, collusive competitive behaviour can lead to the regulatory, 
litigation and reputation costs that may result in net losses of shareholder value.  
In a study of board status and firm centrality in the US context, Davis and Robbins (2005) find 
that corporate boards’ desire to appoint well-connected directors is dependent upon their need 
for displays of status. Firms particularly seek to recruit well-connected directors when they are 
owned by institutional investors rather than individuals, and when they have been the subject 
of governance-related shareholder proposals. Their results demonstrate that firms are able to 
recruit well-connected directors when they have a history of superior performance, but most 
importantly when they are already central. Overall, their findings indicate that board network 
centrality is self-reproducing: central boards appoint central directors, whereas peripheral 
boards do not (see White, 1981). Consistent with this notion, more recent investigations of overall 
board connectedness provide empirical evidence for higher abnormal stock returns (Larcker, So 
and Wang, 2013) and better financial reporting quality (Omer, Shelley and Tice, 2016), suggesting 
that the costs of multiple directorships are outweighed by the benefits of acquiring information,  
resources or learning from other firms. Furthermore, directors’ external connections are shown 
to have a significant impact on the outcomes of director labour market in the form of director 
 
 
65 
 
appointment (Barnae and Guedj, 2007) and director compensation (Kim, 2013). Based on prior 
research, firms’ demand for well-connected directors is expected to be greater than its supply 
(directors’ investments in establishing links in the network). To date, firms’ demand for well-
connected directors has not been studied empirically in the UK context. This is one of the 
knowledge gaps that will be addressed in this thesis.  
3.4 THE DEMAND FOR HUMAN CAPITAL  
Over the last two decades, it has become more visible that education, knowledge and human 
capital constitute a key element of modern economics at both individual and aggregate levels 
(Zagler and Zanzottera, 2009). Developed economies are focusing more and more on skill-
intensive industries in order to maintain their leading positions in the global economy. In this 
context, information and knowledge are the crucial inputs and outputs of nearly all economic 
processes and subsequently economic growth. It is widely acknowledged that, over time, 
human capital has become more significant as an input due to the knowledge-intensive nature 
of production processes (Bell, 1973; Drucker, 1993; Winter, 1987). Knowledge has in fact 
replaced physical capital as the main driver of economic growth. A large and increasing 
fraction of occupations are related to the processing of information or require the application 
of specialised knowledge and skills to produce increasingly sophisticated goods and services. 
In particular, research and development (referred to hereafter as R&D) activities are 
increasingly skill intensive.  
There is vast literature on the role of education from both a microeconomic and a 
macroeconomic point of view. Microeconomic studies, on the one hand, are mostly concerned 
about the estimation of private returns to investments in education. On the other hand, 
macroeconomic studies typically focus on the link between education and growth. An 
important branch of the microeconomic empirical research, which is also linked to the 
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macroeconomic analyses, explores the impact of technological change on the demand for 
human capital and on the wage differentials between low and high-skilled workers.  
The first argument regarding the demand for human capital posits that highly educated workers 
have a comparative advantage in adjusting to new technologies and developing them. Hence, 
the diffusion of these new technologies leads to an increase in the demand for high human 
capital workers. When there is a case of mismatch between the demand and supply for these 
skills (e.g. the demand is greater than the supply), the Mincerian return to education increases. 
The second argument regarding the link between new technologies and the demand for better 
educated workers posits that firms have greater demand for human capital in the production 
processes as the new technologies substitute labour-intensive tasks and are complementary to 
high human capital workers.  
In their study of the development of new technologies and education, Doms, Dunne and Troske 
(1997) demonstrate that human capital is a requirement for the implementation of new 
technologies. Consistent with this view, Upadhyay (1994) develops a model where the demand 
for new types of human capital increases with technological innovation22. Furthermore, studies 
by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) maintain that the acceleration in 
the pace of technological progress has led to an increase in the demand for human capital. It is 
argued that technological progress and capital accumulation complement mental-intensive 
tasks and substitute for physical-intensive tasks in industrial production (Galor and Weil, 1996, 
1999). Lucas (1993) and Greiner (1999) also note that increases in physical capital must be met 
by increases in human capital to ensure the sustainability of growth in per-capita income.   
Following the empirical evidence establishing a link between the technological progress and 
the increasing demand for high skilled workers, several studies have explored the mechanisms 
                                                             
22 Empirical studies examining the link between technological innovation and skills demand include Berman, 
Bound and Griliches (1994), Chapman and Tan (1992), and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998).  
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that drive this process at the firm level adopting an organisational change perspective (Caroli 
and Van Reenen, 1999; Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske, 1996; Machin and Van Reenen, 
1998). Changes in organisational practices include the decentralisation of authority, the 
delayering of managerial functions and increased multi-tasking. In particular, Caroli and Van 
Raneen (1999), using a panel of British and French plants, find that these changes reduce the 
demand for less skilled (low human capital) workers and lead to greater productivity growth 
(particularly in establishments with higher levels of human capital). 
Over the last two decades, the demand for employees with exceptional talent, training, 
autonomy and management ability is increasing much faster than for employees in low and 
middle-wage occupations (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002). Part of this change in 
labour demand is explained by such wider economic patters as globalisation, sectoral changes 
in employment, and changes in labour market institutions. Krugman and Lawrance (1993) 
argue that these factors seem to be too small to shed light on the breadth and depth of the shift, 
leaving a large residual change. Economists have widely referred to this residual as an indicator 
of a “skill-biased technical change” in the way goods and services are produced in the economy 
(Griliches, 1969; Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum, 1992; Berman, Bound and Griliches, 
1994). Hence, several studies have linked the change in skills demand to the largest and most 
widespread technical change of the current era, information technology (Abowd et al., 2007; 
Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002).  
With the start of the information technology era, the context of work within corporations has 
rapidly changed. As the economy has moved from the industrial age to the age of information, 
there is a growing demand for the possession of new skills. Changes in technology have had 
remarkable effects on the way individuals learn and work by creating new job types and 
eliminating or transforming skills needed for existing jobs. Developments in information 
technology have influenced the accessibility of information and how knowledge is produced 
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and protected. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the global markets, it is crucial that firms 
have skilled (high human capital) directors who are able to foresee the developments in their 
respective industry or sector and provide strategic leadership to the firm with the ultimate 
purpose of creating wealth for their shareholders.  
3.5 THE DEMAND FOR SKILLED DIRECTORS 
Directors are appointed to corporate boards to protect shareholder wealth. In addition to setting 
the corporate strategy, directors have the power to select and dismiss managers if needed. 
Hence, the board of directors can be seen as the primary mechanism for monitoring and 
advising management. It is often argued that board of directors’ effectiveness in monitoring 
depends upon the existence of outstanding directors on the board (Dunn, 1987). 
Conventionally, characteristics such as integrity, competence, and an ability to make collective 
decisions with other members are referred to as essential qualities for board directors (Fairchild 
and Li, 2005). However, recent studies show that determining the requirements for directors’ 
skills and experiences is a more complex task (e.g. Anderson et al., 2011; Johnson, Schnatterly 
and Hill, 2013; Kim and Lim, 2010). 
The provision of human capital is one of the reasons why directors are elected on corporate 
boards. Different firms have different demands for monitoring and advising, subject to the costs 
and benefits of such services (Adams 2003, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Gillan, Hartzell and 
Starks, 2011). From a resource dependence theory (RDT hereafter) perspective, directors must 
provide critical resources to a firm or help the firm secure these resources through their external 
ties in order to advise and counsel the management according to the firm’s environment 
(Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hillman et al. 2000, 2008, 2009). Prior research 
provides empirical evidence that directors’ human capital affects firm behaviour (Dalziel et al., 
2011). Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the market for outside directorships 
provides incentives for outside directors to develop their reputation as good monitors. In other 
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words, managers of high performing firms are more likely to acquire positions as outside 
directors in other boards as they are assumed to have the relevant skills and experience to direct 
and assess managerial behaviour. Fama and Jensen’s view suggests that a board with a more 
reputable outside director, with high stocks of human capital, monitor more effectively than 
other boards as they possess significant reputation capital as well as extensive knowledge and 
experience regarding the firm’s external environment.  
The increasing internationalisation of business has led to a higher demand for directors with 
relevant knowledge and contacts in foreign markets which will help firms establish links in 
different contexts of the countries in which they operate (Carpenter et al., 2001). It is argued 
that more-diversified firms have a higher demand for different expertise on their boards 
(Yermack, 1996). Such firms are expected to have more complex operations which require 
more board effort (Adams, 2003; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009; 
Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). A recent study by Nguyen (2014) maintains that the demand 
for monitoring and advising, in turn, influences the way firms contract with their directors, 
which includes the use of different types of compensation such as stock, stock options and 
meeting fees. The study reveals that different components of director compensation have 
different effects on board monitoring and advising activity.   
Prior research on the impact of regulatory changes in corporate governance demonstrates that 
there has been a substantial increase in the workload of directors and the associated 
reputational23 and litigation risks24 (Linck, Netter and Yang, 2009). In addition, corporate 
scandals such as Enron and Worldcom have led to considerably increased public scrutiny of 
corporate governance over the last decade. Following the corporate governance reforms, time 
demands on corporate boards are growing, with more frequent meetings and greater preparation 
                                                             
23 See Lel and Miller (2015) for a discussion on the market for director reputation around the world.  
24 Both real and perceived risks including concerns about governance transparency and board effectiveness have 
increased in the aftermath of corporate reforms.  
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time (Canavan and Gallo, 2003). Furthermore, there is an increased need for specific expertise 
such as finance and accounting (Krishnan and Lee, 2009; Badolato, Donelson and Ege, 2014) 
and for non-executive directors to serve as board/committee chair (Engel, Hayes and Wang, 
2010). Consequently, over time, corporate boards have become larger, more independent, have 
more committees, meet more often and have more responsibility and risk (Linck, Netter and 
Yang, 2009). Following these changes, it is observed that there is a significant decrease in the 
supply of directors whereas the demand for non-executive directors is greater (Sharma, 2011; 
Linck, Netter and Yang, 2009). In the context of UK corporate boards, to date, the demand for 
skilled (high human capital) directors has not been empirically examined. This is one of the 
gaps this thesis intends to address through various empirical analyses.  
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter explored the demand for social and human capital with a particular focus on well-
connected and skilled board directors. A review of prior literature demonstrates that firms have 
to bear the costs associated with acquiring and/or maintaining higher levels of social capital, 
as well as enjoying the benefits acquired through the board interlocks. Furthermore, in the 
current era of knowledge and technology, extant research provides evidence on the increasing 
need for high-skilled directors, which has led to the increases in their workload, public scrutiny 
and associated reputational and litigation risks. The following chapter presents the literature 
review on intangibles from an accounting perspective and explores the role of financial 
reporting in firm valuation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTANGIBLES IN ACCOUNTING: A REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTING IN FIRM VALUATION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the literature review on social and human capital, this chapter aims to shed light on 
intangibles from an accounting perspective and examines the use of accounting-based valuation 
models for corporate valuation. Despite extensive theoretical and empirical work on social and 
human capital as two significant forms of non-physical, non-financial capital, existing 
accounting systems neither recognise nor prescribe an accounting treatment25 for these forms. 
Following the rise of a knowledge-based economy, non-recognition of intangible assets in the 
financial statements has resulted in a growing difference between the book value and market 
value of firms (El-Tawy and Abdel-Kader, 2013). Accounting information has two important 
roles in market-based economies: valuation role and stewardship role (Beyer et al., 2010). The 
valuation role of accounting information enables shareholders and creditors to assess the return 
potential of investment opportunities whereas the stewardship role of accounting information 
enables capital providers to monitor the use of their capital once committed. Therefore, from a 
valuation perspective, the increasing disparity between the book value and market value of 
firms indicates the inadequacy of accounting information26 in reflecting firms’ current 
economic position and financial performance.   
Among standard setting bodies, the majority of current views27 on the measurement concept is 
based on an idealised view of markets as being complete and in perfectly competitive 
                                                             
25 It is worth noting that there is an exception to this statement. Some listed football clubs do include investments 
in player contracts in their statements of financial position (see Amir and Livne, 2005). 
26 See Beyer et al. (2010) for a discussion on the tension between the valuation and stewardship perspectives.  
27 Contrary to the current view, an informational approach to measurement concerns the existence of incomplete 
and imperfect markets, and advocates the use of different measurement methods to provide the most relevant 
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equilibrium (Whittington, 2010). Under such conditions, every asset and liability has a unique 
market price, and this price is referred to as the ideal measure for accounting purposes. From 
this point of view, the IASB conceptual framework suggests a single ideal measurement 
method which is based on the market price, such as the fair value as defined in IFRS 13.  
However, in reality, markets are neither perfect nor complete, therefore unique market prices 
as ideal measures for accounting are not available for all assets and liabilities28. The existence 
of information asymmetry is a fundamental source of imperfection in markets. Market 
imperfection stems from the fact that market participants are not provided with equal amounts 
of information. Based on an informational approach, the objective of accounting should be 
designed to improve such asymmetry in capital markets (Christensen, 2010; Whittington, 
2010). Applying a single measurement method may not be sufficient in reflecting the current 
market conditions or firms’ financial performance. Hence, it is vital for accounting systems to 
identify and provide the information that will assist users of financial statements in predicting 
future performance of entities. Following an informational approach, this thesis intends to 
explore the role of intangibles in firm valuation, in particular, the value relevance of 
information on board social and human capital.  
The chapter begins with a review of the concept of intangibles in accounting and accounting 
treatment for intangible assets in accordance with the UK Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Following the 
review, the chapter will discuss the market-based accounting research and examine the value-
relevance literature with a particular focus on the Ohlson (1995) Model.  
                                                             
information in assessing the current economic position and financial performance of the entity (Whittington, 
2010).   
28 IFRS 13 establishes a fair value hierarchy that categorises into three levels (para. 76-90) the inputs to valuation 
techniques used to measure fair value. The fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to quoted (unadjusted) 
prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities (Level 1 inputs) and the lowest priority to unobservable 
inputs (Level 3 inputs).  
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4.2 INTANGIBLES IN ACCOUNTING 
4.2.1 The Intangible Dimension of Businesses  
Over the past decade, academics have argued that existing systems of accounting and financial 
reporting29 are insufficient to support business models that are largely driven by innovation 
and intangibles (Davison, 2010; Eckstein, 2004; Lev, 2001; Petty and Guthrie, 2000; Zeghal 
and Maaloul, 2011). The central argument asserts that current accounting and reporting systems 
were designed for a manufacturing-based economy, trade and consumption of physical goods. 
These systems are therefore inadequate for a knowledge-based economy driven by intangible 
experience, technologies and ideas. The accounting problem regarding intangibles emerges 
from the need to provide relevant and faithfully represented information about the intangible 
dimensions of businesses. The dimension comprises innovations and technologies, 
organisational structures and capabilities, control processes, brand names, customer lists and 
databases, and social, professional, and political networks that contribute to a firm’s operations 
at different levels (Blair and Wallman, 2001; Bond and Cummins, 2000; OECD, 2006). The 
OECD (2006: 7) underlines this problem by noting that: 
Although accounting standards can probably be developed further to take 
into account a wider range of intangibles, clear limits are set by the difficulty 
of establishing monetary values (valuation) that are at the same time 
consistent across firms, verifiable and that cannot be easily manipulated. As 
a result, a significant portion of corporate assets go under-reported in the 
financial accounts. The relative lack of accounting recognition of intangibles 
coupled with their growing importance in the value creation process means 
                                                             
29 “An accounting system records transactions and events according to a set of accounting standards in force, and 
produces the base information for a periodic financial report” (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005: 1104). A financial 
reporting system comprises various processes which link an accounting system to financial reports with an 
objective to provide useful information to external stakeholders.  
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that the financial statements have lost some of their value for shareholders. 
If other information does not fill the void, there could be misallocation of 
resources in capital markets. 
The function of financial accounting and reporting is to provide a formal representation that 
reflects a firm’s activities, which are complex and have an unfolding nature in the form of 
reported figures and narrative statements (Biondi and Reberioux, 2012). Since current 
accounting standards provide a narrow framework to deal with intangibles and are often 
inadequate in recognising a wider range of intangibles such as social and human capital, this 
thesis benefits from management literature to explore the concept of intangibles and the extent 
to which they can be included in accounting and financial reporting systems. Hence, next 
section addresses the existing debate over current accounting practices for intangible assets.  
4.2.2 Extant Debate over Current Standards for Intangible Assets 
Intangible assets recognised by accounting standard-setters can be examined under two 
fundamental groups30. The first group comprises a set of activities such as advertising, 
distributing, training, start-up and research and development (R&D) which could lead to the 
creation of intangible assets in firms. There has been a long debate over the issue of the link 
between the scope of investment in activities that can facilitate the creation of intangible assets 
and related accounting practices (Dedman et al., 2009). Accounting treatment for expenditures 
related to intangible-creating activities is the immediate expensing rather than capitalisation, 
which remained the same excluding development costs (see IAS 38.57, Appendix II) after the 
introduction of IAS 38 (Stark, 2008). Following the revision of financial reporting standards 
(FRS), this view still holds.  
                                                             
30 See Appendix II for a review of current accounting standards and practices for intangibles in the UK and global 
context.  
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The revised version of FRS requires the immediate expensing of start-up, training, advertising 
and promotional activities and intangible assets arising from research (FRS 102, Para. 18.8C 
and 18.8E). Only intangible assets arising from development can be recognised if they fulfil 
the relevant criteria for recognition (FRS 102, Para. 18.8H). The UK accounting system does 
not set any requirements on the disclosure of these expenditures (except R&D expenditure 
which is recognised as an expense during the period) while other accounting systems, such as 
the US system, requires a limited amount of disclosure on such activities (SFAS No.142). In 
the UK context, there has been little investigation regarding the accounting treatment of 
expenditures arising as a result of the activities that lead to the creation of intangible assets 
(Stark, 2008). The majority of prior studies focus on the US accounting system and explore the 
value relevance of such expenditures31 (e.g. Aboody and Lev, 1998; Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman, 2001; Chan et al., 2001; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). 
Over the years, a number of concerns relating to these accounting treatments have been raised. 
The first concern is that most of the expenditures in intangible-creating activities are expensed 
even though they result in the creation of economic assets. The second concern involves the 
restricted amount of disclosure required by the accounting standards to provide information on 
these items. Furthermore, it is argued that inappropriate measurement practices regarding these 
activities and limited amount of disclosures lead to a misleading representation of firms32 since 
the benefits of these activities are not fully reflected in the stock prices (Dedman et al., 2009). 
This argument is particularly robust for the accounting standards and practices with respect to 
R&D activities (Akbar and Stark, 2003a; Green, Stark and Thomas, 1996; Stark and Thomas, 
1998). 
                                                             
31 For a review, see Wyatt (2008). 
32 See Dedman et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion on accounting, intangible assets and stock market activity.  
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The second group includes a range of legal rights such as brands, patents, trademarks, secret 
processes, licences, operating rights and copyrights which are legally possessed and used by 
firms to generate future cash flows. The second group is also referred to as accounting 
intangibles and firms are allowed to report accounting intangibles that are purchased in an 
arm’s length transaction at their acquisition values (Basu and Waymire, 2008). However, the 
majority of accounting intangibles are internally developed and firms are not permitted to 
capitalise their internally-generated intangible assets which do not have readily ascertainable 
market values under the UK GAAP. Revised FRS requires the immediate expensing of 
expenditure on internally generated intangible assets such as brands, logos, publishing titles, 
and customer lists (FRS 102, Para. 18.8C). In some accounting systems such as the US system, 
firms can report these intangibles on their balance sheets at historical costs or nominal amounts 
rather than at their market values33. Academics34 have long ascribed conservative accounting 
practices to the expensing of R&D expenditures regulated by SFAS No. 2 (FASB 1975). 
Accounting conservatism in the recognition and disclosure of intangibles has led to several 
calls for accounting standard-setters to re-evaluate how intangibles are recognised and to 
improve existing accounting practices for intangibles (Lev, 2001; Oliveira, Rodrigues and 
Craig, 2010; Wyatt, 2008; Zeghal and Maaloul, 2011).  A review of intangibles demonstrates 
that there are a number of difficulties associated with the concept itself (Biondi and Reberioux, 
2012; Choong, 2008; Kaufmann and Schneider, 2004). These difficulties relate to their 
recognition, measurement, impairment (and amortisation) and disclosure. The major difficulty 
lies in the fact that it is challenging for academics and accounting standard-setting bodies to 
provide a precise definition of intangibles. Existing definitions provided by accounting 
                                                             
33 In the US accounting system, the practice of reporting valuable intangibles at conservative nominal values such 
as $1 can be traced back to General Electric’s balance sheet of 1907 (Ely and Waymire, 1999; Waymire and Basu, 
2008). 
34 See Aboody and Lev (1998), Aboody and Lev (2000) and Lev and Sougiannis (1996). 
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standard-setters are very limited in their scope and therefore fail to account for firms’ 
intangibles, such as social and human capital. The lack of a comprehensive framework for 
recognising and disclosing information on intangibles as well as the increased use of intangible 
assets has led to a decline in the relevance of financial statements for valuation (Zeghal and 
Maaloul, 2011). To date, extant research has not examined the value relevance of information 
on firms’ social and human capital stocks. This research gap is addressed in this thesis.  
4.2.3 Concluding Remarks  
Section 4.2 focuses on intangibles and examines the accounting treatment of intangible assets 
and goodwill in the UK and global contexts. The review reveals that there is a lack of a 
comprehensive framework for defining and categorising intangibles, and major accounting 
issues relate to their recognition, measurement, impairment (and amortisation) and disclosure. 
Following the review of intangibles in accounting, the remainder of the chapter explores the 
literature on equity valuation and market-based accounting research, which provides a useful 
framework for examining the link between the summary accounting figures and the market 
value of firms. In particular, this thesis focuses on the Ohlson (1995) Model which allows the 
inclusion of other information (information on social and human capital) in firm valuation.  
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4.3 EQUITY VALUATION AND MARKET-BASED ACCOUNTING RESEARCH  
4.3.1 A Review of Market-based Accounting Research  
Capital markets-based accounting research (referred to hereafter as MBAR) in financial 
accounting has a history of more than four decades and researchers’ interest continues to 
increase as a consequence of the issues in financial reporting. Market-based accounting 
research examines the relationship between accounting information and key market variables, 
such as the share price of a firm, the rate of return on its shares over a given period or the 
systematic risk of its shares35. The study of Ball and Brown (1968) is the first to investigate the 
relationship between an accounting measure (e.g. earnings or cash flows from operations) and 
stock returns. Ball and Brown (1968) maintain that market participants (investors) have access 
to more timely sources of information about firms’ ability to generate cash flows, and therefore 
assume that financial statements are not the only source of information for market participants. 
Following Ball and Brown’s study, a large number of researchers examine the relative 
informativeness of earnings and cash flows. This research stream broadly investigates the 
changes in stock returns caused by accounting information (earnings announcements), value 
relevant economic events and accounting disclosure. Examples include, but are not limited to, 
Ali and Pope (1995), Ball (1972, 1978), Beaver (1968), Beaver and Dukes (1972), Dechow 
(1994), Grant (1980), McLeay, Kassab and Helan (1997) and Wilson (1987). 
The other stream in MBAR focuses on explaining values (valuation models) rather than 
changes in value (return models). Lev and Ohlson (1982) maintain that accounting researchers 
have exclusively focused on the link between financial statement data and stock returns, and 
ignored the crucial role of accounting figures in asset valuation. Lev and Ohlson (1982: 305) 
emphasise this idea by noting: 
                                                             
35 See Brown and Howieson (1998) and Kothari (2001) for a review of capital markets-based accounting research. 
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... If the relevance of accounting information to investors is at issue, surely 
the extent to which this information accounts for (explains) the values of 
stock, rather than just triggers a change in these values, should be of major 
concern. 
The advantages and disadvantages of return and valuation models are discussed in several 
studies (e.g. Beaver and Landsman, 1983; Gonedes and Dopuch 1974; Kothari and 
Zimmerman, 1995; Lev, 1989; Lev and Ohlson, 1982). For instance, Beaver and Landsman 
(1983) advocate both return and valuation approaches rather than promoting one over the other. 
They maintain that each approach will provide information that is not provided by the other, 
and therefore support the use of both approaches. On the other hand, Kothari and Zimmerman 
(1995) provide empirical evidence supporting the superiority of valuation models over the 
return models in MBAR. Their analysis suggests that the estimated slope coefficient from the 
price model is unbiased. In a similar manner, Lev (1989) argues that the goodness of fit 
obtained through modelling the link between unexpected earnings and stock returns is poor. 
This poor statistical performance may be caused by a number of factors such as poor model 
specification, measurement errors in the earnings and the research design, which ignores the 
impact of firm-specific, industrial and macro-level dynamics. 
Valuation models are increasingly being used to examine different types of relationships to 
explain the variation in stock prices. Ohlson’s work (1995) has been seminal in valuation 
research. Ohlson (1995) expresses firm market value as a linear function of book value and the 
present value of expected abnormal earnings, which is defined as current earnings minus a 
capital charge (equal to the risk-free rate) multiplied by the opening book value. Furthermore, 
Ohlson36 (1995) suggests additional assumptions of linear information dynamics where firm 
                                                             
36 Merits and limitations of the Ohlson (1995) model are discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter 
whereas its methodological foundations are examined in section 6.4 of Chapter Six. 
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value can be re-expressed as a linear function of equity book value, clean surplus earnings and 
dividends. Feltham and Ohlson (1995) expand on the work of Ohlson (1995) and develop a 
model of accounting data and firm market value when data on financial and operating activities 
are available. The valuation models suggested by Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
and Stark (1997) advance the theoretical foundation for re-defining the link between 
accounting figures and firm market value.  
In recent years, a substantial amount of the empirical valuation research uses Ohlson’s 
valuation framework as a theoretical benchmark. A large number of studies examine the value 
relevance of accounting numbers in developed markets through the price model. In these 
studies, firm market value is expressed as a function of the book value and reported earnings 
(or their components). This stream of research provides empirical evidence on the value 
relevance of book values and earnings (e.g. Akbar and Stark, 2003b; Bernard 1995; Bettman 
2007; Bettman, Sault and Welch, 2006; Brief and Zarowin, 1999; Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 
1997; Green, Stark and Thomas, 1996; Hand and Landsman, 2005; Rees 1997). Some of these 
studies also include non-accounting variables such as growth, firm size, industry type, market 
share and risk as control variables in their models.  
In value relevance literature, there are numerous studies that are rooted in a wide range of 
explanations of the standard setting and accounting theories which determine the basis for 
estimating relationships and drawing various conclusions. Despite the existence of some 
studies with no or minimal explanation, the majority of value relevance studies refer to the 
fundamental objective of financial reporting (financial statements and disclosures) as equity 
valuation. Such studies assume that accounting’s role is to provide either measures of equity 
value or measures associated with the equity values, or information relevant for equity 
valuation. These assumptions are deemed to derive from both the descriptions of accounting 
practice as part of an accounting theory, and the descriptions of the objective pursued by 
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accounting standard setters as part of a standard-setting theory. It is worth noting that value 
relevance research that contributes to the improvement of accounting standards fundamentally 
stems from inputs-to-equity valuation theory since, under this theory, research focuses on 
accounting numbers relating to particular assets, liabilities or components of earnings (Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman, 2001). Hence, despite using prices as a benchmark for equity value, 
studies vary in the assumptions made and the models specified.  
4.3.2 Valuation Models in Market-based Accounting Research 
Valuation models employed in market-based accounting research literature comprise the 
dividend-discounting model (DDM) and its transformations such as the earnings 
(capitalisation) model and the residual income model. The balance sheet model, which equates 
the market value of equity to the market value of assets minus the market value of liabilit ies, 
is also widely used among incremental association studies in the literature (Barth, 1991, 1994; 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1992; Barth and Landsman, 1995). This approach is contingent 
upon the implicit assumption that a firm’s assets and liabilities are separable and that book 
values of these assets and liabilities convey information about their market values (Kothari, 
2001). The balance sheet model holds only if there is a relevant market for each asset, liability 
and stock, and there is no expectation of above-competitive returns (all markets are 
competitive) to the firm (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Furthermore, the balance sheet model 
is generally extended to comprise earnings as an added variable and therefore is converted into 
an empirically similar model to other dividend-discounting models.  
The development of the dividend-discounting model is ascribed to Williams (1938). The model 
describes share price as the present value of expected future dividends discounted at their risk-
adjusted expected rate of return. Stock price is calculated based on the forecasts of future 
dividends and the discount rates for future periods. A number of assumptions about the 
dividend process and discount rates were made by Gordon (1962) to develop a simple valuation 
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formula, known as the Gordon Growth Model. These assumptions particularly concern the 
discount (r) and growth (g) rates. The dividend-discounting model has been reformulated based 
on the attribute that future dividends can be rewritten as a function of forecasted values of 
future earnings and future investments. The work of Fama and Miller (1972) provide a 
complete explanation of how the dividend-discounting model is transformed into an earnings 
capitalisation model. They analyse the key drivers of share prices and highlight the important 
features of equity valuation. 
In accounting literature, earnings capitalisation models are predominantly used in studies on 
the earnings response coefficient (see Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980; Beaver, Lambert and 
Ryan 1987). In earnings response coefficient applications of earnings capitalisation models, 
forecasted earnings are either derived from time-series properties of earnings (e.g. Beaver, 
Lambert and Morse, 1980; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989) or analysts’ 
forecasts (e.g. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999). The reinvestment effect on earnings is 
explained by the assumption that future investments do not yield above-normal rates of returns, 
which corresponds to anticipating a 100% dividend-payout ratio (e.g. Kothari, 1992; Kothari 
and Zimmerman, 1995). In the earnings response coefficient literature, the marginal effect of 
growth opportunities is captured through proxy measures such as the market-to-book ratio or 
analysts’ high forecasted earnings growth (e.g. Barth, Elliott and Finn, 1999; Charitou, Clubb 
and Andreou, 2001; Collins and Kothari, 1989). 
4.3.3 The Residual Income Valuation Models  
Residual income valuation is defined as “the method of estimating firm value based on 
expected future accounting numbers” (Myers, 1999: 1).The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) residual income valuation models (referred to hereafter as RIVM) have been 
widely used and discussed in accounting literature (e.g. Ali, Hwang and Trombley, 2003; 
Beaver, 1999; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999; Jiang and Lee, 2005; Lo and Lys, 2000; 
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Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Myers, 1999; Richardson and Tinaikar, 2004). The residual 
income valuation model derives from a dividend-discounting model and expresses equity 
market value as the sum of current book value and the discounted present value of expected 
abnormal earnings. It is emphasised by Ohlson (1995) and other researchers (e.g. Bernard, 
1995; Biddle, Bowen and Wallace, 1997) that residual income valuation has a long history that 
can be traced back to the 18th century37. Nevertheless, Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995) have the undeniable merit of successfully evoking the concept of residual income 
valuation and advocating the concept to the extent that it has had a major influence on empirical 
accounting research.  
The applications of residual income valuation model include studies employing forecasted 
numbers (e.g. Abarbanell and Bernard, 2000; Aboody, Hughes and Liu, 2002; Baginski and 
Wahlen, 2003; Bernard, 1995; Frankel and Lee, 1998; Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001; 
Liu, Nissim and Thomas, 2002) and studies employing historical numbers for equity valuation 
(e.g. Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999). Such studies typically 
focus on whether book value of equities and earnings could explain differences in market value 
of equities across different firms and periods. The forecasted model estimates the stock price 
based on book value and residual income whereas the historical model estimates the stock price 
based on book value and actual historical earnings.  
The Ohlson (1995) model postulates a time-series structure on the abnormal earnings process 
that has an impact on value. The linear information dynamics in the Ohlson model determines 
an autoregressive, time-series decay in the current period’s abnormal earnings and incorporates 
‘‘information other than abnormal earnings’’ into the valuation model (Ohlson, 1995: 668). 
The autoregressive process in abnormal earnings captures the notion that the persistence of 
                                                             
37 Previous research on the concept of residual income valuation comprises the works of Edwards and Bell (1961), 
Hamilton (1777), Marshall (1890), Peasnell (1981, 1982), Preinreich (1938) and Stewart (1991). 
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monopoly rents must affect residual income (Myers, 1999). In other words, competition will 
eventually compel returns toward the cost of capital and subsequently, firms experiencing 
below-normal rates of returns will exit. The other information variable advocates the idea that 
transaction-based, historical-cost earnings (accounting conservatism) fails to reflect the 
information implicit in market value of a firm’s equity (Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980). 
The Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model is developed on the same foundations as the Ohlson 
(1995) model excluding the autoregressive time-series process. The Feltham-Ohlson RIVM is 
akin to the dividend-discounting model in that firm value is expressed as a function of current 
and forecasted accounting numbers in preference to forecasted dividends or net cash flows. 
The model assumes that forecasted abnormal earnings reflect the existence of other information 
and can follow any process. Based on this property, analysts’ forecasts can be used in the 
applications of the Feltham-Ohlson model. The use of analysts’ forecasts is seen as an 
appealing feature of the model compared to the dividend-discounting model (see Lee, 1999). 
Another appealing feature of residual income valuation models, as emphasised in the literature, 
is that the model’s implementation is not affected by the management’s choice of accounting 
method (Bernard, 1995). However, this feature results in a number of consequences, which 
have been the subject of much debate among accounting researchers38. 
4.3.4 The Ohlson (1995) Model 
The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) papers have received notable wide 
acceptance in accounting research. Various accounting researchers such as Bernard (1995), 
Lundholm (1995) and Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) emphasise the significance of these 
models for accounting, in particular, valuation research. For instance, Bernard (1995: 733) 
underlines their significance by noting:  
                                                             
38 For a detailed review, see Kothari (2001). 
 
 
85 
 
The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) studies stand among the 
most important developments in capital markets research in the last several 
years. The studies provide a foundation for redefining the appropriate 
objective of research on the relation between financial statement data and 
firm value. 
In Ohlson (1995) model, firm value is expressed as a linear function of the book value of equity 
and the present value of expected future abnormal earnings. The model makes the assumption 
that the capital markets are perfect although imperfect product markets are permitted for a finite 
number of periods. The assumption of linear information dynamics allows the firm value to be 
represented as a linear function of equity book value, net income, dividends, and other 
information (v term). In his paper, Ohlson (1995) demonstrates that limiting assumptions 
relating to the persistence of abnormal earnings leads to two extreme cases: balance sheet-
based and earnings-based valuation models. The Ohlson model facilitates equity valuation that 
is based on current accounting data (earnings and equity book value) rather than permanent 
earnings or the value of assets and liabilities. Therefore, the model can be applied regardless 
of an informational link between accounting numbers and economic measures such as the 
permanent earnings. 
Ohlson’s (1995) equity valuation model has found a large-scale implementation since it 
parameterises the links between firms’ book values, earnings, net dividends and other 
information and equity market values. The model combines the dividend discount model with 
clean surplus accounting and linear information dynamics and assumes that there is market 
information symmetry and market efficiency (Ohlson, 1995, 2001). Akin to other models, the 
Ohlson model is built upon simplifying assumptions that allow prudent representations of the 
complex reality (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001). Advocating this idea, the model assumes 
clean surplus accounting (change in book value of equity is equal to earnings less dividends 
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plus or minus capital transactions). Although the model is criticised for not specifying an 
optimal accounting system, this criticism is not seen as a weakness which prevents its use in 
assessing the value relevance of accounting numbers (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
The Ohlson model is widely used as the valuation method in numerous studies that examine 
the value relevance of accounting information in different contexts. These studies mostly argue 
that the inclusion of both earnings and book value in the valuation model results in more 
explanatory power than the inclusion of either accounting number alone although the results 
vary depending on the prevailing accounting systems39. Nevertheless, in majority of the 
studies, there is an important part of the variance that needs to be examined. From a value 
relevance perspective, researchers incorporate different variables into the Ohlson model as the 
“other information variable” which represents information on value-relevant events. This 
stream of research, therefore, promotes further investigation into determining variables other 
than accounting earnings and equity book value that can yield better estimates of firm value.  
This research focuses on the Ohlson (1995) model for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Ohlson 
model allows firm market value to be represented as a linear function of equity book value, net 
income, dividends, and other information (v term). In other words, current accounting 
information can be used to estimate equity market value regardless of a logical relationship 
between summary accounting numbers and economic measures such as permanent earnings40. 
Secondly, the other information variable (v term) is an appealing feature for incorporating non-
physical, non-financial forms of capital (assets) into the model and testing their significance in 
firm valuation. Through the use of other information variable, these forms, which are not 
reflected in financial statements, can be taken into consideration and examined to explore 
whether they provide relevant information for firm value41. As emphasised previously, the 
                                                             
39 See Pirie and Smith (2005) for a detailed review. 
40 See Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) for a study of earnings, adaptation and equity value.  
41 In the Ohlson model, the impact of such assets on firm value may be under or overestimated.  
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other information variable advocates the idea that transaction-based, historical-cost earnings 
(accounting conservatism) fails to reflect the information embedded in equity market value. 
Thirdly, the clean surplus framework presented in the Ohlson model provides a rational 
framework for integrating traditional concepts of income measurement into neo-classical 
economics based approach to financial reporting. This implies that, despite referring to 
accounting income as a feasible proxy for economic income, the model also concerns the 
development of capital asset pricing in the economic theory. Hence, it yields a model of 
financial reporting embracing several insights from information economics and positive 
accounting theory.  
4.3.5 Criticisms of the Ohlson (1995) Model  
Despite having gained huge popularity in accounting research, residual income valuation 
models and the Ohlson (1995) model in particular, have been criticised for a number of 
limitations they impose. Criticisms toward Ohlson model include, but are not limited to, issues 
around the model’s valuation anchors, other information variable (v term), dirty surplus 
accounting opposed to clean surplus accounting and empirical implementations of the model.  
The first criticism concerns the model’s formal linkage between current accounting information 
and firm value. Although this characteristic is perceived as a merit of the Ohlson Model, some 
researchers argue that the major function of equity valuation is forecasting, therefore, historical 
accounting numbers may not be sufficient for forecasting the stream of expected returns42. 
From this perspective, the fundamental analysis is considered more useful since it requires the 
use of broader information set to make better forecasts. In other words, reported financial 
statement numbers can be of more importance for equity valuation if they are used in 
association with other information. Firm valuation entails combining information derived from 
                                                             
42 See Lee (1999). 
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a number of disciplines such as accounting, finance, economics, marketing, and corporate 
strategy (Lee, 1999). Advocating this argument, Verrecchia (1998: 113) criticises a derivation 
of the RIVM by noting: “a very simple idea...an idea, however, with no economic context”. 
Despite potential benefits of communicating firm value in terms of cash flows and non-cash 
information, Verrecchia (1998) challenges the Ohlson model as to how knowledge of the cash 
and non-cash information is acquired.  
The second criticism relates to the “other information variable” as presented in the model. The 
term v denotes the information that relates to all value-relevant events that have not yet been 
reflected in financial statements. Despite being well acknowledged, empirical applications of 
the Ohlson model grasp the crucial role of other information variable in firm valuation. Early 
applications of the Ohlson model typically set the v term to zero since the variable is interpreted 
as unspecified (Hand and Landsman, 1998). In his critique of empirical applications of RIVM; 
Ohlson (1998) demonstrates that, when “v term” is omitted from the model, market value of 
firm equity can be expressed as a linear function of equity book value, current net income, net 
dividends and one period-ahead forecasted net income43.  
It is emphasised that not restricting v term to be zero (in other words, omitting v term) reverses 
the signs of the coefficients on current net income, dividends and net capital outflows. 
Therefore, omitting the “v term” from an empirical refinement of the Ohlson model is likely to 
result in highly misspecified conclusions on the coefficients of current net income and net 
dividends. In particular, Hand and Landsman’s (1998) analysis of two assumptions about the 
v term observes three major anomalies44 which lead them to argue that the impact of 
                                                             
43 Ohlson (1998), Appendix I.  
44 These anomalies include: 1) if v term is assumed to be zero, the mean coefficient estimate on dividends is found 
to be reliably positive when it is predicted to be negative, 2) the mean coefficient estimates on current period net 
income and net capital stock outflows are found to be positive and negative when they are predicted to be negative 
and positive respectively, and 3) current dividends are positively related to future abnormal earnings when they 
should be unrelated (Hand and Landsman, 1998: 4).  
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information other than summary accounting numbers reported in financial statements may be 
more limited in determining prices. Thus, their findings evoke the question of whether the 
current accounting system reflects the economic information hidden in equity market values in 
a timelier way than it is generally perceived.   
The third criticism revolves around the “clean surplus accounting” assumption of the Ohlson 
model. It is worth noting that clean surplus relation (referred to hereafter as CSR) comprises 
only operating and financial items of the income statement whereas dirty surplus relation 
includes extraordinary items to operating and financial activities. While the Ohlson model 
assumes a clean surplus relation; in practice, the clean surplus relation can be violated.  
Johnson, Reither and Swieringa (1995) and Frankel and Lee (1999) provide reviews on dirty 
surplus items in the US GAAP whereas the work of O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) and Lo and 
Lys (2000) explore UK accounting regulations on dirty surplus accounting. As a consequence 
of this violation, reported net income may be “dirty”, which may result in the possibility of 
omitted variable bias in the model (Hand and Landsman, 1998). The work of Lo and Lys (2000) 
provides insights into how allowing for dirty surplus affects the Ohlson model. They conclude 
that the explanatory power of regression (R2) and the coefficients of the included variables will 
be biased by the use of dirty surplus earnings; and therefore the model will be rejected. 
Concerns relating to dirty surplus accounting practices are discussed by a number of 
researchers who argue that such practices may lead to measurement errors in accounting-based 
valuation models (Isidro, O’Hanlon and Young, 2004, 2006; Linsmeier et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, it is argued that cross-regime differences in dirty surplus accounting may yield 
cross-country differences in the implementation of such models (Frankel and Lee, 1999). Such 
concerns are taken into consideration by standard-setters who endeavour to eliminate dirty 
surplus flows or require a more transparent reporting of dirty surplus flows in statements of 
comprehensive income. Contrary to this view, O’Hanlon and Pope (1996, 1999) maintain that 
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dirty surplus accounting practices produce more value-relevant income numbers by eliminating 
value-irrelevant flows from reported earnings, therefore yield more useful information for 
equity valuation purposes. Nevertheless, there is no strong evidence on the value relevance of 
dirty surplus accounting flows in accounting literature (Lin, 2006).This thesis assumes a clean 
surplus relation in its extension of the Ohlson Model (1995). 
The last criticism relates to empirical implementations of the Ohlson model. Akin to all linear 
valuation models, the Ohlson model is based on Miller-Modigliani (MM) assumptions. These 
assumptions are criticised for their challenging nature in the reality of corporate taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, debt tax-shield substitutes, asymmetric information and signalling (Callen 
and Morel, 2001). Recalling Verrecchia’s (1998) comment on the simplicity of the RIVM, none 
of the linear valuation models is expected to provide meaningful estimates since they do not 
account for all possible factors, which may likely to have an impact on market value of firms.  
Similarly, the assumption on the linear information dynamics (referred to hereafter as LID) has 
been questioned. The model assumes unbiased accounting, which implies that abnormal 
earnings typically equate to zero. Under the condition that accounting systems are biased (e.g. 
systems are conservative), average abnormal earnings are expected to be non-zero (i.e. 
positive). In this case, future growth in equity book value needs to be taken into account as an 
additional component. This problem is resolved by Feltham and Ohlson (1995, 1996) who 
make adjustments to the original LID assumptions through which information on future 
abnormal earnings is reflected in current book value of equity. The LID assumptions are tested 
by several studies in empirical accounting literature. Examples include Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan (1999), Hand and Landsman (1998), and Myers (1999) which provide insights into the 
empirical applications of linear information dynamics. However, it is argued that, despite being 
derived from economic concepts such as the dividend irrelevance, LID assumptions are only 
 
 
91 
 
two of many other methods that allow historical accounting numbers to convey information on 
future forecasts (Lee, 1999). 
Despite its criticisms, the Ohlson (1995) model provides a sound theoretical framework and is 
used to examine the value relevance of information on firms’ non-physical, non-financial 
capital, namely social and human capital, in this thesis. In particular, Ohlson’s argument on the 
crucial role of other information beyond equity book value and current earnings lends itself 
well to a powerful motivation for this analysis since board social and human capital are not yet 
in financial statements, and can be used as a proxy for other information in the model. This 
thesis maintains that, in today’s knowledge and information-based economy, social and human 
capital measures may successfully capture the information, which is fully reflected in market 
prices, but are not yet disclosed in financial statements. Therefore, social and human capital 
possessed at board level are expected to influence market prices through firms’ future earnings 
and therefore, have significant explanatory power for market value of firms.  
4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter outlines the accounting regulations and practices for intangibles based on the UK 
GAAP and IFRS. Firstly, the chapter examines the role of intangibles following the rise of a 
knowledge-based economy over the last three decades. Secondly, it goes on to revise current 
accounting standards and practices in accordance with UK GAAP and IFRS. Thirdly, the 
chapter reviews the market-based accounting research and focuses on the Ohlson (1995) model 
as an appropriate model to examine the role of information on social and human capital in firm 
valuation. Finally, criticisms of the Ohlson model are discussed. The following chapter focuses 
on hypotheses development and presents a number of hypotheses based on extant research on 
the directorships in executive labour market and the demand for social and human capital, and 
on the impact of social and human capital on the market value of firms.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
5. 1 INTRODUCTION 
Preceding chapters (Chapters Two and Three) discussed the concept of social and human 
capital, the characteristics of the executive labour market and the demand for social and human 
capital in the UK context. A review of the existing literature demonstrates that scholars in 
various disciplines continue to explore how firms extract economic benefits from their human 
capital resources (Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011) and the relational 
networks in which they are embedded (Borgatti and Li, 2009; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and 
Labianca, 2009). Exploring the economic advantages of social and human capital 
simultaneously, despite being not new, has so far followed an individual perspective (e.g. 
Felicio et al., 2002; Olroyd and Morris 2012; Seibert, Kraimer, and Liden, 2001). Current 
research calls for the need to focus on the interaction between social capital and human capital 
and responding to the question of who captures the value created by these forms (Nyberg and 
Wright, 2015).  
The accessibility of information and the production and protection of knowledge have been 
significantly influenced by the developments in information technology. As global markets 
evolve, the need for the skilled (high human capital) directors who are able to foresee the 
developments in their respective industry/sector and provide strategic leadership to the firm 
has increased for firms whose ultimate purpose is creating wealth for their shareholders. Hence, 
director human and social capital are seen as important elements that contribute to firm 
performance through the provision of extensive experience and knowledge as well as the access 
to information and reduced costs of contracting and coordination (Schoorman et al., 1981).  
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In this chapter, a number of hypotheses will be developed based on extant research on the 
directorships in executive labour market and the demand for social and human capital, and on 
the impact of social and human capital on firms’ market value. Firstly, hypotheses on the 
demand for social and human capital at the individual level will be presented. Secondly, the 
chapter presents the hypotheses on the demand for social and human capital at the firm level.  
Thirdly, hypotheses relating to the association between board social and human capital and 
firm market value are developed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the 
hypotheses on the demand for social and human capital and on the relationship between social 
and human capital and the market value of firms.   
5.2 THE DEMAND FOR SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL AT INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL  
The market for corporate directors has long been referred to as an important labour market for 
executives (Davis, 1993). When there is a vacancy on the board, firms enter this labour market 
in search of a director who fulfils the requirements for relevant skills and experience.  To 
appoint a director, the firm may look for executives of the focal firm, current or retired 
executives from other listed firms, community leaders such as politicians and academics, or 
individuals with specialised expertise (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). The firm’s 
decision largely depends on the negotiations between the CEO and the board (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1988, 1998). Consequently, negotiation process leads to a bifurcated market “in 
which both active and passive board members can thrive in a labour market for directors that 
is segmented by orientation toward management” (Westphal & Zajac, 1995: 509). 
Research on the executive labour market acknowledges a number of benefits that motivate 
directors (individuals) to serve on boards (Withers, Hillman and Cannella, 2012). Early 
research on directors’ motivations reveals that individuals accepted board appointments 
because they were keen to learn and gain contacts (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1986). In 
 
 
94 
 
a broader context, early research also posits that individuals are motivated by economic 
incentives, prestige, and career objectives when making decisions to join boards (Mace, 1986; 
Zajac, 1988). Similarly, acquisition of power and influence inherent in board roles are other 
factors affecting corporate elite’s decision of accepting a board appointment (Davis, Yoo and 
Baker, 2003; Useem, 1979). Furthermore, directors benefit from their elite ties in the form of 
future board and executive appointments (Useem, 1984) as well as informational benefits 
arising from their experience on board service (Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild and Beckman, 
1998). Board service is visibly important to corporate directors as they often put significant 
effort to acquire board seats (Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007). Based on extant research, it can 
be concluded that directors serve on corporate boards for a variety of reasons (Boivie et al. 
2015). Given that board service is important to corporate directors, one would expect a director 
with high levels of human and social capital to be appointed (or have been appointed) to more 
corporate boards. The following associations are hypothesised to test for the demand for social 
and human capital at the individual level. All hypotheses presented in this chapter are stated in 
the alternate form. Two-tailed tests will be used to determine the significance of findings. 
Hence: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between director social and human capital and 
the number of current board seats held.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between director social and human capital and 
the number of past board seats held.  
5.3 THE DEMAND FOR SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL AT FIRM LEVEL  
The provision of social and human capital is referred to as one of the determinants of director 
selection (Withers, Hillman and Cannella, 2012). Potential directors bring their expertise, 
skills, experience, and relationships to the boards which reflect their human and social capital.  
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Different firms have different demands for monitoring and advising, subject to the costs and 
benefits of such services (Adams 2003, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Gillan, Hartzell and Starks, 
2011). From a resource dependence theory perspective, directors must provide critical 
resources to a firm or help the firm secure these resources through their external ties in order 
to advise and counsel the management according to the firm’s environment (Pfeffer, 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hillman et al. 2000, 2008, 2009). Prior research also provides 
empirical evidence that directors’ human capital affects firm behaviour (Dalziel et al., 2011).  
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the market for outside directorships 
provide incentives for outside directors to develop their reputation as good monitors. In other 
words, managers of high performing firms are more likely to acquire positions as outside 
directors in other boards as they are assumed to have the relevant skills and experience to direct 
and assess managerial behaviour. Fama and Jensen’s view advocates that that a board with a 
more reputable outside director, with high stocks of human capital, monitor more effectively 
than other boards as they possess significant reputation capital as well as extensive knowledge 
and experience regarding the firm’s external environment.  
In existing literature, there are no clear predictions on firms’ demand for well-connected 
directors. As discussed in the preceding chapters, prior research in organisational sociology, 
economics and finance highlights the potential benefits and costs associated with being well-
networked. Firms are likely to have a high demand for well-connected directors for a number 
of reasons, which are outlined in section 3.3 of Chapter Three.   
Failure to recognise and explicitly incorporate the concept of social capital as an input into 
business operations may limit the understanding of how firms use social capital to generate 
economic benefits. A study by Johnson, Suarez and Lundy (2002) finds that firms’ demand for 
social capital is partly determined by their endowments of social capital. Hence, firms with 
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greater connectedness are expected to demonstrate more willingness in extending their 
networks and reinforcing their existing ties in their networks.   
Consistent with this notion, more recent investigations of overall board connectedness provide 
empirical evidence for higher abnormal stock returns (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013) and better  
financial reporting quality (Omer, Shelley and Tice, 2014) suggesting that the costs of multiple 
directorships are outweighed by the benefits of acquiring information, resources or learning from 
other firms. Based on extant literature, firms’ demand for well-connected directors is expected 
to be greater than its supply (directors’ investments in establishing links in the network). To 
date, firms’ demand for social and human capital has not been studied empirically in the UK 
context. The following associations are hypothesised to test for the demand for social and 
human capital at the firm level. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between a firm’s earnings and its social and 
human capital.  
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between a firm’s stock returns and its social and 
human capital.  
5.4 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL ON FIRM VALUE 
This section draws on the theoretical frameworks introduced in previous chapters and presents 
hypotheses which are developed based on extant theoretical perspectives and empirical 
evidence provided in prior literature. The preceding chapter highlighted the decreasing 
relevance of financial information to equity valuation in recent years (Certo, 2003; Lev and 
Zarowin, 1999). Hence, this thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach, using theoretical 
insights from sociology, management and accounting, and explores whether measures of social 
and human capital possessed at board level help to explain the differences between the book 
value and market value of firms. The following section starts with hypotheses related to 
organisational social capital and discusses existing theoretical views and empirical evidence 
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supporting proposed hypotheses. Then, the chapter goes on to present hypotheses on the 
organisational human capital and provides empirical evidence justifying the rationale for 
anticipated relationships.  
5.4.1 Social Capital Theory  
Social Capital as a Consequence of Interlocking Directorates  
Following extant research on the impacts of social networking at multiple levels (individual, 
organisational, or national), this research focuses on the impact of interlocking corporate 
directorates as a source of organisational social capital (indicated by board directors’ social 
capital) on the market value of firms. This study seeks to examine whether firms benefit from 
network advantages derived by their directors through board interlocks and to understand how 
interlocking directorate ties evolve over a ten-year period (2001-2010).  
This research employs social network analysis (SNA) as a means of analysing the structure and 
pattern of the relationships and ties which are regarded as the source of social capital (Tichy, 
Tushman and Fombrun, 1979). Since 1930s, the applications of social network techniques have 
long been found in studies examining corporate power and interlocking directorships (Scott, 
2011). A social network perspective allows for the identification of the causes and 
consequences of networks in which individuals and/or organisations participate and seeks to 
determine the scope of opportunities and constraints they may confront as a result of their 
locations within the networks (Borgatti et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, SNA provides a theoretical framework for collecting and analysing data on 
personal and organisational ties as sources of social capital, a construct which has proven 
difficult to measure directly. Despite its limitation to focus only on the structural aspect of 
social capital, the use of SNA enables the quantification of individual and organisational level 
social capital and therefore, their inclusion in the Ohlson (1995) model for data analysis.  
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This thesis employs chosen methodology acknowledging that interlocking directorships are an 
effective way for firms to develop external relationships and to acquire a variety of benefits 
from such relationships through directors serving on the same boards. However, prior literature 
has maintained that not all directorships provide the same level of network benefits for each 
firm (Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001). It is argued that some directorships are rather 
more valuable than others (Young and Tsai, 2008). For instance, an interlocking directorship 
on the General Electric board may be particularly beneficial as a result of the firm’s size and 
other board members, who are likely to hold several directorships on other prominent boards 
(Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001). Similarly, a directorship on Procter & Gamble 
board may be more useful as a result of the firm’s high connectivity in the overall network 
(Chu and Davis, 2011).   
Since directorate ties differ according to the level of network benefits they provide for various 
firms, it is difficult to capture the impact (value) of such ties by using merely one network 
measure for board directors of an observed firm. Prior literature on social network theory 
supports this idea by maintaining that social capital benefits derive not only from the 
characteristics of an actor’s ties, but also his/her overall location and structural position (Burt, 
1992, 1997a; Portes, 1998). As emphasised in the preceding chapter on theories of human and 
social capital, a desirable structural position is identified as “having a sparse ego-network or 
being located along the shortest path between otherwise unconnected actors” (Borgatti and 
Foster, 2003: 1004).  
There are two groups of network measures which are widely used to capture an actor’s (a 
director’s) overall network position, namely structural hole and centrality measures. These 
measures allow us to identify whether a director has a sparse network from which he/she can 
derive information and control benefits (Burt, 1992, 2002), or is more centrally embedded in 
the overall network where he/she can enjoy superior access to other directors, resources, and 
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information (Pfeffer, 1991). This analysis employs four centrality measures (degree, closeness, 
betweenness, and eigenvector centrality) and two structural hole measures (effective size and 
network constraint) to capture social capital possessed at the organisational level. The rationale 
behind employing four different centrality measures lies in fact that each centrality measure 
captures a different aspect of an actor’s network advantages. This is emphasised by Wasserman 
and Faust (1994: 218) who note that:  
“One should not utilise any single centrality measure. Each has its virtues 
and utility”.  
Therefore, this analysis endeavours to explore which network positions possessed by board 
directors are the most advantageous for firms as there has been little empirical research in this 
area (Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012; Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). The following section 
goes on to explain the network measures used in this thesis and concludes with the hypothesis 
(es) relating to the association between organisational social capital and firm market value.  
Centrality Measures 
The concept of centrality comprises a variety of aspects regarding the “importance” or 
“visibility” of actors within a network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The works of Hubbell 
(1965), Freeman (1979), Knoke and Burt (1983), Friedkin (1991), Faust and Wasserman 
(1992), and Wasserman and Faust (1994) provide different insights into the interpretation of 
the concept and the use of centrality measures in various contexts. The motivations behind the 
use of centrality concept in one-mode dyadic networks can be summarised in four points (Faust, 
1997: 160). These motivations are: (1) actors are central if they are active in the network, (2) 
actors are central if they can contact others through efficient (short) paths, (3) actors are central 
if they have the potential to mediate flows of resources or information between other actors, 
and (4) actors are central if they have ties to other actors who are themselves central. These 
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motivations relate to four centrality measures respectively: degree centrality, closeness 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality.  
Degree centrality 
Degree centrality is regarded as one of the simplest and well-known measures of centrality 
(Borgatti and Everett, 2006). Degree centrality is the first of Freeman’s (1977, 1979) centrality 
measures and is the function of an actor’s degree. The degree of an actor is simply defined as 
the number of alters to whom the actor is adjacent, and therefore is directly tied (Freeman, 
1979). Deriving from this definition, actors with high degrees are considered the most active 
since they possess more direct ties to other actors within the network. Hence, degree measures 
the level of activity. The intuitive rationale for degree centrality is that high centrality index 
indicates high level of activity, and therefore a very active actor in the network. 
Proctor and Loomis (1951) and Shaw (1954) were the first researchers to introduce the idea 
that an actor’s centrality should be measured by using the degree of the actor. Similarly, many 
other researchers45 (Czepiel, 1974; Faucheux and Moscovici, 1960; Garrison, 1960; Glanzer 
and Glaser, 1957; Mackenzie, 1964, 1966; Rogers, 1974) regarded actor centrality in the same 
way and they referred to centrality as degree. Freeman (1979) later discussed that the concept 
of degree centrality was found so appealing that the foundations of the concept were not 
elaborated in detail. In his analysis, Freeman refined the concept in the context of 
communication, and argued that actor (point) degree centrality responds to “the visibility or 
the potential for activity in communication of such points” (Freeman, 1979: 219). 
Considering communication in a social network, an actor with high degree has direct contact 
with many other actors, and therefore is in a position to be perceived as an important channel 
of information. In this sense, the actor is prominent to the extent to which he/she is in the 
                                                             
45 A review of early researchers on degree centrality can be found in Freeman (1979). 
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mainstream of information flow in the network. Hence, in the concept of degree centrality, 
prominence is linked to the level of actor’s activity, in other words, the actor’s degree 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In the same manner, an actor with low degree has direct contact 
with few other actors, and therefore is in a position to be perceived as peripheral. Since the 
actor occupies a position with few direct ties, his level of activity in communication is expected 
to be lower than other actors in the networks. Therefore, actors with low degree can be seen as 
less important in respect of their connectivity, which reduces their opportunities regarding 
information control and access to resources (Rowley, 1997). 
Degree centrality is simply measured as the number of direct ties incident upon a given node 
(Marsden, 2002). Based on the work of Nieminen (1974), Freeman (1979) defines actor degree 
centrality (CD) by the following equation: 
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) = �𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
(1) 
Where g represents network size and a represents adjacency, 
           𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) = 1 if and only if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  and 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 are connected by a line  
                               0 otherwise.  
Degree centrality is a straightforward index of the degree to which 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 is the focal point of 
activity. 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) is large if actor 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  is adjacent to, or in direct contact with, a large number of 
other actors; and small if 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 occupies a position in which the actor possesses less direct ties to 
other actors. 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) = 0 for an actor who is entirely isolated from contact with any other actor. 
One problem associated with actor degree centrality measure 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)  is that it is contingent on 
the size of the network from which the measure is calculated (Freeman, 1979). Therefore, the 
measure may be irrelevant in some applications, particularly when there is variation among the 
network sizes of actors. Some firms are larger (have more directorships) than others, therefore 
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using a normalised measure is more rational. Although the measure is useful to calculate an 
actor’s total amount of activity, it is appealing to have a measure which is independent of the 
network size. Removing the effect of network size from the measure allows researchers to 
compare the relative centrality of actors from different networks. At a maximum, an actor can 
be adjacent to 𝑛𝑛 − 1 other actors in a network. Hence, Freeman’s (1979) proposed a 
standardisation of degree centrality measure as: 
𝐶𝐶′𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝒌𝒌) = ∑ 𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛 − 1  
(2) 
is the proportion of other actors that are adjacent to 𝑝𝑝𝒌𝒌. 𝐶𝐶′𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝒌𝒌) is independent of the network 
size, and therefore can be compared across networks of different sizes. 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) and 𝐶𝐶′𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝒌𝒌) are 
degree-based measures of actor centrality, Freeman (1979: 221) emphasises the importance of 
an actor’s degree as “an index of its potential communication activity”.  
Since a director’s degree centrality is simply the number of ties he/she has with other directors 
in the network, high degree centrality represents well-connectivity as a result of having a large 
number of connections within the network. Being connected to many others may facilitate 
obtaining access to different sources of information and resources, which is previously argued 
to influence firms’ strategic decisions (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). Renneboog and Zhao 
(2011) suggest that CEOs with many direct contacts in adjacent firms are endowed with more 
managerial power on the board. However, it is emphasised that being very active in the network 
does not provide sufficient justification for a strong position in terms of information benefits 
within the network. Therefore, different centrality measures should be used to explore the 
advantages of a director’s structural position in the overall network (Brass and Burkhardt, 
1993; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
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Closeness Centrality  
The second centrality measure is Freeman’s (1979) closeness centrality which is classified as 
a distance (length) measure. Closeness centrality is defined as the total geodesic distance from 
a given node to all other nodes (Freeman, 1979). Closeness centrality is an inverse measure of 
centrality since greater closeness centrality implies that the ego is more distanced to all other 
actors in his/her network, and therefore is less central. However, this terminological issue can 
be solved by using a normalised version of closeness which yields a measure of closeness 
instead of farness (Borgatti and Everett, 2006). Closeness centrality (normalised) is deemed to 
be positively linked to social capital since being less distanced to all other actors increases the 
probability of acquiring timely information in a network (Borgatti, Jones and Everett, 1998). 
Closeness-based centrality measures, which determine how close an actor is to other actors 
within the network, were developed by Bavelas (1950), Harary (1959), Beauchamp (1965), 
Sabidussi (1966), Moxley and Moxley (1974), and Rogers (1974). Freeman (1979) noted that 
the simplest measure of closeness-based centrality is that of Sabidussi (1966). Sabidussi (1966) 
proposed that the centrality of an actor should be measured by summing the geodesic distances 
from an actor to all other actors in the network. However, in this case, actor centrality is 
expected to decrease as the length of geodesics increase. Therefore, the sum of geodesic 
distances is weighted inversely to attain Sabidussi’s index. Actor closeness centrality is a 
measure which depends not only on direct ties, but also on indirect ties of the actor.  
To calculate actor (point) closeness centrality (Cc), d(pi, pk) is assumed to be the number of 
lines (edges) in the geodesic linking actors pi and pk. The total distance that k is from other 
actors is ∑ 𝑑𝑑(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where the sum is taken over all k  ≠ i. Therefore, Sabidussi’s (1966) 
index of actor closeness (CC) is expressed as: 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) = � 𝑑𝑑(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�
−1
 
(3) 
In this formula, the subscript C represents “closeness”. As previously noted, the index yields 
the inverse of the sum of the distances from actor k to all other actors. The index can be equal 
to (𝑛𝑛 − 1)−1 at a maximum, which occurs when the actor is adjacent to all other actors in the 
network. At a minimum, the index takes the value of 0 in its limit, which arises “whenever one 
or more actors are not reachable from the actor in question” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 185). 
Freeman (1979) acknowledges that, in an unconnected graph, every actor is at an infinite 
distance from at least one other actor, and therefore Sabidussi’s (1966) index is only 
meaningful for a connected graph.  
As emphasised above, the maximum value that this index can yield is contingent on n. Since 
the index is dependent on the number of actors in the network from which it is computed, it is 
difficult to compare values derived from networks of different sizes (Freeman, 1979). 
Beauchamp (1965) solved this problem by suggesting the standardisation of indices so that the 
maximum value equals unity. To standardise this index, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖) is simply multiplied by (𝑛𝑛 −1). Thus: 
𝐶𝐶′𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) =  𝑛𝑛 − 1[∑ 𝑑𝑑(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ] 
                                                              = (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) 
(4) 
The standardised index ranges between 0 and 1, and is the inverse average distance between 
actor k  and all other actors. 𝐶𝐶′𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) is the direct measure of distance-based actor centrality. 
Hence, the index equals unity when the actor is adjacent to all other actors, which is when the 
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actor is maximally close to all other actors. The value of index decreases as the average distance 
between actor k and other actors increases.  
Firms can derive a number of advantages from interlocking directorate networks in respect of 
acquiring information. Timely access to information may be a competitive advantage in 
dynamic business environments where the creation of more innovative, more entrepreneurial, 
and more rewarding solutions is reinforced by exclusive access to such information (Burt, 
1992, 2001, 2002). Firms may also benefit from director networks in developing more effective 
corporate strategies (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Therefore, board directors who are well-
connected, and of higher information value are assumed to have higher levels of social capital.  
A director’s connectivity concerning information benefits can be measured by two centrality 
measures, namely (normalised) closeness and betweenness centrality46. Directors with high 
closeness and betweenness centrality indices are more likely to receive the information in a 
timelier way when it is identified and transmitted along the paths in the network (Freeman, 
1977, 1979).  
Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality, the third centrality measure developed by Freeman (1979, 1980), 
measures the centrality of an actor based on his/her betweenness in the network. Betweenness 
centrality is defined as “the number of times that an ego falls along the shortest path between 
two other actors” (Borgatti, Jones and Everett, 1998: 31). Actors with high betweenness are 
considered as possessing a favourable position since other actors are dependent on him/her to 
make connections with others. Therefore, betweenness centrality measures the extent to which 
an actor has power over other actors’ access to different regions of the network (Freeman 1979). 
                                                             
46 A detailed description of the betweenness centrality concept is provided in the following section.  
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From this perspective, betweenness centrality is positively associated with social capital since 
information and control benefits are most harnessed by actors with high betweenness.  
Early centrality researchers emphasise the strategic meaning of locations on geodesics 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). For instance, Bavelas (1948) and Shaw (1954) maintain that 
actors who are located on many geodesics are in fact central to the network. Similarly, Shimbel 
(1953) and Cohn and Marriott (1958) suggest that actors with such locations are strategically 
important in the network. However, a measure of betweenness was not developed until the 
work of Anthonisse (1971), and subsequently Freeman (1977) and Pitts (1979) proposed the 
examination of actors’ locations on geodesics. Anthonisse (1971) and Freeman (1977) are the 
first researchers to quantify the idea that an actor is central to the degree to which he/she falls 
on the shortest path between other actors and therefore, has control over the path of 
communication (Freeman, Borgatti and White, 1991). From this point of view, betweenness 
centrality measures the degree to which an actor can act as an intermediary or broker to other 
actors (Brandes, 2008; Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001) since actors located on many 
geodesics have control over the flow of information and resources. 
To calculate actor betweenness centrality (CB), it is assumed that gij is the number of geodesics 
linking two actors (pi and pj). If all geodesics are equally likely to be selected for the path, the 
probability of the communication using any one of them is simply 1/ gij. The probability that a 
distinct actor, k , is involved in the communication between two actors is also considered. In 
this case, gij (pk) is the number of geodesics linking the two actors that include actor pk. Freeman 
makes the assumption that geodesics are equally likely to be chosen for this path, and then 
estimates this probability by gij (pk) / gij. The actor betweenness centrality (CB) for pk is, 
therefore, the sum of these estimated probabilities over all pairs of actors excluding the kth 
actor: 
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𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) = � �  𝑔𝑔ij(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)/𝑔𝑔ij 𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗
𝑛𝑛
   𝑖𝑖    <  
(5) 
Where k is different from i and j.  
Hence, actor betweenness index, the sum of probabilities, measures the extent to how 
“between” an actor is. The index is equal to the value of 0 when pk falls on no geodesics. The 
maximum value of the index is calculated by (𝑛𝑛 − 1)(𝑛𝑛 − 2)/2 ,which is equal to the number 
of pairs of actors excluding pk. The maximum value is attained when the k th actor falls on all 
geodesics. Akin to closeness centrality index, the value of betweenness centrality index is 
contingent on the number of actors in the network. Therefore, the index is standardised to allow 
the comparison of indices that are calculated from networks of various sizes: 
𝐶𝐶′𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) = 2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)/(𝑛𝑛2− 3𝑛𝑛 + 2) 
(6) 
Standardised betweenness index can be compared to other indices calculated from different 
networks and relations, and can attain values ranging between 0 and 1. Betwenness centrality 
index 𝐶𝐶′𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) differs from closeness centrality index 𝐶𝐶′𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) in that it can even be meaningful 
in an unconnected graph (Freeman, 1977). This feature is considered as an advantage of 
betweenness index for researchers conducting network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Betweenness centrality measures the degree to which a board director occupies a desired 
position by falling on the shortest distance paths between other directors in the overall network. 
Directors with high betweenness are assumed to have power in the network since a large 
number of other directors are dependent on him/her to make connections with others (Brass, 
1984). In corporate networks, betweenness centrality has been used to measure the extent to 
which a director or CEO can act as an intermediary or broker in the network, in other words to 
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determine whether he/she is in a position to have control over information and resource 
exchange (Brandes, 2008; Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001; Rowley, 1997). 
Therefore, betweenness is a measure of the frequency with which a director falls on the 
geodesic paths between pairs of other directors (Freeman, 1979). Directors with high 
betweenness centrality indices can be brokers or gatekeepers in the network since they facilitate 
the flow of information and resources between less central directors (Scott, 1991). 
 
Eigenvector Centrality 
Eigenvector centrality, the fourth of the widely used centrality measures, was developed by 
Bonacich (1972, 1987) to measure the extent to which an ego is connected to other important 
actors in the network. In other words, eigenvector centrality measures an actor’s importance in 
relation to the centrality of his/her neighbours in the network. Therefore, it is referred to as a 
measure of power and prestige in the literature (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). Eigenvector 
centrality is seen as a good network measure since it concerns the entire pattern of 
connections47 in a network (Bonacich, 2007). Actors with high eigenvector centrality are 
deemed to create more opportunities for accumulation of resources through their ties with well-
connected actors. Despite its advantages, Bonacich48 has also acknowledged that there exist a 
number of problems posed by the use of eigenvector centrality in certain types of networks, 
which implies the need for using the index with caution in SNA. 
Eigenvector centrality derives from the idea that an actor’s centrality should be proportional to 
the strength of the actor's ties to other actors, and the centrality of these other actors within the 
network (Bonacich, 1972; Faust, 1997; Mizruchi, 1982; Mizruchi et al., 1986). Bonacich’s 
(1972) initial motivation for developing eigenvector centrality index was to measure 
                                                             
47 Eigenvector centrality differs from closeness and betweenness centrality in that it weights all contacts according 
to their own centrality in a network (Bonacich, 1972). 
48 For a review, see Bonacich (2007).  
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popularity, which is linked to relative standing or status measures suggested by Katz (1953) 
and Hubbell (1965). Subsequently, various scholars have proposed using the index as a 
measure of the degree to which an actor holds a position to have influence over other actors in 
the network (Fernandez and McAdam, 1988; Friedkin, 1991; Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981). 
Since the index was comprised in the studies of network influence, Friedkin (1991) referred to 
eigenvector index as a measure of “total effects centrality”. 
Bonacich (1972) proposed that the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of an adjacency matrix 
could be considered as a good measure of network centrality.  The eigenvector differs from 
degree in that the measure weights contacts according to their own centralities. Eigenvector 
centrality is referred to as a weighted sum of not only direct connections but also indirect 
connections of every length (Bonacich, 2007). Therefore, the eigenvector measure concerns 
the entire pattern in the network.  
Eigenvector centrality has been extended to beta-centrality c(β), which allows assessing the 
power in negatively connected bargaining networks49, and to networks with negative as well 
as positive ties, where a negative connection to a high status actor reduces the actor’s status but 
a negative connection to a disliked actor increases the status of the actor (Bonacich and Lloyd, 
2004). Although the concept has been widely used and extended by several researchers in 
different fields (e.g. Brundes and Cornelsen, 2003; Richards and Seary, 2000; Ruhnau, 2000), 
it has been particularly influential in interlocking directorate research, where eigenvector 
centrality is referred to as the standard measure of centrality50. 
To calculate eigenvector centrality of an actor (𝑥𝑥), A is assumed to be a matrix of relationships 
(adjacency matrix) and i and j are vertices. A is generally symmetric although this is not a 
                                                             
49 Bonacich (1987) explains that such networks arise when an actor’s own power is reduced by connection to other 
actors with many alternative exchange partners. In other words, each actor’s status is reduced by the high status 
of others to whom the actor is connected.   
50 Early studies that used eigenvector centrality include Mariolis (1975), Mintz and Schwartz (1981a, 1981b), 
Mizruchi and Bunting (1981); Mizruchi (1982); Rosenthal et al. (1985) and Roy (1983).  
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requirement for calculating the index (Bonacich, 1987). The main diagonal elements of matrix 
A are zeros. The centrality of actor i (x) is expressed by the following equation (Bonacich, 
2007): 
𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑛 
                                  (7) 
Where 𝜆𝜆 is a constant used to ensure that the equations have a nonzero solution. In matrix 
notation, this standard eigenvector-eigenvalue problem is expressed by the equation: 
𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 = 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 
(8) 
Where A is a n x n sociomatrix, 𝜆𝜆 is its related eigenvalue, and x is a vector of centrality scores 
(the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue). Equation (7) and (8) express 
eigenvector centrality x in two equivalent ways: as a sum and as a matrix equation. aij = 1 if 
vertices i and j are connected by an edge and aij= 0 if they are not. The centrality of an actor is 
proportional to the sum of the centralities of the other actors to which he/she is connected. λ is 
the largest eigenvalue51 of A and n is the number of vertices. 
A director’s eigenvector centrality represents the extent to which he/she is relatively important 
as a consequence of being connected to more central directors in the overall network (Bonacich, 
1972, 1987). Eigenvector centrality is a recursive measure of degree, the sum of a director’s 
direct ties to other directors in the network, weighted by the centralities of such connections 
(Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007). A director’s eigenvector centrality score is more 
positively affected by his/her ties to high-scoring directors than equal ties to low-scoring 
                                                             
51 Bonacich (1987: 1172) notes that “all eigenvectors of R give solutions consistent with eq. (1) and (2). They are 
all possible centrality measures. However, if R is symmetric, each eigenvector is a factor of R, and the associated 
eigenvalue measures the accuracy with which it can reproduce R”.  
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directors (Milakovic, Alfarano and Lux, 2010). Therefore, the concept of eigenvector centrality 
is based on the idea that the quality of connection is crucial to determining an actor’s 
prominence or power in a network. Deriving from Bonacich’s (1972) seminal work, board 
directors who are connected to well-networked directors are expected to be endowed with 
status and influence in corporate networks (Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm, 2009). 
Structural Hole Measures 
Burt (1992, 2001) demonstrates a number of benefits derived from network positions where 
ego has connections to alters, who otherwise are disconnected from each other. In this case, 
ego can act as a broker between alters and obtain access to the knowledge and resources of 
alters for his/her own advantage. Within interlocking directorate networks, these brokers would 
be board directors who provide a link between rather disconnected directors and can be of great 
importance to firm value creation through the information and control benefits they harness 
across non-redundant connections in their network. Two fundamental measures were 
developed by Burt (1992, 1997a, 1997bF) to identify an ego’s ability to bridge structural holes. 
These measures are the effective size of an ego’s network and ego’s aggregate network 
constraint. 
Effective Network Size  
Effective size is defined as “the number of alters, weighted by strength of tie, that an ego is 
directly connected to, minus a redundancy factor” (Borgatti, Jones and Everett, 1998: 31). 
Effective size is regarded as a measure of information benefits derived from spanning a 
structural hole and can never take a value greater than the degree of a network (van Liere, 
Koppius and Vervest, 2008).  Higher effective size indicates that alters have few ties to one 
another and therefore, the ego enjoys more social capital (network) benefits through spanning 
many structural holes (Burt, 1992). As effective size of an ego’s network increases, it widens 
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ego’s exclusive access to a set of diverse knowledge and resources (Anderson, 2008). From 
this perspective, effective network size is deemed to have a positive association with social 
capital since an ego increases his/her opportunities for information and control benefits through 
having non-redundant connections.  
As aforementioned, effective size is the number of alters to whom an ego is connected minus 
the redundancy of links between alters. Burt (1992) defines the effective size (efsize) of an 
actor’s ego network as: 
��1 −�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
�
𝑗𝑗
𝑞𝑞 ≠ 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 
(9) 
Where: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�∑ �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 
 
 (10) 
And 
𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = �𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖+𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘�𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘+ 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗� , 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑘𝑘 
(11) 
And Z is the data, the matrix of network ties. Where piq reflects node zi’s network time and 
energy invested in a relationship with zq while mjq indicates the strength of the relationship 
between zj and zq. A contact with zj is redundant for zi to the extent that the summation inside 
the brackets is large; redundant contacts reduce the effective size of an egocentric network 
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(Marsden, 2002). Strong relationships mjq between alter nodes zj and zq are within zi’s 
egocentric network thus lower its effective size.  
In his examination of Burt’s redundancy measures, Borgatti (1997: 38) demonstrates that the 
effective size of an ego network is “the actual size minus the average degree of the alters”. 
Borgatti (1997) explains that the average degree of any network is closely related to network 
density. Therefore, the average degree is equal to the density times (n-1), where n is the number 
of nodes in the network. Burt’s redundancy measure is considered as identical to ego network 
density, scaled by a factor of (n-1) (Borgatti, 1997). Hence, the redundancy of any ego network 
is expressed by the following formula: 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 2𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛
 
(12) 
Where t is the number of ties in the network (excluding ties to ego) and n is the number of 
nodes (excluding ego). Thus, Borgatti (1997) provides a simplification of Burt’s original 
formulae and defines effective size as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟 = 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛
 
(13) 
Therefore, effective size is an unstandardised network measure which takes a minimum value 
of 1 and a maximum value of the network size minus one (van Liere, Koppius and Vervest, 
2008). Burt’s effective size captures the degree to which a board director holds a bridging 
position since it is a measure of the number of structural holes a director spans in his/her ego 
network. High effective size indicates that a board director’s ties possess few ties to one another 
and the director acquires social capital benefits from spanning many structural holes among 
his/her non-redundant ties.  
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Aggregate Network Constraint 
The second structural hole measure, network constraint, is an index which measures how much 
an ego is constrained by his/her alters in a network. Burt (2002: 209) refers to network 
constraint as “the extent to which a person’s contacts are redundant”. It is regarded as a measure 
of the control benefits derived from bridging structural holes. For instance, when an ego is 
highly dependent on his/her alters; he/she is highly constrained, and therefore exerts little 
autonomy and control over his/her activities. More network constraint, as emphasised by Burt 
(1997a, 1997b), indicates fewer structural holes. Thus, network constraint is negatively linked 
to social capital since structural holes are important sources of social capital benefits (Burt, 
1992, 1997a, 1997b).  
Network constraint is a function of network size, network density, and network hierarchy (Burt 
1997a, 1997b). Network constraint is generally a negative function of network size, which 
means that larger networks are less constraining (Burt, 1992). Network density and network 
hierarchy have a positive correlation with network constraint since network constraint increases 
when ego’s network consists of strongly interconnected contacts, and when the majority of 
contacts are tied to a leading single contact. Therefore, network constraint is used to measure 
the extent to which relations are directly or indirectly concentrated in a single contact (Burt, 
1997a). The constraint of a tie on ego is known as dyadic constraint. The higher the constraint, 
the fewer structural holes, and therefore means fewer opportunities for ego to broker (De Nooy, 
Mrvar and Batagelj, 2005). As emphasised by Burt (2001: 39), higher constraint indicates more 
network closure. In this case, information within the network is transmitted between groups, 
and therefore is shared by all contacts. Hence, actors with lower aggregate network constraint 
scores are deemed to harness more social capital advantages in the network (Richardson, 2009; 
Burt, 2001). 
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Burt’s (1992: 55) original formula for computing an ego’s network constraint (c) is given as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�
2 , 𝑞𝑞 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖  
(14) 
The index starts with a measure of the extent to which all of director i’s network is directly or 
indirectly invested in his/her relationship in contact j. Therefore, pij is the proportion of i’s 
relations invested in contact j. The sum ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the portion of i’s relations invested in 
contacts q who are in turn invested in contact j. The total shown in parentheses indicates the 
proportion of i’s relations that are directly or indirectly invested in the connection with contact 
j. The sum of squared proportions, ∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , yields the network constraint index C. Constraint 
scores are then multiplied by 100 to allow the comparison of social capital effects per point of 
constraint (Burt, 1997a). 
Based on extant research on centrality and structural hole measures as a measure of social 
capital, this thesis examines whether there is a significant association between organisational 
social capital and firm market value. Hence: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive (negative) association between organisational social capital 
measured as directors’ network centrality or effective network size (aggregate constraint) and 
the market value of firms.  
5.4.2 Human Capital Theory 
Based on the central tenets of human capital theory, this research aims to examine whether 
human capital possessed by board directors have a significant impact on market value of firms. 
Since the human capital embodied in professionals is developed through education and 
personal experience (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005), this thesis employs six different proxies to 
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capture the overall impact of human capital on firms’ market value. Human capital proxies 
comprise highest degree, professional qualifications, elite education, director age, prior board 
experience, and organisational tenure. In the remainder of this chapter, these proxy measures 
are discussed in further detail, and a summary of extant research leading to proposed 
hypotheses is provided.  
Highest Degree 
Investments in education and training play an important role in the accumulation of human 
capital at both individual and organisational level (Becker, 1975). Education provides 
individuals with knowledge, skills and abilities as well as valuable contacts that may enable 
them to obtain access to unique information and resources (Arenius and DeClercq, 2005; 
Shane, 2003). In the management literature, individuals’ educational levels have been 
associated with the possession of cognitive skills and abilities (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996; Smith, Collins and Clark, 2005). Individuals with high 
educational attainment are considered as being more capable of acquiring, processing and 
transmitting information and generating more creative ideas for their organisations (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989; Gradstein and Justman, 2000; Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 2010). Extant 
research has also argued that CEOs or executives with higher levels of education are likely to 
possess greater propensity to receive new ideas and undergo change (Boeker, 1997; Datta and 
Rajagopalan, 1998; Datta, Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2003; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Educated directors are more likely to enhance firm value through increasing innovation 
(Dalziel, Gentry and Bowerman, 2011) and innovative performance (Wincent, Anokhin and 
Örtqvist, 2010). 
Consistent with theoretical implications on education, empirical studies widely referred to 
individuals’ educational achievements as a proxy for human capital stocks of an organisation. 
While the impact of board human capital on firm performance is relatively under researched 
 
 
117 
 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009), there has been extensive theoretical 
and empirical investigation examining the links between CEO (Carpenter, Sanders and 
Gregersen, 2001; Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) and top 
management team (TMT) human capital and organisational outcomes (Cohen and Dean, 2005; 
Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Kor, 2003). Highly educated CEOs or top management members 
are perceived as contributing to organisational legitimacy (Cohen and Dean, 2005), 
organisational innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Thomas, 
Litschert and Ramaswamy, 1991), firm survival (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; 
Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994; Gimeno et al. 1997; Pennings, Lee and Van 
Witteloostuijn, 1998), firm growth (Norburn and Birley, 1988) and strategic change (Datta, 
Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2003). Firm survival, firm growth, organisational innovation and 
legitimacy can possibly be seen as factors leading to a higher firm value in the market.  
In human capital literature, years of schooling (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Young and Tsai, 
2008) and highest educational degree (Westphal and Zajac, 1995) are the most frequently used 
proxies for educational level. This study chooses highest educational degree to measure the 
impact of directors’ education on firm value as this measure offers more useful insights by 
allowing an investigation of the differences among three educational levels (Bachelor, Master’s 
and PhD degrees). Prior research argues that, through education, individuals acquire 
knowledge, skills and abilities as well as valuable contacts that may enable them to obtain 
access to unique information and diverse resources (Arenius and DeClercq, 2005; Shane, 
2003). Therefore, this thesis predicts a positive relationship between directors’ highest degree 
and firm value. Following prior research on the impacts of education level, this thesis explores 
whether highest degree achieved by board directors have a significant impact on the market 
value of firms.  
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Professional Qualifications 
Professional qualifications have been referred to as a further indicator of specific human capital 
developed through educational specialisation. Prior literature has acknowledged that 
individuals holding qualifications from externally recognised and validated professional bodies 
are highly valued, particularly in dynamic and competitive business environments (Storey, 
Watson and Wynarczyk, 1995; Watson et al. 1994). From specific human capital perspective, 
individuals who have undergone professional training are expected to possess a greater 
knowledge base, advanced skills and capabilities, and professional expertise which are likely 
to enhance their performance in related tasks. 
In accounting literature, executives with professional qualifications are deemed to improve the 
quality of internal control systems and enhance investors’ confidence in corporate financial 
reporting (Li, Sun and Ettredge, 2010). There is empirical evidence supporting a positive and 
significant relationship between the existence of qualified directors on firm boards and the 
market reaction to “good news” (Cai, Keasey and Short, 2006). It is also argued that share price 
reactions are sensitive to a number of board characteristics including professional qualifications 
(Yermack, 2006). Although studies on corporate boards have widely emphasised the 
importance of board expertise as one of the key antecedents of effective board performance 
(Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009; Payne, Benson and 
Finegold, 2009; Ruigrok, Peck and Keller, 2006), the relationship between qualified board 
members and performance outcomes still remains a challenging open question.  
Based on prior literature on human capital, this research maintains that board directors holding 
professional qualifications in business-related disciplines52 such as accounting, finance, 
                                                             
52 Professional qualifications awarded in other fields such as biology, chemistry, engineering and medical sciences 
are excluded from the list based on the argument that possession of professional knowledge and competence in 
business-related disciplines is more likely to enhance the governing performance of board directors.  
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management, and marketing are more likely to contribute to firm value positively since they 
are considered as possessing more professional knowledge and competence, which may 
increase their governing performance through exercising effective control strategies and more 
efficient monitoring. In line with this argument, this thesis examines whether board directors 
holding professional qualifications such as ACA, CFA, and CIMA53 have a significant impact 
on firms’ market value. 
Elite Education 
Human capital theory posits that individuals who have educational backgrounds from high 
status institutions are able to derive additional benefits from having studied at such institutions 
(Becker, 1964). Scholars have long argued that educational credentials have a distinct impact 
on individuals’ earnings (James et al., 1989; Kingston and Smart, 1990; Solomon, 1975; 
Trusheim and Crouse, 1981) and status attainment (Karabel and McClelland, 1987; Tinto, 
1980; Useem and Karabel, 1986) since such credentials reflect stocks of human, social, and 
cultural capital (Lee and Brinton, 1996).  
Educational attainment from elite institutions is deemed to contribute to an individual’s human 
capital in three different aspects (Long et al., 1998; Useem and Karabel, 1986). The first aspect 
relates to the quality of an individual’s knowledge base that the individual develops through 
his/her education at a prestigious institution (also referred to as scholastic capital). The second 
aspect comprises elite social networks that an individual develops and maintains through 
his/her personal contacts who are also members of such elite institutions (Kim, 2005; Terjesen, 
Sealy and Singh, 2009; Yoo and Lee, 2009). The final aspect concerns how educational 
attainment from an elite institution is perceived on the basis of reputation and prestige (Useem 
and Karabel 1986).  
                                                             
53 A list of professional qualifications that meet specific criteria is provided in Appendix I. 
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Considering UK higher education environment, there are few institutions that have distinct 
recognition as the most prestigious universities on a national scale: University of Oxford and 
University of Cambridge (Kirchmaier and Kollo, 2006; Marginson, 2006, 2008; Singh, 
Terjesen and Vinnicombe, 2008). Graduates of these universities are distinguished by 
university credentials and, in addition to bestowed human and social capital, they are regarded 
as deriving further benefits from such credentials (Thelin, 1976). Educational attainment from 
such institutions is deemed to confer prestige that augments individuals’ credibility and can be 
of great importance to organisational success through higher levels of intellectual capacity and 
tacit knowledge (Hitt et al., 2001), the provision of diverse resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003) and enhanced organisational legitimacy (Certo, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005). Director 
prestige conveyed through attending elite institutions is likely to act as a powerful indicator to 
the market of the competency and value of the board of directors, and therefore is expected to 
enhance firm market value.  
Director Age  
Human capital research has employed age as a proxy measure for individuals’ human capital 
since increased age is associated with increased experience, and therefore higher stocks of 
human capital (Becker, 1964; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2001; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992). 
It is argued that an individual’s age is an important factor in decision-making since it affects 
the entire process from beginning to the end (Kirchner, 1958). For instance, Taylor (1975) find 
that individuals at an older age spend more time on making decisions, search for more 
information and are more hesitant about their decisions and therefore, are keener to review 
them. In the same manner, prior research demonstrates that, as individuals get older, they are 
more inclined to prefer established routines (Carlsson and Karlsson, 1970; Chown, 1960) and 
are less inclined to confront the system of formal rules and authority in effect (Child, 1974), 
which is likely to have a negative impact on firm value.   
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Consistent with early research on managerial age, upper echelons literature has argued that 
executive age, as well as other characteristics, influences how a firm’s situation is perceived 
and how pertinent decisions are made (e.g. Guthrie and Datta, 1997; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Tihanyi et al., 2000). Studies on TMTs have viewed age as a proxy for director and/or 
CEO experience, and also as an indicator for directors’ and/or CEO’s propensity to take risks 
and undergo change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). It has long been argued that younger 
executives have greater propensity for risk-taking than their older counterparts who tend to 
exhibit more importance on their career and financial stability (Child, 1974; Hart and Mellons, 
1970). Furthermore, older executives are deemed to have greater commitment to status quo 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Stevens, Beyer and Trice, 1978) which leads to reluctance for 
any organisational change. Hence, prior research has established that managerial youth is 
linked to corporate change and growth (Herrmann and Datta, 2005; Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992), which are important factors that may lead to higher market valuations.  
In addition to propensity for change and risk-taking, executive age has also been linked to 
information gathering and processing capacity. Prior research maintained that increased 
managerial age is likely to decrease the amount of physical and mental energy devoted to firm 
decisions (Child, 1974). Older executives are deemed to possess fewer abilities to learn new 
ideas and behaviours and to integrate information in decision-making (Chown, 1960). On the 
other hand, it is argued that older executives are associated with rationality in decision-making 
(Goll and Rasheed, 2005) since they tend to search for more information and provide a more 
accurate analysis of related information than their younger counterparts (Taylor, 1975). While 
increased managerial age is considered as an indicator of advanced experience (Anderson, 
Mansi and Reeb, 2004; Cornett et al., 2003) and rational decision-making (Goll and Rasheed, 
2005), empirical studies have demonstrated that director age affects firm growth and strategic 
change in a negative way by limiting firms’ capacity to renew and expand (Child, 1974; 
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Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). This may suggest that the 
association between director age and firm value can be nonlinear. Further analyses will be 
performed to address this possibility.  
Following prior research on managerial age as an indicator of advanced experience (Anderson, 
Mansi and Reeb, 2004; Cornett et al., 2003), this thesis maintains that older board directors are 
more likely to contribute to firm value through higher levels of experience and rational 
decision-making skills they bring to firm boards. Despite the lack of a clear and significant 
relationship between director age and firm value, this thesis explores whether director age has 
a significant impact on the market value of firms.  
Prior Board Experience 
Human capital theory posits that post-school investments such as work experience enhance 
individuals’ human capital through the accumulation of cognitive abilities and knowledge 
(Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Previous work experience is deemed to provide individuals with 
a range of business-related skills and abilities which may enable them to increase productive 
and efficient activity (Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 2001; Parker, 2006), to monitor diverse 
functions (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994) and to solve complex problems 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Furthermore, prior work experience in a particular context 
provides individuals with access to diverse social networks (Certo, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Kim, Aldrich and Keister, 2006), tacit knowledge required for understanding current 
dynamics in an industry or sector (Arthur, 1994; King and Zeithaml, 2003; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, 2009), and familiarity and internal knowledge that nourish group functioning 
and decision-making (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Westphal and Bednar, 2005). 
Extant research has operationalised prior work experience (broad labour market experience) 
by using a number of indicators. Most frequently used indicator is the number of years of prior 
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work experience (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992; Colombo, Delmastro and Grilli, 
2004; Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Evans and Leighton, 1989). Although prior work 
experience is mostly referred to as the number of years that an individual has been in 
employment, this component has also been associated with individuals’ achievement levels. 
Therefore, two further indicators have been proposed to operationalise work experience as an 
indicator of general human capital. These indicators include the number of jobs previously held 
(Addison and Portugal, 2002; Gimeno et al., 1997; Veum, 1995), and the number of years of 
previous managerial or supervisory experience (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Kim, Aldrich and 
Keister, 2006). Similarly, these indicators have been employed54 in various analyses to 
represent specific human capital (Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Kor and Misangyi, 2008; Tian, 
Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011).  
A recent study by Unger et al. (2011) have argued that human capital endows individuals with 
higher performance when it is applied and effectively adopted to the specific tasks that are 
assigned to such individuals. They emphasise that the process, in which human capital is 
transferred to specific tasks, will be easier if human capital embedded in individuals relate to 
their current tasks. Transfer of any work experience to other firms could arguably be easier if 
old and new job descriptions were similar to each other. Therefore, task-specific (task-related) 
human capital represents “some of the human capital an individual acquires on the job (which) 
is specific to the tasks being performed, as opposed to being specific to the firm” (Gibbons and 
Waldman, 2004: 203).  
Based on prior research on specific human capital, this thesis operationalise prior board 
experience as the number of quoted boards a director sat in the past. In the context of firm 
boards, this thesis argues that prior board experiences of directors can be of great importance 
                                                             
54 In human capital literature, the number of previously held positions (e.g. managerial or board positions) and the 
number of years of specific work experience (e.g. industry, firm or task-specific) are used as proxies of specific 
human capital.  
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as an indicator of task-specific human capital and could leverage the performance at individua l 
and organisational level. Hence, it is hypothesised that board members with prior board 
experience will have a positive impact on firm value. Following human capital literature on 
prior work experience, this thesis includes prior board experience variable to explore whether 
board directors’ previous board experiences have a significant impact on firm value.  
Organisational Tenure 
According to human capital theory, individuals develop firm-specific human capital 
throughout the period they have worked in an organisation. While firm (organisational) tenure 
is regarded as a key indicator for firm-specific human capital, which denotes an individua l’s 
accumulated knowledge of a particular organisation and its operations (Becker, 1975; Hatch 
and Dyer, 2004; Kesner, 1988; Pennings, Lee and Van Witteloostuijn, 1998, Weiss, 1995), 
research on top management teams has investigated the effects of organisational tenure from a 
group dynamics perspective (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Grimm and Smith, 1991; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Prior research on organisational 
tenures of TMTs demonstrates that the length of a director’s or TMT’s tenure may affect 
organisational processes and decisions in both positive and negative ways (Goll and Rasheed, 
2005). 
With regard to positive effects of organisational tenure, it is argued that organisational 
members (directors) with long tenures accumulate knowledge concerning each other’s skills, 
limitations, and idiosyncratic skills (Kor, 2006; Penrose, 1959), develop internal social capital 
with other organisational members, and therefore enable the development of interpersonal trust, 
shared norms, language and routines which are deemed to improve group-functioning 
(Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999; Zenger and 
Lawrence, 1989). Furthermore, individuals with long organisational tenures are expected to 
have developed a better grasp of organisational procedures and policies (Hambrick and Mason, 
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1984) as well as its external environment, which is perceived as a valuable resource for 
implementation of firm’s strategic decisions (Bergh, 2001; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993).  
On the contrary, prior research on TMTs suggests that executives with long organisational 
tenures are less to likely to make changes in a firm’s strategies and configurations (Gabarro, 
1987; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), collect and process new 
information (Miller, 1991), adopt a risk-taker approach (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and 
have willingness to develop new ideas and directions (Miller, 1993). It is also argued that long-
tenured executives are associated with status quo (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), strategic inertia 
(Boeker, 1997) and risk aversion (Herrmann and Datta, 2005). The underlying reason stems 
from the fact that long-tenured executives are more likely to have greater commitment to 
company history, procedure and processes (Katz, 1982; March and March, 1977), to engage in 
previous company strategies (Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson, 1993), and to depend 
on routine information sources and past experience (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Miller 
(1991) noted that CEOs with long organisational tenure tend to become “stale in the saddle” 
since they fail to make crucial organisational changes to adapt to the external environment.  
It has been previously emphasised that this thesis focuses on human capital of board directors 
and firm board as the focal unit of analysis. Prior literature has extensively used measures of 
heterogeneity across board members to operationalise human capital. This study attempts to 
explore the direct impact of human capital measures. Based on extant research on the link 
between organisational tenure and human capital, it is hypothesised that board directors with 
long organisational tenures contribute to firm value through their accumulated knowledge 
regarding firms and their operations (Kosnik, 1990; Musteen, Datta and Kemmerer, 2010), 
which is fundamental to achieving service tasks. Following prior studies on firm-specific 
human capital, this thesis explores whether organisational tenure of board directors have a 
significant impact on the market value of firms. Thus: 
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Hypothesis 6: There is a positive association between organisational human capital indicated 
by director age, professional expertise, elite education and organisational tenure and the market 
value of firms.  
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter develops a number of hypotheses based on extant research on executive labour 
market and the demand for social and human capital, and on the impact of social and human 
capital on firms’ market value. Firstly, hypotheses on the demand for social and human capital 
at the individual level are presented. Secondly, the chapter presents the hypotheses on the 
demand for director social and human capital at the firm level.  Thirdly, hypotheses relating to 
the association between board social and human capital and firm market value are developed. 
The following chapter focuses on the research design of this study and describes the key aspects 
of the Ohlson model. Furthermore, it examines the empirical specifications of ‘other 
information’ (v term) and identifies a benchmark model.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
     THE OHLSON (1995) MODEL AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
OF ‘OTHER INFORMATION’ 
 
 6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research extends the Ohlson (1995) model to examine the impact of social and human 
capital, possessed at the firm level, on the market value of firms. Since its publication in 1995, 
the Ohlson model has received wide acceptance among financial accounting scholars as an 
accounting-based equity valuation model. Several researchers have paid a great deal of 
attention to the work of Ohlson (1995) in the fields of accounting and finance (e.g. Barth and 
Clinch, 2009; Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999; Ely and 
Waymire, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Gregory, Saleh and Tucker, 2005; Hand and 
Landsman, 1998; Ota, 2002; Pirie and Smith, 2005; Stober, 1999). The model has had a great 
influence55 on subsequent empirical work since it establishes a robust theoretical association 
between current accounting numbers and equity market value (Lo and Lys, 2000). 
This thesis particularly focuses on assessing the explanatory power of “other information – v”, 
which is proxied by a set of human and social capital measures developed based on extant 
literature56, for the market value of firm equity over three traditional accounting measures, 
namely book value of equity, earnings and dividends. As discussed in section 4.3.4 of Chapter 
Four, the term v relates to information that denotes value-relevant events that are expected to 
have an impact on a firm’s market value through its future abnormal earnings, yet are not 
disclosed in the financial statements. This research aims to examine to what extent social and 
human capital possessed at firm level could assist in determining market prices57. Under the 
                                                             
55 See Section 4.3.5 of Chapter Four for a critical review of the limitations of the Ohlson (1995) model.  
56 See Chapter Two and Chapter Five for a discussion of the measures of board social and human capital.  
57 A detail discussion of the gap between the book values and market values is provided in Chapter Four.  
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Ohlson (1995) valuation framework, the value relevance of information on social and human 
capital, being the v term, is tested using a sample of FTSE All Share constituents over a period 
of 10 years (2001-2010). A detailed discussion of the sample and time period selection is 
included in Chapter Seven.  
6.2 ACCOUNTING-BASED EQUITY VALUATION MODELS 
A review of literature on market-based accounting research demonstrates that much of the 
theoretical research on valuation models stems from Ohlson’s seminal work in 1995. The 
Ohlson (1995) model (OM) has found rapid acceptance and has been extended in subsequent 
empirical work examining the relationship between market value of a firm’s equity and its 
accounting information (Gregory, Saleh and Tucker, 2005; Morel, 1999; Morel, 2003). 
Furthermore, the criticisms58 on accounting regulations’ ability to timely recognise the 
information, which has already been reflected in market prices, stimulate further applications 
of the model since the value-relevance of traditional accounting measures, particularly for firms 
with a high level of unrecognised intangible assets, is often questioned (Amir and Lev, 1996; 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997; Dontoh, Radhakrishnan and Ronen, 2004; Francis and 
Schipper 1999; Filip and Raffournier, 2010).  
Ohlson’s work comprises two major models: the residual income valuation model (RIVM) and 
the linear information dynamics model (LIM). The RIVM is considered as an application of 
the Dividend Discount Model, and it expresses the economic value of equity in terms of the 
book value of firm equity and abnormal earnings whereas the LIM focuses on the mechanism 
of abnormal earnings and establishes an association between existing information and future 
abnormal earnings. The Ohlson (1995) model relies on three main assumptions, which 
                                                             
58  See Basu (1997) and Lev (1989). 
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comprise dividend discounting, clean surplus accounting, and modified auto-regressive AR(1) 
linear information dynamics.  
Since the development of the RIVM is attributed to prior research efforts59 of early academics 
such as Preinreich (1938), Edwards and Bell (1961) and Peasnell (1982), several researchers 
argue that Ohlson’s actual contribution to accounting-based valuation theory is his modelling 
of linear information dynamics, which stochastically links current abnormal earnings and other 
information (v) to future abnormal earnings (Hand and Landsman, 1998; Lo and Lys, 2000; 
Ota, 2002). Ohlson (1995) expands upon the RIVM by setting assumptions concerning the 
evolution of residual income through time. These assumptions are expressed in a system of 
equations which are referred to as the linear information model (LIM). Furthermore, Ohlson 
(1995) assumes unbiased accounting for the implementation of his model60.  
Prior research on the explanatory and predictive power of the Ohlson (1995) model followed 
two alternative approaches to implementing Ohlson’s valuation framework (McCrae and 
Nilsson, 2001). The first approach predicts the value of equity based exclusively on an RIVM 
specification. Examples of this approach include Claus and Thomas (1999), Dichev (1997), 
Frankel and Lee (1998). The second approach includes a variable to incorporate non-
accounting-related expectations about future abnormal earnings and develops the linear 
information dynamics of expectation formation from both current abnormal earnings and non-
accounting information as approximating first-order, autoregressive processes (Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan, 1999). There is extensive research on the comparison of different valuation 
models. Studies examining the performance of different valuation models include Courteau, 
                                                             
59 Lo and Lys (2000) and Palepu, Bernard and Healy (1996) provide historical information on the residual income 
model.  
60 Feltham and Ohlson (1995) further explore the implementation of the RIVM in a conservative accounting 
setting. 
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Kao and Richardson (2001), Francis, Olsson and Oswald (2000), Liu, Nissim and Thomas 
(2002), Lundholm and O’Keefe (2001), Penman and Sougiannis (1998), and Penman (2001). 
Before the Ohlson (1995) model is explored in greater depth, next section goes on to discuss 
the residual income valuation model to provide a better understanding of how Ohlson (1995) 
expands upon the RIVM to develop his influential model.  
6.3 THE RESIDUAL INCOME VALUATION MODEL (RIVM) 
The RIVM and the Ohlson (1995) model both rely on the Dividend Discount Model (DDM), 
which is based on one main hypothesis: the value of a firm’s equity at time t equals to the 
present value of expected future dividends. Under the assumptions that the markets are efficient 
and the firm is going concern with an indefinite life, the following equation is a general version 
of the Dividend Discount Model:  
Pt = ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓
−𝜏𝜏∞
𝜏𝜏=1  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏) 
 (PVED)                              
 (15) 
  Where 
   Pt   = market value, or price, of the firm’s equity at date t,      𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  = net dividends paid at date t,     𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 1+ the risk- free rate (r-the risk-free rate), 
    Et[. ] = expectation operator based on the information at date t. 
 
The RIVM is derived from the DDM by making two additional assumptions61. Firstly, it is 
assumed that a clean surplus relation (CSR) holds. This entails accounting earnings to include 
all changes in the book value of equity excluding the transactions with the owners. Peasnell 
                                                             
61 The validity of its assumptions are critiqued in Section 4.3.5 of Chapter Four in a detailed discussion of the 
model’s limitations.  
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(1982) links dividends to fundamental accounting measures, namely book value of equity and 
earnings by the formula below: 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 
(CSR) 
(16) 
 
Where 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = net book value of equity at date t 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡= accounting earnings (or net income) for period (t-1, t) 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = dividends (or net cash payments) at date t. 
 
Equation (16) is referred to as the Clean Surplus Relation in Ohlson (1995). 
Book value of equity (at the beginning of period t) multiplied by the cost of equity capital is 
deemed to be the “normal earnings” of the firm. Therefore, “abnormal earnings” (or the 
residual income) is determined by the following formula: 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎  = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡− 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 
(RI) 
(17) 
Where 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎   = abnormal earnings for period t, 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡     = accounting earnings (or net income) for period t, 
𝑟𝑟      = cost of capital,  
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 = book value of equity at the end of period t-1. 
 
 
Secondly, Ohlson (1995) requires a regularity condition which states that the book value of 
equity grows at a rate less than R: 
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𝑅𝑅−𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏) 𝜏𝜏→∞�⎯� 0. 
(18) 
Using the clean surplus relation and definition of abnormal earnings expressed in the equations 
(16) and (17), dividends can be determined by the following equation: 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1− 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 
                                                                                                                                     (19)  
  
Based on two assumptions described earlier, first equation (PVED) can be restated as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡=𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + � 𝑅𝑅−𝜏𝜏∞
𝜏𝜏=1
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏𝑎𝑎 ) 
 (RIVM)                                                                                                                                            
(20) 
This equation yields the residual income valuation model, which expresses the market value 
(or price) of a firm’s equity as the sum of the book value (of equity) and the present value of 
future abnormal earnings. It is essential to note that the clean surplus relation is not a firm 
requirement for accounting variables at their current values. The RIVM requires the clean 
surplus relation to hold when future values are estimated. From an accounting perspective, one 
issue relating to the RIVM is identified as failing to relate current accounting figures to equity 
value (McCrae and Nilsson, 2001). The variables on the right-hand side of the Equation (20) 
relate to expected future values rather than past realisations. Ohlson’s (1995) analytical 
extension of the RIVM provides a solution to this limitation.  
6.4 THE OHLSON (1995) MODEL 
Despite its wide influence among researchers in respect of the theoretical link it provides 
between the market value of firms and accounting information, the RIVM is criticised for being 
neither implementable nor testable (Lo and Lys, 2000). Ohlson (1995) transforms the RIVM 
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by making a final assumption in respect of abnormal earnings information dynamics. This 
assumption implies certain restrictions on the general version of the Dividend Discount Model 
which expresses firm value as the present value of expected dividends (Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan, 1999). Despite having the same theoretical foundation, which fundamentally involves 
determining firm value by discounting expected dividends, Ohlson’s (1995) information 
dynamics model assumes that abnormal earnings follow an auto-regressive process. The time-
series behaviour of abnormal earnings is expressed by two following equations: 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1
𝑎𝑎 = 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀1,𝑡𝑡+1 
(21a) 
𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝛾𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀2,𝑡𝑡+1 
(21b) 
Where  𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡    = information which is useful for estimating future abnormal earnings (other than current 
abnormal earnings), 
 𝜔𝜔, 𝛾𝛾 = constant persistence parameters that are non-negative and less than one:                                
(0 ≤  𝜔𝜔, 𝛾𝛾 < 1),  𝜀𝜀1,𝑡𝑡 = the mean zero disturbance terms. 
 
Based on the information dynamics specified by the equations (21a) and (21b), Ohlson 
demonstrates that the RIVM can be rewritten as a linear function of current book value, current 
abnormal earnings, and other information variable: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡  
(22) 
 
Where the coefficient on abnormal earnings: α1 = 𝜔𝜔/(𝑅𝑅 − 𝜔𝜔), 
the coefficient on other information: α2 =𝑅𝑅/(𝑅𝑅 − 𝜔𝜔)(𝑅𝑅 − 𝛾𝛾), R is equal to the one plus the risk 
free rate. 
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Using the clean surplus relation and definition of abnormal earnings demonstrated in equations 
(16) and (17), the market value of equity can be expressed in terms of current book value, 
current earnings, current dividends and other value-relevant information. The valuation 
function is rearranged as the equation below: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = (1 −𝑘𝑘)𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘(𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼2𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 
 (23) 
Where 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = net book value of equity at date t, 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡= accounting earnings (or net income) for period (t-1, t), 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = dividends (or net cash payments) at date t, 
the coefficient  𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑟𝑟 =  𝑟𝑟𝜔𝜔/(𝑅𝑅 − 𝜔𝜔), 
the coefficient 𝜑𝜑 = 𝑅𝑅/(𝑅𝑅 − 1) = 𝑅𝑅/𝑟𝑟. 
 
It is worth emphasising that Ohlson’s (1995) linear information dynamics model (LIM) 
expressed in the form of equation (23) determines the value of equity by using 
contemporaneous accounting data and information (Lo and Lys, 2000).  
In the Ohlson model, ω and γ are assumed to take a value between 0 and 1. Dechow, Hutton 
and Sloan (1999) and McCrae and Nilsson (2001) provide some empirical support for Ohlson’s 
information dynamics, in other words for persistence parameters. If the coefficients on book 
value and earnings are rearranged by using the equations above, the Ohlson (1995) model can 
be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼1𝑟𝑟)𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑟𝑟 �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟 − 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡� + 𝛼𝛼2𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡  
 (24) 
If it is assumed that dividends are equal to zero, market value of a firm’s equity is a linear 
function of book value of equity, earnings and other information (v term). Alternatively, a 
model based on growth rates in book values and earnings can be derived by omitting Ohlson’s 
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(1995) linear information dynamics (Rees, 1997). This approach is often adopted in value 
relevance research to derive a valuation model in which the strict linearity assumptions of the 
Ohlson (1995) model are relaxed through estimating constituents of book values and earnings, 
and allowing for industry effects (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001). In a general framework, 
value relevance literature is concerned with the examination of whether the coefficient of the 
accounting amount being studied is significantly different from zero, and with the predicted 
sign (Shen and Stark, 2013).  
Studies in the UK control for variables other than book value and earnings and draw inferences 
on the value relevance of the accounting amount if there is correlation or partial correlation 
between the accounting amount studied and market value in the presence of the control 
variables specified. Hence, such a modification of the Ohlson (1995) model allows more 
widespread assessment of to what extent firms’ intangibles and various activities enabling the 
creation of intangibles are value-relevant62. 
The equation (24) can simply be rearranged to derive the model below: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = (1 −𝛼𝛼1𝑟𝑟)𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎1(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼1𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 
(25) 
Several studies that examine the value relevance of dividends in developed markets find that 
dividends have a positive impact on firm market value (e.g. Akbar and Stark, 2003b; Hand and 
Landsman, 2005; Rees, 1997). In the UK, Rees (1997) examines the value relevance of 
dividends, capital structure and capital expenditure during the period from 1987 to 1995. His 
findings demonstrate that earnings distributed as dividends have a greater impact on value than 
do earnings retained within the firm. Rees (1997) emphasises that the inclusion of dividends in 
the valuation model enhances the explanatory power of the model. Akbar and Stark (2003b) 
                                                             
62 Examples of value-relevance research include Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1992, 1998 and 2001). 
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also report a positive and significant relationship between dividends and firm value. Their 
findings suggest that deflators have no impact on the value relevance of dividends in the UK. 
Furthermore, in a study of US firms, Hand and Landsman (2005) find that dividends have 
information content, and this information is greatest when earnings are transitory. Hence, 
following prior empirical research, dividends are incorporated into the model.  
Following the Ohlson (1995) model, the market value of a firm’s equity is expressed as a linear 
function of the book value of equity, earnings and dividends together with a constant term to 
capture the effects of omitted variables. This leads to the empirical specification in Equation 
(26) below: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 (26) 
Where MVit, BVit, Eit, and Dit are the market value of equity, the book value of equity, earnings 
(net income of the firm) and dividends respectively, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a random variable, for firm i at 
time t. 
 
In the UK, prior research has identified a number of accounting variables beyond book value, 
earnings and dividends that significantly contribute to explaining the market value of firms. 
These include research and development expenditures, capital contributions and capital 
expenditures (e.g. Akbar and Stark, 2003b; Dedman, Mouselli, Shen and Stark, 2009; Dedman, 
Kungwal and Stark, 2012; Green, Stark, and Thomas 1996; Rees, 1997). Hence, an extended 
model for estimating market value is specified as follows:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  =  𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(27) 
where, RDit, CCit and CEit are research and development expenditures, capital contributions 
and capital expenditures, respectively, for firm i at time t. 
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 6.5 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF ‘OTHER INFORMATION’ 
 6.5.1 The Role of Other Information (v term) in Explaining Market Prices  
The previous chapter discussed how residual income valuation models are developed and used 
to estimate the value of firms’ equity. In particular, Ohlson (1995) model is built upon the 
standard valuation model of dividend-discounting and advanced by the assumptions of clean 
surplus relation and dynamic linear information model (LIM) to develop an accounting-based 
(residual income) valuation model which estimates the market value of a firm’s equity by using 
contemporaneous accounting data (e.g. book value and earnings) and other information. In his 
paper, Ohlson (1995) indicates that “vt should be thought of as summarizing value-relevant 
events that have yet to have an impact on the financial statements” and “one thinks of vt as 
capturing all non-accounting information used in the prediction of future abnormal earnings”. 
Until 1998, almost all empirical research motivated by Ohlson (1995) set v term to zero (e.g. 
Collins, Maydew, and Weiss 1997; Collins, Pincus, and Xie 1999; Francis and Schipper 1999; 
Guenther and Trombley 1994; Stober 1999). The very few papers which did not set v aside 
follow an intuitive manner rather than an empirical manner in exploring the v term (e.g. Amir 
and Lev 1996; Ittner and Larcker 1998; Myers 1999).  
Research on Ohlson (1995) model discusses that incorporating the value-relevant information 
beyond book value and earnings is crucial as those accounting numbers are transaction-based 
and deemed insufficient for firm valuation (Hand, 2001; Wang, Alam, and Makar, 2005). From 
an empirical perspective, Begley and Feltham (2002) emphasise that not including any value-
relevant information in the empirical setting may lead to estimation and inference errors due to 
the existence of a potential omitted variable. Following earlier work, there have been several 
attempts to develop proxies for the v term. Empirical attempts to capture ‘other information’ 
in equity valuation models focus on two fundamental proxies: analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
a multiple of last year’s ‘other information’.  
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First proxy for other information is an adjusted version of the one year-ahead consensus analyst 
forecasts (see Agarwal, Taffler and Brown, 2011; Bryan and Tiras 2007; Dechow, Hutton, and 
Sloan 1999; Frankel and Lee 1998; Hand and Landsman 2005; Hope and Kang 2005; Liu and 
Thomas 2000; Mui‐Siang Tan and Lim, 2007; Ohlson 2001). This stems from a linear 
information dynamics system in which the two variables included within the system are 
residual income and ‘other information’. As a consequence, one year-ahead abnormal earnings 
are predicted by current abnormal earnings and current ‘other information’. If it is assumed 
that the multiplier of current abnormal earnings in the predictive equation for one year-ahead 
abnormal earnings can be successfully estimated; and that the expectation of next year’s 
earnings can be estimated in an unbiased manner by the one year-ahead consensus analyst 
forecast, then an estimate of a multiple of current ‘other information’ can be obtained from the 
abnormal earnings prediction equation. Such an estimate then can be used in predicting market 
value in value relevance tests (e.g. Hand and Landsman 2005).  
The alternative proxy is a multiple of last year’s ‘other information’. Studies such as Akbar 
and Stark (2003b) and Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman (2005) take advantage of the fact 
that linear information dynamics systems give rise to linear valuation functions. This leads to 
market value being expressed as a linear function of the accounting variables in the system. 
Hence, if the coefficients of the accounting variables can be appropriately estimated, then an 
estimate of a multiple of last year’s ‘other information’ can be obtained by deducting the linear 
function of the accounting variables from the market value. Given that ‘other information’ 
predicts itself, a multiple of last year’s value can be treated as a noisy proxy of the current value 
in the regressions of current market value on the variables in the linear information dynamics 
system.  
In addition to these two main proxies, prior valuation research has used various proxies to 
operationalise ‘other information’. These proxies include environmental performance (Hassel, 
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Nilsson, and Nyquist, 2005), value added intellectual coefficient (Swartz, Swartz, and Firer, 
2006), negative tone in the news (Hsu and Wang, 2013) and compliance (with IFRS mandatory 
disclosure requirements) score (Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 2014). Since providing a detailed 
examination of all ‘other information” proxies in extant valuation research is beyond the remit 
of this thesis, the chapter goes on to explore the empirical specifications of the valuation models 
with two fundamental proxies of other information.  
6.5.2 Measurement of Other Information  
Estimating Other Information by Using One Year-ahead Consensus Analyst Forecast 
If we assume a linear information dynamics (LID) system to estimate market value, the system 
will include n accounting variables labelled AVit, i = 1 to n at time t, and an ‘other information’ 
variable, denoted OI. The accounting variables could include a number of components of book 
value and earnings. One of the accounting variables is dividends and AV1 is the component of 
earnings that corresponds to the aspect of earnings forecast by analysts. Hence, the linear 
information dynamics system can be represented by the set of equations below63 (Kungwal, 
Shen and Stark, 2013, p.5): 
 
 
 AV1t = θ11AV1t−1 + θ12AV2t−1 +⋯ + θ1nAVnt−1 + θ1n+1OIt−1 + ε1t  AV2t = θ21AV1t−1 + θ22AV2t−1 +⋯ + θ2nAVnt−1 + θ2n+1OIt−1 + ε2t 
                                                                       ……                                                            (28) AVnt = θn1AV1t−1 + θn2AV2t−1 +⋯ + θnnAVnt−1 + θnn+1OIt−1 + εnt 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛+1𝑛𝑛+1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛+1𝑡𝑡 
 
                                                             
63 Constraints may be placed on the size of the 𝜃𝜃ij’s reflecting, for example, the clean surplus relationship and an 
assumption of dividend irrelevance. Following Kungwal, Shen and Stark (2013), it is assumed that such 
constraints are irrelevant. The scale of OIt is arbitrarily such that θ1n+1= 1 
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Following Ohlson (1989), a linear valuation function can be deduced from the equation system 
above: 
MVt = α1AV1t + α2AV2t +⋯ + αnAVnt + αn+1OIt 
(29) 
where the 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗’s j = 1 to n+1 are functions of the 𝜃𝜃1𝑗𝑗′ 𝑒𝑒 and the cost of capital.  
From equation system (XIV) and equation (XV) above, two alternative methods of estimating 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 .  can be deduced. Recalling that AV1 is denoted as the component of earnings that analysts 
forecast, if the one year-ahead consensus analyst forecast, denoted by FE𝑡𝑡, is an unbiased 
expectation of AV1t+1 then: FEt = E(AV1t+1) 
(30) 
and, hence, following the first equation of equation system (XIV): 
OIt = FEt − [θ11AV1t + θ12AV2t + ⋯+ θ1nAVnt] 
(31) 
If the 𝜃𝜃1𝑖𝑖 , i = 1 to n, can be estimated, then adjusting the one year-ahead consensus analyst 
forecast, using equation (31), can produce an estimate of OI. With the scaling of ‘other 
information’, it represents the component of one year-ahead earnings that cannot be forecasted 
using accounting variables alone. Further, equation (31) can be incorporated into equation (29) 
to produce the valuation equation below:  
MVt = (α1 − θ11)AV1t + (α2− θ12)AV2t + ⋯+ (αn − θ1n)AVnt + αn+1FEt 
(32) 
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Equations (29) and (32) are identical in their approaches to estimating the market value. It is 
worth noting that, if specific properties of the valuation coefficients of the accounting variables 
are of concern, equation (32) will produce biased coefficients unless the OI is the consensus 
analysts’ forecast (Kungwal, Shen and Stark 2013). 
The method of estimating ‘other information’ in equation (31) is implemented by Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan (1999), however, it is given concrete empirical content in Ohlson (2001). In 
both studies, there is only one accounting variable – abnormal clean surplus earnings. Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan (1999) use cross-sectional regressions of actual abnormal clean surplus 
earnings on the one year lag value to estimate the coefficient of abnormal clean surplus earnings 
in the linear information dynamics system. This coefficient is then used in producing 
observations for ‘other information’ and producing estimates of the overall system dynamics.  
It is important to note that this method of estimating other information makes the assumption 
that ‘other information’ is single-dimensional. If other information had more than one 
dimension, consensus forecasts would have to be available for all of the accounting variables 
in the system. This is due to the fact that the linear combination of the ‘other information’ 
components in the valuation equation is not automatically identical to their linear combinations 
embedded in the linear information dynamics system (Akbar and Stark, 2003b).  
 
Estimating Other Information by Using a Multiple of Last Year’s ‘Other Information’ 
Akbar and Stark (2003b) and Barth et al. (2005) develop a different proxy for current ‘other 
information’. Similar to the first method of estimating other information, this proxy is also 
dependent upon the assumption that ‘other information’ is single-dimensional. In this method, 
the only estimator of OIt is specified as OIt-1. Therefore, if other information at time t is 
unobservable, then other information at time t-1 can be used as a noisy proxy. A multiple of 
OIt-1 can be approximated by using the model below:  
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MVt−1 = α1AV1t−1 + α2AV2t−1 +⋯ + αnAVnt−1 + αn+1OIt−1 
αn+1OIt−1 = MVt−1 − [α1AV1t−1 + α2AV2t−1 +⋯ + αnAVnt−1] 
(33) 
In essence, this approximation refers to the market valuation error at time t-1 if appropriate 
coefficients can be estimated for the accounting variables in the valuation equation. Based on 
the relationship specified in Equation (33), OIt can be estimated as a multiple of αn+1OIt−1 plus 
an error term.  
To perform the model specified in Equation (33), one year of observations need to be lost in 
order to acquire a proxy for OIt−1. This will mean restricting each annual year t cross-section 
to only include those firms for which necessary information exists to estimate OIt−1.  
6.5.3 Which proxy is the best? 
Kungwal, Shen and Stark (2013) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of both methods of 
estimating “other information” at great length in their empirical study. They note that both 
measures pose two general problems. First, estimation of both measures depends on a well-
specified set of accounting variables. In the absence of a well-specified system, the impact of 
omitted variables as well as ‘other information’ will be reflected in both measures. Hence, they 
will not be pure proxies of ‘other information’. Further, the changes in the explanatory power 
will reflect how well the measures help counteract the effects of the omitted variables in the 
valuation equation. Second, the use of both measures is based on the assumption that ‘other 
information’ is single-dimensioned. If it is not, neither of the measures will be valid (despite 
increasing the explanatory power of the model). These two problems will be revisited in the 
following chapter in the discussion of the operationalisation of the SHC and the benchmark 
model.   
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Looking at the specific problems arising from the use of each measure, there are three major 
drawbacks associated with estimating ‘other information’ using consensus analyst forecasts. 
The first drawback relates the issue of data loss. In the UK, there are no forecasts available for 
almost half of firm-year observations on relevant databases. Kungwal, Shen and Stark (2013) 
emphasise that setting the availability of a forecast as a selection criterion may lead to a sample 
selection bias due to the type of firms having forecasts associated with them.  
The second drawback is associated with the issue of what is actually being forecasted by the 
analysts. The method is expected to succeed as long as forecasted component of earnings is a 
linear combination of some or all of the earnings components being modelled in the LID system 
(Kungwal, Shen and Stark, 2013). In the absence of a linear combination, the risk of creating 
an errors-in-variables problem may arise. This may, in turn, lead to possibly biased coefficients 
for the accounting variables in the system.  
Thirdly, it is assumed that consensus analyst forecasts are unbiased. However, there is extant 
research which suggests otherwise64. Using biased forecasts introduces further potential for an 
errors-in-variables problem which leads to biased coefficients for accounting variables.   
There are also disadvantages associated with the use of last year’s valuation error as a proxy 
for ‘other information’ (Kungwal, Shen and Stark, 2013). First of all, this method of estimating 
other information requires the prior year’s accounting and market data to be available. 
Compared to the use of an analyst forecast, the scope of data loss is likely to be less in the use 
of last year’s valuation error. However, introducing the availability of prior year’s accounting 
data as a selection criterion is likely to induce bias in the sample selection process.   
The second drawback relates to the possibility of biased coefficients for the ‘other information’. 
As the last year’s valuation error is a noisy estimate of this year’s valuation error, this will 
                                                             
64 See Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Gu and Wu (2003), Hong and Kubik (2003), Hilary and Hsu 
(2013), Ke and Yu (2006), Lim (2001).  
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introduce an errors-in-variables problem (Greene, 1993). This problem should not bias the 
coefficients of the accounting variables as long as the error is not systematically correlated with 
those in the system. This may specifically pose a problem if the coefficient of the ‘other 
information’ is of interest to the researcher.  
The final drawback is associated with the issue of multicollinearity in the market value 
estimations. As the proxy for current ‘other information’ is last year’s value, the last year’s 
‘other information’ is one of the variables that help predict some or all of the current accounting 
variables (through the LID system). Hence, the last year’s “other information” is expected to 
partially correlate with some or all of the current values of accounting variables, which poses 
a multicollinearity problem in the market value estimations.      
The investigation of advantages and disadvantages of the two fundamental methods of 
estimating ‘other information’ reveals that, despite their merits, both methods suffer from a 
number of distinct problems. This thesis dismisses the first method (estimating other 
information by using one year-ahead consensus analyst forecast) due to the limitations on 
access to required datasets (via I/B/E/S). The second method (estimating other information by 
using last year’s valuation error) is adopted in empirical analyses and a comparison of the 
results for different proxies of ‘other information’ is provided in Chapter Eight.  
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6.6 BENCHMARK MODEL 
Following a detailed examination of the Ohlson (1995) Model and measurement of ‘other 
information’, a benchmark model is specified to examine the role of social and human capital 
in explaining the market value of firms in the UK. In Akbar and Stark (2003a) and Dedman et 
al. (2009), ‘other information’ is added to valuation models with an expectation of increased 
effectiveness. Therefore, Equations (26) and (27) can be extended to include estimates of ‘other 
information’, OIit, and SHC (social and human capital) index as a proxy for OI resulting in the 
following equations below: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(34) 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  =  𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(35) 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  =  𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(36) 
(Benchmark Model) 
Equation (35) forms the empirical accounting-based valuation model that will be used to 
explore the role of social and human capital in explaining the market value in this thesis. 
Sources of data, definitions of the variables and the details of the deflators used in estimating 
Equation (34)-(36) are provided in the following chapter.  
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 6.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter describes the key aspects of the research design focusing on the foundations of 
the Ohlson (1995) Model and its empirical specifications in the UK. The chapter starts with a 
rigorous theoretical examination of accounting-based equity valuation models and presents 
how the Ohlson Model is developed on the foundations of Residual Income Valuation Model. 
Next, the chapter concentrates on the role of ‘other information’ (v term) in explaining the 
market prices and examines different specifications of v term based on prior empirical research. 
Following the examination of empirical specifications of the v term, advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each estimation method are discussed. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with providing a benchmark model to examine the role of ‘other information’ in the 
context of this study. The following chapter provides the details of operationalisation of social 
and human capital measures and describes how a social and human capital (SHC) index is 
developed as a proxy for ‘other information’ in the benchmark model.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters explored the relevant theories and discussed the theoretical and empirical 
streams of research relating to the aims and objectives of this thesis. This chapter provides 
insights into accounting research and illustrates the proposed methodology and the research 
design used to test hypothesised relationships presented in Chapter Five. The major themes in 
this chapter comprise accounting research, the sample and data, operational measures and 
research design. 
7.2 ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
7.2.1 A Review of Research Methods in Accounting Research 
In consideration of the research method and methodology in accounting, Ryans, Scapens, and 
Theobold (2002) provide a useful review for the researchers in this field. Despite the limitation 
that their work is over 10 years old, it is one of the most widely cited source on the research 
methods in accounting research. In their review, Ryans, Scapens, and Theobold (2002) 
acknowledge that accounting research experienced a period of rapid growth and development 
in the 1970s. During this period, research in accounting mostly comprised the application of 
financial economics to accounting problems, and, to a great extent, utilised the methods 
commonly used in economics. Despite the use of such methods, the methodology of accounting 
research was given little critical thought by researchers. At the end of 1970s, the American 
Accounting Association (AAA) commissioned a report titled Empirical Research in 
Accounting: A Methodological Viewpoint (Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya, 1979). This report 
provided a detailed review of the alternative methodological approaches to accounting 
research; however concluded that “ideal” method of accounting research should be the 
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scientific method (as opposed to naturalistic methods). Before this period, studies in accounting 
literature rarely used positivism as a research paradigm and “the correct method for accounting 
research seemed self-evident” (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995:74). 
Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya’s report (1979) maintained that scientific method begins with a well-
formulated theory and is founded on a review of prior literature. Furthermore, they argue that 
the method is expressed in the form of a mathematical model. Subsequently, based on the 
theory, hypotheses which identify relationships between sets of dependent and independent 
variables are formulated. Following the formulation of hypotheses, data are collected by using 
a highly structured and predetermined design and then analysed by mathematical and statistical 
techniques. The final phase of this method is to generalise the results. Therefore, scientific 
approach is rooted in abstraction, reductionism, and statistical methods. Despite 
acknowledging that this approach may not be suitable in all areas of accounting research, 
Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1979) describe scientific method as the most desirable approach for 
researchers in accounting.  
The conclusion of Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya’s (1979) report was challenged by scholars such 
as Tomkins and Groves (1983). Despite recognising the role of scientific methods, they argued 
that it should not be prioritised over other methods. Furthermore, they emphasised that different 
areas of accounting research may require a variety of methods to explore certain ideas. The 
fundamental aim of Tomkins and Groves’ (1983) paper was to underline the need for focusing 
on the nature of phenomenon being explored in order to select the most appropriate approach 
for a particular type of research. They maintained that the selection of an appropriate research 
methodology cannot be achieved devoid of any attention to ontological and epistemological 
assumptions which underpin the research in question. The alternative to scientific approach is 
naturalistic approach which is based on realism, holism, and analytical method.  
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In consideration of different methodological approaches, Tomkins and Groves (1983) draw on 
the six fold classification of the social world developed by Morgan and Smircich (1980). This 
classification provides the six fundamental ontological65 assumptions, which can be linked to 
particular schools of thought in the social sciences, and has inferences for the methodological 
approaches that are used in accounting research. These ontological assumptions refer to reality 
as: 1) a concrete structure, 2) a concrete process, 3) a contextual field of information, 4) a 
symbolic discourse, 5) a social construction, 6) a projection of human imagination (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980: 492). These assumptions range from the objective to the subjective, 
providing a basis for different research methods. Arising from these assumptions, accounting 
research comprises different research areas using different methods. Therefore, next section 
goes on to discuss the taxonomy of accounting research and identifies the category this study 
falls into.  
7.2.2 Taxonomy of Accounting Research 
As outlined in the previous section, six ontological assumptions (Morgan and Smircich, 1980), 
ranging from the objective to the subjective, also provides a basis for different areas of 
accounting research.  A subjective-objective continuum is used by Hopper and Powell (1985) 
to construct their taxonomy of accounting research. Hopper and Powell (1985) expand upon 
the earlier work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), which provides a classification of organisational 
research. In their classification, Burrell and Morgan (1979) draw on two independent 
dimensions: the nature of social sciences and the nature of society. The social science 
dimension comprises four distinct but related elements: assumptions about ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology (Hopper and Powell, 1985: 431). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) collapse these elements into the single subjective-objective continuum.  
                                                             
65 Beliefs about physical and social reality.  
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Following their work, Hopper and Powell (1985) combine the four dimensions of ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology into a single subjective-objective continuum 
which they used to represent a range of methods applied in the social sciences. In their 
taxonomy, Hopper and Powell (1985) also include a second dimension, which characterises a 
range of methods researchers adopt towards society. At one extreme, researchers are interested 
in exploring how society is held together; and consequently in understanding the “regulation” 
and the creation of order in society. At the other extreme, researchers are interested in analysing 
conflicts and inequalities in society, and subsequently in assessing the potential for “radical 
change”. In between the two extremes, there are researchers with intermediate positions since 
these dimensions are continua, not dichotomies. Hopper and Powell (1985) offer a useful 
framework for classifying accounting research through acknowledging the importance of social 
context and the impact of “wider social and political collectivities” (Hopper and Powell, 1985: 
450). Furthermore, their work is deemed authoritative in research on accounting methodology 
(Ahrens, 2008; Roslender, 2012). Hopper and Powell’s taxonomy of accounting research is set 
out in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: Hopper and Powell's taxonomy of accounting research 
RADICAL CHANGE
REGULATION 
 
Based on this classification, accounting research is broadly classified into three categories, 
namely mainstream, interpretive and critical research. Hopper and Powell (1985) emphasise 
that classifying accounting research into three major categories is useful for understanding the 
nature and range of different types of research and methods used in these areas. This study falls 
into mainstream accounting research, which is principally concerned with the functioning of 
accounting. This thesis excludes the interpretive and the critical paradigms based on the 
motivation that interpretive and critical research evolve around the wider contexts of 
organisations and the societies in which accounting operates (Baker and Bettner, 1997) and 
attempt to describe and interpret of real world phenomena (Laughlin, 1995). The following 
section goes on to discuss mainstream accounting research and explains why this study is 
classified under this category.  
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7.2.3 Mainstream Accounting Research 
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, Burrell and Morgan (1979) refers to the leading paradigm in the 
bottom-right quadrant as “functionalism”. This paradigm combines an objectivist view with a 
concern for regulation. Functionalism is a term rooted in sociology that “regards society as a 
single system of interrelated elements, with each element of social life serving a specific 
function, and the role of the researcher being to discover the nature of those functions” (Ryans, 
Scapens and Theobald, 2002: 41). From this perspective, functionalism is similar to the 
majority of mainstream accounting research, which explores the functioning of accounting. 
This type of research has an objective view of society, refers to individual behaviour as 
deterministic, uses empirical observation, and adopts a positivist research methodology.  
Chua (1986) provides a similar classification of accounting research and describes the 
fundamental assumptions of mainstream accounting research, interpretative research and 
critical theory. Chua (1986) summarises epistemological (beliefs about knowledge) position of 
mainstream accounting research as theory and observation being independent of each other, 
and quantitative methods of data collection being desirable to facilitate generalisations. In 
Chua’s (1986) paper, the ontological assumption dominant in mainstream accounting research 
is physical realism. Empirical reality is objective and is presumed to be independent of the 
knower (the researcher). Human actors (such as researchers) are perceived as passive since 
they are not active makers of social reality. In mainstream accounting research, society and 
organisations are assumed to be stable, and control systems are established to manage any 
dysfunctional behaviour.  
Furthermore, Chua (1986) comments on the relationship between the accounting theory and 
practice, and maintains that there is a means-end dichotomy dominant in mainstream 
accounting research. This indicates that accountants should only be concerned with providing 
the decision-maker with information in an efficient and effective way rather than making 
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judgements about the needs or goals of the decision-maker (Chua, 1986). This perception leads 
to the conclusion that accounting is value neutral, and existing structures are taken for granted. 
It is worth noting that there are several consequences arising from the dominant assumptions 
in mainstream accounting research, which may be seen as the limitations of this stream66. 
7.2.4 Epistemological Approach  
Epistemology is referred to as the theory of knowledge and justification. It deals with how we 
know what we know, what justifies us in believing what we believe, and what standards of 
evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world and human experience (Audi, 2010). 
In Plato's dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates considers a number of theories as to what knowledge 
is, the last being that knowledge is true belief that has been “given an account of”(Peters, 
2009). An epistemological issue involves the question of what is (or should be) regarded as 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Epistemological considerations 
are of fundamental significance for any type of research as they inform the methodologies 
regarding the nature of knowledge, or determine what is considered as a fact and where 
knowledge is to be sought (Sarantakos, 2005). Methodology as a research strategy translates 
ontological and epistemological principals into the guidelines that demonstrate how research 
has to be conducted (Cook and Fonow, 1990: 72).  
Positivism is referred to as “an epistemological position that advocates the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond” (Bryman, 2012: 28). 
The positivist approach in its modern sense was developed by the philosopher Auguste Comte 
during the early 19th century although its fundamental concepts can be traced back to the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment. Positivism maintains that knowledge should be based on 
real facts, not abstractions, thus knowledge is established on observations and experiments as 
                                                             
66 For a review, see Chua (1986). 
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opposed to the phenomenological paradigm of searching for the inner meaning or the essence 
of things (Robson, 2002). According to positivism, “there is only one logic of science, to which 
any intellectual activity aspiring to the title of ‘science’ must conform (Keat and Urry, 1975: 
25). Positivism is associated with various social theories and acts as a linkage to structural-
functional, rational choice and exchange-theory framework. Positivism has also become the 
basis of mainstream accounting research, which attempts to build a coherent, comprehensive, 
and hierarchical scientific system to test hypothesised relationships deduced from specific 
theories (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995). 
Positivistic research uses a hypothetico-deductive method and follows a set of specific 
procedures: first, a formally expressed general statement which attempts to test theory is 
introduced; second, the purpose of the theory is to generate hypotheses that can be tested and 
allows explanations of laws to be assessed (deductive principal); third, a careful 
operationalisation of constructs is achieved; fourth, constructs are measured; fifth, hypotheses 
are tested and finally, the theory is verified (Jankowicz, 2000). Positivism is referred to as a 
link between the theory and the research, and endeavours to test theory in order to increase 
predictive understanding of phenomena. 
This study adopts a deductive approach as the research design follows a specific order as 
described above. A deductive approach is chosen over an inductive approach based on the 
rationale that this thesis aims to test hypothesised relationships between social capital, human 
capital and firm market value deduced from relevant theories. Based on the literature reviews 
presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis, this thesis presents a number of hypotheses 
relating to the relationship between organisational social and human capital and firms’ market 
value. Subsequently, data on accounting, social and human capital measures are collected. 
Next, hypotheses are tested through relevant statistical analyses to examine whether the theory 
is verified. Hypothesis testing is concerned with validating or disconfirming existing theory. 
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Finally, a conceptual and analytical framework derived from the existing theory is used to 
explain the empirical findings. Figure 7.2 below summarises the design of this research. 
Figure 7.2: Research Design   
 
Consistent with the specific order of a deductive approach, next section describes the sample 
and data. Details of operationalization of social and human capital measures are also provided 
in the remainder of this chapter.  
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7.3 METHOD 
7.3.1 Sample and Data 
This thesis employs a sample of UK firms listed on FTSE All Share index for a period of 10 
years (2001-2010). This study explores the role of organisational social and human capital in 
determining the market value of firms during the period from 2001 to 2010. This time frame 
has been chosen to reflect the most recent activity67 across the UK firms in the sample. 
Furthermore, this time frame includes both the boom and bust periods such as dot-com boom 
(early 2000s) and 2007-08 financial crisis, which allows further investigation of various 
associations between the social and human capital measures and firms’ market value. Finally, 
this thesis aims to contribute to extant UK studies (e.g. Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012) on 
the impact of board connectivity by extending the time frame subject to analysis.  
This study uses a sample of UK firms which are constituents of FTSE All Share index. This 
research is centred on the UK data for a number of reasons. Firstly, the UK is the fifth leading 
economy in the world68, which makes this analysis interesting since extant studies on human 
and social capital have often focused on a single industry in the largest economies such as the 
US (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Soh, 2010; Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011; Yoo 
et al., 2009) and China (Cao, Simsek and Jansen, 2012; Wu, 2008, Wu et al., 2012), or 
examined their impacts in a particular context such as director selection (Johnson et al., 2011), 
entrepreneurial orientation (Cao, Simsek and Jansen, 2012), auditor choice and audit fees 
(Johansen and Pettersson, 2013) and partner selection (Shipilov, Li and Greve, 2011). 
Secondly, to date, there has been no attempt to explore the value relevance of social and human 
capital possessed at organisational level in a joint context. Previous research on board capital 
highlights that simultaneous analyses (beyond value relevance analyses) of social and human 
                                                             
67 At the time of acquiring network data on the UK firms.  
68 The information is based on International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (April 2017).  
 
 
157 
 
capital have been limited (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian, and Rajagopalan, 
2011). Hence, this study addresses this gap in board of directors research by examining the 
value relevance of social and human capital measures for a sample of UK firms over a period 
of 10 years. Thirdly, the role of non-physical, non-financial forms of capital, namely social and 
human capital, in determining firm market value has not been subject to empirical examination 
in the UK context after the recent financial crisis. This analysis allows us to develop a better 
understanding of the relationship between firms’ possession of social and human capital and 
firm market value during times of certainty and uncertainty.  
Accounting data for the UK firms were obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
professional which is one of the largest financial and economics databases in the world. All 
accounting and stock market data were cross checked against data disclosed in companies’ 
annual reports for consistency. Raw data for social and human capital measures were acquired 
from BoardEx database which provides detailed biographic information regarding directors on 
firm boards, and allows the identification of their personal ties. BoardEx provides a snapshot 
of interlocking directorate ties at a specific point in time.  
Following steps were taken to compute network metrics and generate human capital variables. 
Firstly, using the raw data on the UK director network (obtained from the BoardEx database), 
the network of FTSE All Share directors is identified using the unique equity index identifiers. 
Secondly, connections in the FTSE All Share director network during the period between 2001 
and 2010 are extracted based on the information on the time period in which the connection 
was established and ended. Thirdly, only director connections through firm boards are 
identified and classified according to the year. All connections with unknown years are 
excluded. Fourthly, data on historical and current connections are merged by years. Fifthly, 
interlocking directorate ties are transferred into Pajek and Ucinet network analysis tools to 
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generate network maps, which are utilised to compute positional metrics, namely centrality and 
structural hole measures. 
For human capital variables, firstly, data on UK director characteristics are classified based on 
the annual report year. Secondly, data on director employment and characteristics are merged 
using the unique director identifiers. Thirdly, using the data on director education, director 
qualifications are analysed and classified to generate variables on the highest degree, elite 
education and professional qualifications. Fourthly, data on education (with variables 
generated through the analysis of the data) are merged with the data on director employment 
and characteristics. Finally, data on network measures are merged with the data on human 
capital measures to obtain director level data on social and human capital. As described in the 
following section, all network and human capital measures are aggregated and divided by the 
board size to obtain organisational level measures. Organisational level measures are 
subsequently merged with the accounting data at the firm level (for the period 2001-2010) and 
used in the proposed model(s).  
7.3.2 Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The main purpose of this study to explore whether board social and human capital have 
significant explanatory power for the market value of firms. Therefore, dependent variable in 
the model is the market value for the firms listed on FTSE All Share index. Market value on 
Datastream is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue for each 
constituent. Data on market value were acquired using data item Market Value (MV).  
Independent Variables 
Independent variables can be classified into three major groups; namely accounting, human 
capital, and social capital variables. All variables are described in detail in the following 
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sections. Table 7.1 provides a summary of descriptions relating to dependent and independent 
variables (see Appendix I). 
- Insert Table 7.1 about here - 
Accounting variables 
Data on accounting variables for estimation are collected from Worldscope, and market data 
are retrieved from Datastream. The definition of the variables are presented as follows: 
1) Market value (MVit – Datastream item MV) - the market value for firm i for year t, is 
measured six months after its balance sheet date during that calendar year for financial 
years ending in all calendar years up until 2007, and four months after the balance sheet 
date for subsequent years. The rationale for measuring the market value with the 
specified lags after the balance sheet date is to reflect the maximum time that listed 
firms had to publish accounts following the end of their financial year in order to ensure 
that the accounting data are reflected in their market prices. Opening market value 
(OMV) is measured twelve months prior to market value; 
2) Book value (BVit) – book value for firm i at year t, is measured as the sum of preferred 
stock and common shareholders’ equity for the financial year ending in year t 
(Worldscope item – WC03995 – total shareholder’s equity); 
3) Earnings (Eit) – earnings for firm i at year t, are measured as the net income of the 
company for the financial year ending in year t (Worldscope item – WC01651- net 
income available to common);  
4) Dividends (Dit) – dividends for firm i at year t, are measured as the total cash common 
dividends paid on the company’s common stock during year t (Worldscope item – 
WC05376 – common dividends cash); 
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5) Research and Development expenditure (R&Dit) – research and development 
expenditures for firm i at year t, are measured as R&D expenses recognised in the 
income statement at year t (Worldscope item – WC01201- research and development 
expense); 
6) Capital contributions (CCit) – capital contributions for firm i at year t, are measured as 
the negative of the amount the firm received from the sale of common and/or preferred 
stock at year t (Worldscope item – WC04251 – net proceeds from sales/issue of 
common and preferred); 
7) Capital expenditures (CEit) – capital expenditures for firm i at year t, are measured as 
the funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions at 
year t (Worldscope item – WC04601- capital expenditures – additions to fixed assets); 
8) Sales (Sit) – sales for firm i at year t, is measured by gross sales and other operating 
revenue less discounts, returns and allowances at year t (Worldscope item – WC01001, 
net sales or revenues); 
9) Number of shares (NoSHARESit) – number of shares for firm i at year t, is measured 
by common shares outstanding (Worldscope item – WC05301 – common shares 
outstanding). 
Due to the potential distorting role of the deflator choice, models (34) – (36) are estimated 
using four deflators previously employed in valuation literature69: 
1) Number of shares outstanding, 
2) Sales, 
3) Opening market value, 
4) Closing book value.  
                                                             
69 This study follows Akbar and Stark (2003b) and Dedman et al. (2009) in its choice of deflators.  
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Social Capital Variables 
Social capital variables comprise centrality measures degree centrality (DEGCEN), closeness 
centrality (CLOSCEN), betweenness centrality (BETCEN), and eigenvector centrality 
(EIGCEN); and structural hole measures effective size (EFSIZE) and network constraint 
(AGGCON). All social capital variables were firstly measured at director (individual) level.  
Subsequently, all variables were aggregated to firm (organisational) level through dividing a 
firm’s total score for each variable by its board size. Therefore, for all network measures, 
average scores (measures) were used in regression analyses.  
The first centrality measure, degree centrality (DEGCEN) indicates a director’s level of 
activity. It is simply measured as the number of direct ties incident upon a given director (see 
Equations No. 1 and 2). Closeness centrality (CLOSCEN), the second centrality measure, 
determines how close a director is to other directors within the network. Closeness centrality 
is measured as the total geodesic distance from a given director to all other directors in the 
network (see Equations No. 3 and 4). The third measure, betweenness centrality (BETCEN) 
evaluates the extent to which an actor has power over other actors’ access to different regions 
of the network (Freeman, 1979). It is measured as the sum of estimated probabilities over all 
pairs of directors excluding the ith director (refer to Equations No. 5 and 6). The last centrality 
measure in this analysis, eigenvector centrality (EIGCEN), measures the extent to which a 
director is connected to other important actors in the network (Bonacich, 1972, 1987). It is 
measured as the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of an adjacency matrix; therefore 
eigenvector centrality is a weighted sum of not only direct connections but also indirect 
connections of every length (see Equations No. 7 and 8). Degree, closeness, and betweenness 
centrality measures were computed by using network analysis tool Pajek and eigenvector 
centrality was calculated by using Ucinet network analysis software.  
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Effective size (EFSIZE), the first structural hole measure, is a network measure of the number 
of structural holes a director spans in his/her ego network. It is measured as the number of alters 
to whom an ego is connected minus the redundancy of links between alters (see Equations No. 
9-11) Effective size captures the degree to which a board director holds a bridging position in 
the network (Burt, 1992, 1997a). The second structural hole measure, network constraint 
(AGGCON), is an index which measures how much a director is constrained by his/her alters 
(connections) in the network (Burt 1992). It is measured as the sum of squared proportions of 
director i’s relations that are directly or indirectly invested in the connection with contact j (see 
Equation No. 14). Effective size was calculated by using Ucinet network analysis software, 
and aggregate network constraint was computed by using Pajek network analysis tool.  
Human capital variables 
Human capital variables include Highest Degree (HIGHDEG), professional qualifications 
(PROF), elite education (ELITE), director age (AGE), prior board experience (BRDEXP), 
and organisational tenure (ORGTEN). All human capital variables were firstly created 
(measured) at director (individual) level. Subsequently, all variables were aggregated to firm 
(organisational) level through dividing a firm’s total score for each variable by the size of its 
board. Therefore, average score (measure) for each variable was used in regression analyses 
(Soda, Usai and Zaheer 2004).  
As elaborated in section 5.4.2, highest degree attained by a board director is an indicator of 
general human capital. Highest degree takes the value 1 if a director holds a bachelor’s degree 
(e.g. BA, BS, BSc), and zero otherwise. A list of bachelor degrees that meet the qualifying 
criteria is provided in the Table 7.2.  
- Insert Table 7.2 about here - 
 
 
163 
 
Highest degree (MASTER) takes the value 2 if a board director holds a master’s degree (e.g. 
MA, MSc, MBA), and zero otherwise. A list of master’s degrees that meet the qualifying 
criteria is provided in Table 7.3.  
- Insert Table 7.3 about here - 
Finally, highest degree variable is given the value 3 if a director holds a doctorate degree (e.g. 
DBA, DM, PhD), and zero otherwise. A list of doctorate degrees that meet the qualifying 
criteria is provided in Table 7.4. 
- Insert Table 7.4 about here - 
It is worth noting that it is conceivable, but rare to have a PhD or MSc degree without having 
completed an undergraduate degree. However, the database failed to disclose any information 
which could possibly shed light on this concern. All dummy variables were created based on 
available data on the degrees that directors completed in the past. Therefore, this limitation will 
be taken into consideration when interpreting the coefficients of educational variables.  
For further analyses, dummy variables for science and non-science degrees were created. 
Science degree is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a board director has completed 
an undergraduate or postgraduate degree in a discipline which is classified under natural 
sciences, and zero otherwise. Second variable non-science degree takes the value 1 if a board 
director has completed an undergraduate or postgraduate degree in disciplines which are 
broadly classified outside natural sciences. It is worth noting that this distinction is a relatively 
crude breakdown of science and non-science degrees, and therefore can be referred to as a 
limitation in this analysis. Lists relating to science and non-science degrees that meet the 
qualifying criteria are provided in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 respectively.  
- Insert Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 about here - 
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Professional qualifications (PROF) is another dummy variable which indicates whether a 
board director holds a business-related professional qualification. This variable is given the 
value 1 if the director holds a professional qualification (e.g. ACA, CFA, CPA), and zero 
otherwise. This decision is made based on the following criteria: a) the director holds a 
business-related professional qualification, or b) the director is a fellow or member of an 
institution which awards professional qualifications. A list of professional qualifications which 
meet the criteria is provided in Table 7.7. In addition to professional qualifications, directors 
who are members or fellows of professional bodies are also regarded as possessing a 
professional qualification. A list of qualified institutions is provided in Table 7.8.  
- Insert Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 about here - 
Another human capital measure, elite education, (ELITE) is a dummy variable which indicates 
whether a board director has achieved educational attainment from University of Oxford or 
University of Cambridge in the UK. The variable is coded 1 if the director holds an 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree from one of the elite institutions specified, and zero 
otherwise. A list of elite institutions (including colleges within University of Oxford and 
University of Cambridge) is provided in Table 7.9. 
- Insert Table 7.9 about here - 
For sensitivity checks, this study also examines the impact of directors’ educational attainment 
from different groups of UK universities on the market value of firms. These groups comprise 
Russell Group Universities, Pre-1992 Universities, Post-1992 Universities and Group 1994 
Universities in the United Kingdom. Therefore, four dummy variables were created70.  
The first dummy variable Russell takes the value 1 if a board director holds an undergraduate 
or postgraduate degree from a Russell Group University, and zero otherwise. A list of Russell 
                                                             
70 These variables were created based on the list of universities as of March 2012 for each group. 
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Group Universities is provided in Table 7.10. Russell Group Universities include University 
of Oxford and University of Cambridge (and colleges in both universities). This is chosen as a 
dummy variable because the self-selecting Russell Group Universities are all research active 
leading UK universities and are well known for their commitment to the highest levels of 
academic excellence.  
- Insert Table 7.10 about here - 
The second dummy variable Pre-1992 Uni takes the value 1 if a board director holds an 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree from a Pre-1992 University, and zero otherwise. A list 
of Pre-1992 Universities is provided in Table 7.11. The inclusion of this dummy variable is 
based on the perception that Pre-1992 Universities are prestigious and well-established 
universities in the UK.  
- Insert Table 7.11 about here - 
The third dummy variable Post-1992 Uni takes the value 1 if a board director holds an 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree from a Post-1992 University, and zero otherwise. A list 
of Post-1992 Universities is provided in Table 7.12. The inclusion of a dummy variable for 
Post-1992 Universities stems from the view that these modern universities with a post-1992 
charter were formerly polytechnics or colleges of higher education which used to provide 
vocational training in the UK. Therefore, the impact of such educational credentials is further 
explored in this study. Variables representing Pre-1992 and Post-1992 Universities are 
included separately in the specified models.  
- Insert Table 7.12 about here - 
The fourth dummy variable Group1994 Uni takes the value 1 if a board director holds an 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree from a Group 1994 University, and zero otherwise. A 
list of Group 1994 Universities is provided in Table 4.13. A dummy variable is also created for 
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Group 1994 Universities as the 1994 Group represents the UK’s leading research-intensive 
universities. Group 1994 Universities tend to have smaller student populations, which leads to 
the emergence of close-knit academic communities.  
- Insert Table 7.13 about here - 
Director age (AGE), another proxy for human capital, represents a director’s age in years. 
Prior board experience (BRDEXP) which denotes a director’s level of board experience. Prior 
board experience is measured as the number of quoted boards a director sat in the past. 
Organisational tenure (ORGTEN) is the last human capital variable, and represents the period 
of time a director has worked for an organisation. Thus, it is measured as the number of years 
that a director has held his/her position in a particular firm. All data relating to education, 
characteristics and employment of board directors were acquired from the BoardEx database, 
and dummy variables were created based on these data.  
Control Variables 
This research includes board independence (BRDIND) and industry dummies (IND) as the 
control variables in the benchmark model. Board independence (BRDIND) is measured as the 
percentage ratio of non-executive directors to all directors on a firm’s board. Board 
independence is likely to have a positive impact on firm value since non-executive directors 
are deemed to be more impartial in assessing managerial performance, thus lead to more 
effective corporate governance (Boeker, 1992, Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 4.10-4.17; Guest, 
2010; Young, 2000). However, several studies have demonstrated mixed evidence suggesting 
a negative or no relationship between board composition and firm performance (Bhagat and 
Black, 1997; Bozec, 2005; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998).  
Finally, this analysis includes industry dummies (IND) to control for industry-fixed effects on 
the market value of firms.  
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7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter describes the research approach followed in this study and explains the underlying 
factors determining the selection of the methodological approach adopted in this study. Next, 
the chapter describes the sample and data, and provides the details of how data on accounting, 
social and human capital measures were acquired and constructed to test related hypotheses in 
the proposed model. The following chapter provides the details of statistical analyses 
undertaken and presents the findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapter illustrated the proposed methodology and described the sample and data used 
for the analyses in this thesis. This chapter begins with outlining the preparation of variables 
for regression analyses and provides the descriptive statistics for accounting, social and human 
capital data (8.2). Following descriptive statistics, the chapter goes on to present the results 
relating to univariate analyses (8.3). After discussing the results for univariate analyses, section 
(8.4) and section (8.5) report the results relating to the baseline models and to hypothesised 
relationships on the demand of social and human capital and the impact they have on the market 
value of firms. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the findings (8.6). 
8.2 PREPARATION OF VARIABLES FOR REGRESSION ANALYSES AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
8.2.1 Accounting Variables 
All accounting data for the sample (2001-2010) were merged by using the ISIN codes and all 
financial firms were excluded from the sample following prior studies in the literature. The top 
and bottom 1% of observations for each deflated variable were removed to mitigate the impact 
of outliers in the analyses. This deletion criterion is a procedure that is often employed by 
researchers in the field of market-based accounting research (e.g. Akbar and Stark, 2003b; 
Dedman et al., 2009; Shen and Stark 2013). The deletion procedure is carried out as follows. 
First, all observations are ranked annually according to the values of different deflated 
variables, and those observations are deleted that are identified in the top and bottom 1%. It is 
worth noting that there are a large number of observations with a value of zero for variables 
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such as dividends, R&D expenditures, capital contributions and capital expenditures. For these 
variables, only the top 1% is deleted.    
The accuracy of the data was checked against database errors. The maximum and minimum 
values for all variables were compared using the hard copies of data published in annual reports 
of companies under consideration. All accounting variables are expressed in British pounds. 
Some firms had their accounting data expressed in other currencies. Those observations were 
deleted from the sample. Because of the use of different deflators, the number of observations 
varies with the deflator employed. Descriptive statistics for deflated accounting variables are 
provided in Tables 8.1-8.4.  
- Insert Table 8.1-8.4 about here- 
As tabulated in Table 8.1, the mean values for market value per share and book value per share 
are £4.59 and £1.87 respectively. The mean values for earnings per share and dividends per 
share are 18 pence and 13 pence respectively. Minimum values relating to dividends per share 
and R&D expenditure per share both equate to zero.  
Table 8.2 presents the descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by sales. 
Minimum values for market value and book value are 10 pence and 3 pence respectively 
whereas minimum values for dividends, R&D expenditure and capital expenditure are found 
as zero. Earnings have a mean value of 5 pence and a maximum value of 56 pence. Maximum 
value for the R&D expenditure is equal to £1.43. 
Table 8.3 presents the descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by the opening 
market value. Minimum values for market value and book value are 21 pence and 4 pence 
respectively whereas mean values for these variables are £1.12 and 52 pence.  Earnings have a 
mean value of 4 pence and a maximum value of 26 pence. Mean values for capital contributions 
and capital expenditure is 1 pence and 6 pence respectively.  
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Table 8.4 presents the descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by the closing 
book value. Minimum and maximum values for the market value are 32 pence and £26.62 
respectively whereas minimum values for dividends, R&D expenditure and capital expenditure 
equate to zero. Earnings have a mean value of 11 pence and a maximum value of £1.07. 
Maximum value for the R&D expenditure is equal to 56 pence. Descriptive statistics presented 
here are close to those presented in Akbar and Stark (2003b) and Akbar, Shah and Stark (2011).  
8.2.2 Social Capital Measures 
All social capital variables (measured at director level) were aggregated at firm level (total 
measures), and then were divided by board size to acquire board level average measures. 
Descriptive statistics for board-level network measures for the pooled sample and in each 
annual cross-section are provided in Table 8.5 and Tables 8.5a-8.5j respectively. 
- Insert Table 8.5 and Tables 8.5a-8.5j about here- 
As tabulated in Table 8.5, mean values for board-level degree centrality, closeness centrality, 
betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality are 0.006, 0.105, 0.002 and 0.314 
respectively. Board effective size has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 13.925. 
Minimum value of board aggregate constraint is 0.378 and it takes the value of 1.125 at 
maximum. A study by Lee (2010) demonstrates that aggregate network constraint can take 
values greater than 1.  These summary statistics are reasonably close to the findings of a UK 
study by Horton, Millo and Serafeim (2012).  
Descriptive statistics provided in Tables 8.5a-8.5j demonstrate that the mean values for 
network measures such as closeness centrality eigenvector centrality and effective size are in 
an increasing trend during the period leading up to 2007-08 financial crisis. It is observed that 
the maximum value for eigenvector centrality in Year 2007 is the highest across 10-year period. 
Descriptive statistics for board-level network measures for the pooled sample are also produced 
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based on their industry classification.  Summary statistics for the pooled sample classified by 
the industry are provided in Tables 8.6a-8.6i.  
- Insert Table 8.6a-8.6i about here- 
An analysis of the network measures based on the broad industry classification demonstrates 
that the highest mean value for eigenvector centrality belongs to Oil and Gas industry with a 
value of 1.103 whereas the highest mean value for aggregate constraint (0.457) is found for 
Technology firms. These figures suggest that directors in Oil and Gas firms possess ties to the 
most prominent actors in the network and directors in Technology firms have fewer structural 
holes, which lead to network closure and less opportunities for information brokerage (Burt, 
1992). Summary statistics also reveal that firms in Utilities industry have the highest mean 
value for effective size with a value of 4.815.  
8.2.3 Human Capital Measures 
All human capital variables were aggregated at firm level, and then were divided by board size 
to acquire board level average measures. Descriptive statistics for board-level human capital 
measures for the pooled sample and in each annual cross-section are presented in Table 8.7 and 
Tables 8.7-8.7j respectively.  
- Insert Table 8.7 and Tables 8.7a -8.7j about here- 
Average board age is found as 55.15 years, which is in line with prior UK studies such as 
Dedman (2000) and Mcknight and Tomkins (2004). The mean values for prior board 
experience and quoted boards to date are 1.56 and 3.11 respectively. Minimum values for board 
organisational tenure and prior board experience are both zero while maximum values for the 
same variables are 18 years and 6.20 respectively. Extant literature includes no similar UK 
studies employing prior board experience as the number of boards a director sat in the past. 
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Prior board experience71 is often constructed as a dummy variable which represents experience 
on different boards such as FTSE 100, minor and international boards (Singh, Terjesen and 
Vinnicombe, 2008).  
The mean value for board organisational tenure is found as 3.73 years. This is consistent with 
the statistics provided in the study of Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003). Busy board (the 
number of current boards) has a mean value of 1.95 and a maximum value of 5. Average board 
independence is 59.62 % percent. This is consistent with prior research by De Andres, Azofra 
and Lopez (2005) which reports an average of 70% independence (percentage of non-executive 
directors) for their sample consisting of 450 firms operating in Europe, Canada, the US and the 
UK.  
Descriptive statistics provided in Tables 8.7a-8.7j demonstrate that boards became more 
independent during the period between 2001 and 2010. Average board independence increased 
from 53.91% to 64.05% as expected in the aftermath of corporate governance reforms. Average 
elite education score demonstrates a declining trend during 2001-2010 period. It is observed 
that the average score dropped from 0.14 to 0.10 during and after the financial crisis. This may 
be explained by the social distancing that directors experience as a control mechanism in the 
corporate elite (Westphal and Khanna, 2003). Another interesting finding relates to the average 
score for professional qualifications. The mean value for board professional qualifications 
demonstrates an increasing trend during the period between 2001 and 2010. The mean value 
increased from 0.30 to 0.34 over the 10-year period, which is in line with the arguments 
developed in prior studies on the link between the presence of qualified directors and firm 
performance72.  
                                                             
71Prior board experience is measured as the number of boards a director sat in the past (excluding current boards). 
72 For example, see Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009); Payne, Benson and Finegold (2009); Ruigrok, Peck and 
Keller (2006).  
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Further, descriptive statistics for board-level human capital measures for the pooled sample are 
produced based on their industry classification.  Summary statistics for the pooled sample 
classified by the industry are provided in Tables 8.8a-8.8i.  
- Insert Table 8.8a-8.8i about here- 
An analysis of the human capital measures based on the broad industry classification 
demonstrates that the highest mean value for professional qualifications belongs to Industrial 
firms with a value of 0.38. In this segment, firms operate in sectors such as construction and 
materials, industrial transportation and support services. Health Care firms have the highest 
mean value for board independence whereas Utilities firms have boards with the highest mean 
value for elite education. It is also interesting to observe that the highest mean value for highest 
degree belongs to the firms operating in Oil and Gas industry.  
8.2.4 Correlation Matrix  
The relationships between the independent variables as well as the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables were analysed using correlation coefficients for every 
potential pair of variables in this study. This allows the investigator to identify whether 
predictors are highly correlated (above 0.80 or 0.90) (Field 2005). The correlation matrix 
presents all correlation coefficients for these relationships. Due to the number of measures 
utilised in this study, correlation matrices for accounting, human capital and network measures 
are provided separately in 8.9a-8.9c73. Correlation coefficients for the pairs of market value per 
share and other accounting variables, book value per share, earnings per share and dividends 
per share, are 0.62, 0.62 and 0.61 respectively. As presented in correlation matrix, network 
measures are highly correlated. Hence, these measures are included in the main effect model(s) 
separately. Highest correlation coefficients relate to potential pairs of degree centrality, 
                                                             
73 Correlation coefficients for every pair of variables are available upon request.  
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effective size and aggregate constraint. Coefficients relating to these potential pairs are above 
0.7. With respect to human capital measures, correlation coefficients for the pairs of quoted 
boards to date and prior board experience, quoted boards to date and busy board (the number 
of current boards) are found as 0.91 and 0.78 respectively. Hence, these measures are included 
in the models with additional caution. Overall, correlation matrix demonstrates that human 
capital measures are not highly correlated.    
For the purpose of this study, a more scientific approach was implemented to detect 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity tests were run using variance inflation factor (VIF) scores 
and tolerance values to investigate the presence of multicollinearity between each of the 
independent variables (Brown, 1991). An acceptable threshold level of VIF is to be less than 
10, and a tolerance value greater than 0.10 (Cohen et al., 2003; Hair et al., 1992). Results 
demonstrate that VIF scores including mean VIF and tolerance values are in the acceptable 
range. The mean VIF scores for the main effects models are below 2. The highest VIF scores 
and the lowest tolerance values are found for book values, dividends and capital expenditures. 
However, VIF scores relating to these variables are still less than 3, and tolerance value range 
from 0.38 and 0.58.  
8.3 UNIVARIATE ANALYSES  
In this section, a number of univariate analyses have been undertaken to explore the 
relationships between the dependent variable (market value) and network and human capital 
measures. The rationale behind undertaking a number of univariate analyses is to explore the 
possible relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables used in this 
study. Hence, panel regressions were run to analyse the relationship between market value, 
network and human capital measures. All regressions were run with firm-fixed effects and 
standard errors were clustered at the firm level. 
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8.3.1 Univariate Analyses – Market Value Per Share as the Dependent Variable  
Table 8.10 tabulates the results of the regressions run to explore the relationship between the 
dependent variable (market value per share) and network measures. Results demonstrate that 
one of the centrality measures (closeness centrality) and two structural hole measures (effective 
size and aggregate constraint) are associated with firm market value at 1% significance level.  
While closeness centrality and effective size have a positive association with market value, 
aggregate constraint is negatively associated.  
- Insert Table 8.10 about here- 
Tables 8.11 and 8.12 tabulate the results relating to the relationship between the dependent 
variable (market value per share) and human capital measures. It is found that board age, 
organisational tenure and professional qualifications are positively associated with market 
value. The strongest association is observed for board age at 1% significance level. Results 
also demonstrate that directors’ possession of non-science degree is positively associated with 
market value at 10% significance level.  
- Insert Tables 8.11 and 8.12 about here- 
8.3.2 Univariate Analyses – Market Value Deflated by Net Sales or Revenues as the 
Dependent Variable 
Table 8.13 tabulates the results of the regressions which explore the relationship between the 
dependent variable (market value deflated by net sales or revenues) and network measures. No 
significant association is found between the dependent variable and network measures when 
the market value is deflated by net sales or revenues. 
- Insert Table 8.13 about here- 
Tables 8.14 and 8.15 tabulate the results relating to the relationship between the dependent 
variable (market value deflated by net sales or revenues) and human capital measures. Results 
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demonstrate that there are only two human capital measures which are associated with the 
market value: professional qualifications and Russell group. Directors’ possession of business-
related professional qualifications is positively associated with the firm market value (at 1% 
significance level). Furthermore, presence of Russell Group graduates on the board is found to 
have a positive association with the market value at 10% significance level. 
- Insert Tables 8.14 and 8.15 about here- 
8.3.3 Univariate Analyses – Market Value Deflated by the Opening Market Value as the 
Dependent Variable 
Table 8.16 tabulates the results of the univariate analyses which explore the relationship 
between the dependent variable (market value deflated by the opening market value) and 
network measures. It is found that closeness centrality is associated with firm market value at 
10% significance level. No significant association is established between other network 
measures and the dependent variable. 
- Insert Table 8.16 about here- 
Tables 8.17 and 8.18 tabulate the results relating to the relationship between the dependent 
variable (market value deflated by the opening market value) and human capital measures. 
Only one of the human capital measures, professional qualifications, is found to be associated 
with the dependent variable and this association is significant at 5% significance level.  
- Insert Tables 8.17 and 8.18 about here- 
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8.3.4 Univariate Analyses – Market Value Deflated by the Closing Book Value as the 
Dependent Variable 
Table 8.19 tabulates the results of the univariate analyses which explore the relationship 
between the dependent variable (market value deflated by the closing book value) and network 
measures. No significant association is found between the dependent variable and network 
measures when it is deflated by the closing book value.  
- Insert Table 8.19 about here- 
Tables 8.20 and 8.21 tabulate the results relating to the relationship between the dependent 
variable (market value deflated by the closing market value) and human capital measures. No 
significant association is found between the dependent variable and human capital measures as 
demonstrated in the relevant tables. 
- Insert Tables 8.20 and 8.21 about here- 
8.3.5 Univariate Analyses – Total Network Measures, Total Human Capital Measures 
and Market Value as the Dependent Variable 
Following the univariate analyses exploring the relationship between the board-level network 
and human capital measures and market value (using 4 different deflators), more univariate 
analyses were undertaken to see whether there are any major differences in these associations 
when network and human-capital measures are aggregated at firm level (total measures).  
Table 8.22 tabulates the results of the univariate analyses exploring the relationship between 
total network measures and market value deflated by the number of shares. Associations 
established in section 8.3.1 are confirmed in further univariate analyses as closeness centrality, 
effective size and aggregate constraint are found to be associated with firm market value. These 
associations are significant at 1% significance level in the context of closeness centrality and 
effective size, and at 10% significance level in the context of aggregate constraint. 
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- Insert Table 8.22 about here- 
Tables 8.23 and 8.24 tabulate the results relating to the univariate analyses undertaken to 
explore the relationship between total human capital measures and market value per share. 
Analyses reveal that there are a number of human capital measures associated with firm market 
value when the measures are aggregated to obtain a firm-level measure. Age, professional 
qualifications, prior board experience and organisational tenure are all found to be positively 
associated with the market value at 1% significance level. Quoted boards to date, Cambridge 
and Russell Group scores are also found to have a significant association with firm market 
value at 10% and 5% levels.  
- Insert Tables 8.23 and 8.24 about here- 
Table 8.25 tabulates the results of the univariate analyses which explore the relationship 
between total network measures and market value deflated by net sales or revenues. No 
significant association is found between the dependent variable and network measures when 
the measures are aggregated at the firm level. Findings are consistent with the results presented 
in section 8.3.2.  
- Insert Table 8.25 about here- 
Tables 8.26 and 8.27 tabulate the results of the univariate analyses exploring the relationship 
between total human capital measures and market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
Results demonstrate that only one total measure of human capital, professional qualifications, 
is positively associated with the firm market value at 5% significance level. This finding is 
consistent with the associations presented in section 8.3.2.  
- Insert Tables 8.26 and 8.27 about here - 
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Table 8.28 presents the results of the univariate analyses which explore the relationship 
between total network measures and market value deflated by the opening market value. No 
significant association is found between the dependent variable and network measures when 
network measures are aggregated at the firm level. Further, none of the total human capital 
measures is found to be associated with the firm market value when it is deflated by the opening 
market value. Results of the univariate analyses exploring the relationship between total human 
capital measures and market value are presented in Tables 8.29 and 8.30.  
- Insert Tables 8.28, 8.29 and 8.30 about here - 
Finally, univariate analyses exploring the relationship between total network measures and 
market value (deflated by the closing book value) were undertaken. As tabulated in Table 8.31, 
there is no significant association between any of the total network measures and the dependent 
variable. This is consistent with the findings presented in section 8.3.4. Further, only one total 
human capital measure, Group 1994 score, is found to be associated with the market value 
when it is deflated by the closing book value. This association is negative and significant at 
10% significance level. Results relating to the associations between the total human capital 
measures and firm market value are tabulated in Tables 8.32 and 8.33.  
- Insert Tables 8.31, 8.32 and 8.33 about here- 
8.4 RESULTS RELATING TO THE BASELINE MODELS 
Following the discussion of the findings from the univariate analyses, this section presents the 
results relating to the baseline models derived from the Ohlson (1995) Model. Baseline models 
were run using panel regressions with and without firm-fixed effects, and standard errors were 
clustered at firm level.  As discussed in Chapter Seven, 4 different deflators were used to 
mitigate several econometric issues arising from the scale effects.  
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8.4.1 Results of the Baseline Models – Number of Shares as the Deflator 
Tables 8.34 and 8.35 tabulate the results of the baseline models in which the dependent variable 
is specified as the market value per share and independent variables included in the extended 
model(s) are book value, earnings, dividends, R&D expenditure, capital contributions, capital 
expenditure and lagged market value deflated by the number of shares. As tabulated in Table 
8.34, in Models (1)-(4), book value, earnings, dividends and capital contributions are found to 
be associated with market value at different significant levels (varying from 1% to 10%). In 
Model (5), the inclusion of lagged market value leads to significant changes in the coefficients 
and significance of book value and dividends in explaining the market value of firms. In Model 
(5), the association between earnings and market value is still significant despite the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable. Overall R2 is highest in Model (5) and range from 0.48 to 
0.83. 
- Insert Table 8.34 about here- 
When the models were run with firm-fixed effects, in addition to the associations presented in 
table 8.34, R&D and capital expenditures are also found to be positively associated with the 
firm market value in Models (3) and (4). This association is stronger in the context of R&D 
expenditure. In Model (5), results demonstrate book value and dividends remain positively 
associated with the market value after the addition of the lagged market value in the model. 
Overall R2 increases from 0.48 to 0.79 when the baseline model is extended in line with prior 
literature on value relevance. The sign and coefficients of the accounting variables discussed 
here are similar to those presented in prior studies (e.g. Akbar and Stark 2003b, Dedman et al., 
2009).  
- Insert Table 8.35 about here- 
 
 
181 
 
8.4.2 Results of the Baseline Models – Net Sales as the Deflator 
Tables 8.36 and 8.37 tabulate the results of the baseline models in which the dependent variable 
independent variables are deflated by net sales. As tabulated in Table 8.36, in Models (1)-(3), 
book value, earnings and dividends are found to be associated with market value at 1% and 5% 
significance levels. In Model (4), R&D and capital expenditures are found to be positively 
associated with the firm market value. In Model (5), the inclusion of lagged market value leads 
to significant changes in the coefficient and significance of earnings whereas book value and 
dividends remain significant at 1% significance level. In Model (5), lagged market value has a 
coefficient of 0.607 and is significant at 1% significance level.  Overall R2 is highest in Model 
(5) with a value of 0.72.  
- Insert Table 8.36 about here- 
When the models were run with firm-fixed effects, coefficients of book value, earnings and 
dividends are lower in Models (1)-(3). Dividends remain positively associated with the market 
value following its inclusion in all models (at 1% and 5% significance levels). R&D 
expenditure is also found to be positively associated with the firm market value in Models (3) 
and (4). In Model (5), book value, dividends and lagged market value remain positively 
associated with firm market value with lower coefficients except the book value. Overall R2 
range from 0.42 to 0.64 in Models (1)-(5).  
- Insert Table 8.37 about here- 
8.4.3 Results of the Baseline Models – Opening Market Value as the Deflator 
Results of the baseline models in which dependent and independent variables are deflated by 
the opening market value are tabulated in Tables 8.38 and 8.39. As tabulated in Table 8.38, the 
coefficients of book value and earnings are consistently positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. Capital contributions are also found to be negatively associated in all models 
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at 1% significance level following its inclusion. The association between the market value and 
lagged market value remains significant when opening market value is used as the deflator in 
the models. However, this association is significant at 10% level as opposed to 1% level 
established in the first two sets of analyses.  
- Insert Table 8.38 about here- 
When the models were run with firm-fixed effects, in addition to the associations presented in 
table 8.38, dividends, R&D expenditure and capital contributions are also found to be 
associated with the firm market value in Models (2)-(5). Following the inclusion of the lagged 
market value in Model (5), the coefficient of capital expenditure increases from 0.240 to 0.770 
and a positive association is observed at 5% significance level. No significant association is 
found between the lagged and current market value in Model (5). Overall R2 is significant ly 
lower than the R2 values presented in earlier analyses with a value ranging from 0.05 to 0.04. 
Results of the baseline models with firm-fixed effects are presented in Table 8.39. 
- Insert Table 8.39 about here- 
8.4.4 Results of the Baseline Models – Closing Book Value as the Deflator 
Results of the baseline models in which dependent and independent variables are deflated by 
the closing book value are tabulated in Tables 8.40 and 8.41. As tabulated in Table 8.40, the 
coefficients of earnings and dividends are consistently positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. Results also demonstrate that R&D expenditure and capital contributions 
are associated with firm market value with expected signs. Further, capital expenditure is found 
to be positively associated with market value in Model (4). Results relating to Model (5) 
provide evidence of a positive association between earnings, dividends and market value when 
the dependent and independent variables are deflated by the closing book value. Lagged market 
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value is also positively associated with firm market value as tabulated in Table 8.40. Overall 
R2 is highest for Model (5) with a value of 0.66 and lowest for Model (1) with a value of 0.26.  
- Insert Table 8.40 about here- 
When the models were run with firm-fixed effects, coefficients of earnings and dividends are 
consistently positive and significant at 1% level. Further, R&D and capital expenditures are 
found to be positively associated with firm market value following their inclusion in all models. 
Finally, in Model (5), a significant association is established between the lagged and current 
market value and this association is significant at 1% level. Overall R2 range from 0.26 to 0.58. 
- Insert Table 8.41 about here- 
8.5 RESULTS RELATING TO THE MAIN EFFECTS MODELS  
8.5.1 Factor Analysis  
This study employs the factor analysis technique to summarise network and human capital data 
into a few dimensions by condensing a large number of variables into a smaller set of latent 
variables or factors. As discussed in Chapter Seven, several measures are used as a proxy for 
different dimensions of SHC. Hence, by undertaking a factor analysis, these measures can be 
loaded on to fewer factors and used as a proxy for “other information” in the Ohlson (1995) 
model. Results of the univariate analyses were used to firstly determine which variables may 
explain the variability across the observations the most in the sample. Secondly, a factor 
analysis was performed by using the principal component extraction method. Thirdly, the 
proportion of variability explained by different factors were examined and factors which will 
be used in subsequent analyses were selected. Finally, the choice of factors were evaluated by 
using the orthogonal varimax rotation. This procedure ensures that factors are not correlated to 
each other. Results of factor analysis are presented in Tables 8.42a-8.42d. 
- Insert Tables 8.42a-8.42d about here- 
 
 
184 
 
As tabulated in Table 42d, social capital measures are loaded on to Factor 1. Closeness 
centrality, aggregate constraint and prior board experience have the highest factor loadings in 
Factor 1 following the rotation procedure. Hence, Factor 1 is referred to as “Network” index in 
the following analyses. Professional qualification score has the highest factor loading in Factor 
2, and age and organisational tenure are the two human capital measures driving Factor 3. 
Factor 2 and Factor 3 will be referred to as “Expertise” and “Experience” indices in multivariate 
analyses of the relationship between SHC and firm market value. 
8.5.2 Results of the Main Effects Model with SHC indices 
Table 8.43 tabulate the results relating to multivariate analyses exploring the relationship 
between SHC indices and firm market value. In all models, earnings, dividends and R&D 
expenditure are associated with the market value. This association is significant at various 
levels (1%, 5%, 10% levels). Further, capital contributions is found to be negatively associated 
with firm market value when it is deflated by the number of shares and the opening market 
value. Capital expenditure is also associated with market value when the deflator is selected as 
the number of shares and the closing book value. Overall R2 varies from 0.04 to 0.57. 
- Insert Tables 8.43 about here- 
Results relating to SHC indices vary across the models. Network index is found to be positively 
associated with firm value when the market value is deflated by the number of shares. This 
association is significant at 1% level. When the market value is deflated by the closing book 
value, only SHC index demonstrating an association with the market value is the expertise. 
This association is significant at 10% level. Results, to a great extent do not support the 
hypotheses and provide very limited evidence on the impact of SHC on firm value. 
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8.5.3 The Demand for Social and Human Capital 
Tables 8.44 and 8.45 tabulate the results of the panel regressions relating to the demand for 
social and human capital. A unique identifier was created to have one observation per director-
firm combination per year. Following the creation of the identifier, panel regressions with 
director-firm fixed effects were run to explore the demand for social and human capital at the 
individual level. Two measures, quoted current boards and quoted boards to date were used as 
dependent variables in these analyses. 
- Insert Tables 8.44 and 8.45 about here- 
Results demonstrate that network measures except eigenvector centrality have a significant 
impact on the number of current board seats held by the board directors. While centrality 
measures and effective size are positively associated with the number of current boards 
directors hold, aggregate constraint demonstrates a negative association. Organisation tenure 
and being a non-executive director are also found to increase the number of current boards 
directors serve on. When number of boards to date is selected as the dependent variable, the 
results continue to hold. Overall R2 in both sets of analyses range from 0.09 to 0.33.  
8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter outlined the preparation of variables for regression analyses and provided the 
descriptive statistics for accounting, social and human capital data. Following descriptive 
statistics, the chapter presented the results relating to univariate analyses which provide 
interesting insights into the social and human capital data. After discussing the results for 
univariate analyses, the remaining sections reported the results relating to the baseline models 
and to the hypothesised relationships on the demand of social and human capital and the impact 
they have on the market value of firms. Key findings, contributions, implications and 
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limitations of the study are discussed in the following chapter. Finally, a number of 
recommendations are made for further research.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explored the role of social and human capital in explaining the firm market value 
in the UK context. This chapter begins with a summary of the main findings in the context of 
research questions addressed in this study. This is followed by a discussion of the implications 
of the findings for both academic research and organisational practice. The chapter goes on to 
discuss the contributions and limitations of the study. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
number of suggestions for further research.  
9.2 KEY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
This chapter summarises the findings of this study. It refers to the conceptual framework of the 
study and links its research objectives with the conclusions of the study. Specific research 
objectives are proposed in the first chapter of this thesis and a summary of the conceptual 
framework is presented. Following the literature review and methodology chapters, the results 
from various analyses are presented in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, this chapter comprises the 
main contributions of the thesis, the implications for academics and business practitioners and 
suggestions for future research.  
The analyses and discussion presented in Chapter Eight provide insights into the key factors 
that influence the market value of firms in the UK. Results of this study are compared with 
prior studies and linked to relevant theories in social networks and board of directors literature. 
Tables illustrate the results from univariate and multiple regression analyses, which are used 
to explore the relationships between SHC measures and firm value and test the research 
hypotheses developed in Chapter Five. This study aims to explore the value relevance of 
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organisational social and human capital by using a sample of FTSE All Share firms. An 
empirical examination of the hypotheses developed from the conceptual framework reveals a 
set of inconclusive results.  
An analysis of descriptive statistics and further univariate analyses of SHC measures provide 
interesting insights. Average board independence increased from 53.91% to 64.05% following 
the corporate governance reforms in the UK. Average elite education score demonstrates a 
declining trend over a 10-year period between 2001 and 2010. Another interesting finding 
relates to presence of qualified directors in the corporate network. The mean value for board 
professional qualifications demonstrates an increasing trend during the period between 2001 
and 2010. This finding supports the arguments on the signalling theory and need for financial 
expertise on firm boards.  
Results from the univariate analyses demonstrate that one of the centrality measures (closeness 
centrality) and both structural hole measures (effective size and aggregate constraint) are 
strongly associated with the firm market value. While closeness centrality and effective size 
are found to increase the market value, aggregate constraint has a negative impact on the firm 
value as hypothesised in earlier chapters. Further, age, professional qualifications, prior board 
experience and organisational tenure are all found to be positively associated with the market 
value, however, these associations were not robust to the type of the deflator used in the 
analyses. It is worth noting that board-level and firm-level measures yield similar results in the 
context of univariate relationships. Hence, the use of average measures do not lead to any bias 
in the analyses performed in this thesis.  
In the context of Ohlson (1995) model, SHC measures were condensed into 3 major factors by 
using the factor analysis technique. The rationale behind reducing the number of variables 
stems from the econometrical nature of the “other information”. Three different dimensions 
emerged as a result of the analyses: network, expertise and experience. These factors were then 
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included in the baseline models to test the impact of SHC on firm market value. Only network 
and expertise dimensions are found to be significant in two models (when market value is 
deflated by the number of shares and by the closing book value).  However, these associations 
are not consistent across different models. Finally, the demand for human and social capital 
was tested at the individual level by using the director-level data. Results demonstrate that 
network measures heavily influence the number of current board seats held by the directors as 
well as the number of boards they sat on in the past. These findings require further investigation 
to establish whether endogeneity is an issue.  
9.3 NOVELTY AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
The novelty of this thesis is based on an extensive review of two distinct strands of literature 
and the development of a theoretical framework that links two distinct but interrelated forms 
of non-physical, non-financial capital, namely social and human capital to the market value of 
UK firms through a residual income valuation framework. Previous studies in value relevance 
research neither focus on social and human capital nor examine the association between 
organisational social and human capital and market value. This study develops an integrative 
theoretical framework that combines theories from management literature with fundamentals 
of market-based accounting research, and aims to investigate the link between organisational 
social capital, organisational human capital and market value of firms. 
Several contributions emerge from this research. The major theoretical contributions of this 
thesis are:  
First, one of the distinctive contributions is the development of an integrative model which 
attempts to explore social and human capital possessed at the organisational level, and link 
both constructs to firm market value through a residual income valuation framework. In this 
study, an integrative model that combines human capital theory with social network theory is 
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developed, and the impacts of these two distinct but interrelated forms of capital on the market 
value of firms are investigated. Majority of prior studies either focus on one form of non-
physical, non-financial capital or examine the impact of such forms on different organisational 
and individual outcomes. This is the first study to the best of author’s knowledge that 
simultaneously examines the impact of social and human capital on the market value of firms.  
Second, another contribution this thesis makes is that it is the first study to examine various 
network measures for a sample of UK firms listed on FTSE All Share index for a period of 10 
years (2001-2010). To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the most recent time period 
examined for a sample of UK firms. An examination of this time period contributes to extant 
literature in two dimensions. Firstly, it provides valuable data with respect to the board 
interlocks within FTSE All Share network during a period of 10 years. Secondly, observed 
time span includes periods which are affected by two global financial crises: the dot-com 
bubble (2000) and the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, this opportunity led to an 
investigation of the links between organisational social and human capital, and firm market 
value during times of financial crisis and non-crisis. 
Third, this study uses a multi-dimensional representation of organisational social and human 
capital in order to examine their impacts on the market value of firms. In this study, board of 
directors is considered as a social construction and aggregate measures of board members’ 
social and human capital are used to represent organisational social and human capital. This is 
different from previous studies which refer to attributes of top management teams or CEOs as 
a proxy for firm-level social and human capital. This thesis also contributes to research on 
board of directors, which has received more interest over the last two decades (Withers, 
Hillman, and Cannella, 2012). Despite being explored from various perspectives, literature on 
corporate boards lacks a strong consensus as to what an optimum board should look like 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill, 2013). Prior research has been 
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conceptual and the link between characteristics of corporate boards and market value has 
received limited attention (Haynes and Hillman 2010; Horton, Millo, and Serafeim 2012; 
Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill 2013). From this perspective, this thesis contributes to the 
sociology of markets and organisations by exploring the link between, organisational human 
capital, organisational social capital created and developed through interlocking directorate ties 
and firm market value.  
Fourth, this study contributes to extant literature on the value relevance of intangibles. To the 
best of author’s knowledge, the value relevance of social and human capital of this scope has 
not been examined in prior research. This thesis adds to existing literature by examining the 
value relevance of organisational social and human capital in the UK context. This study is a 
response to the call on the need for recognising the impact that intangibles have on firm 
performance (Davison 2010; Eckstein 2004; Lev 2001; Petty and Guthrie 2000; Zeghal and 
Maaloul, 2011). Hence, an examination of the link between two distinct but interrelated forms 
of non-financial capital and firms’ market value sheds light on the extent to which information 
on the intangible dimension of firms is relevant for equity valuation. 
9.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The research findings of this study have several useful implications. In this section, specific 
implications for academics and business practitioners will be highlighted.  
9.4.1 Implications for Academic Research 
This study offers a number of implications for academic research. 
First, this thesis explores the role of social and human capital in explaining the firm market 
value through a residual income valuation framework. Results of this study provide empirical 
evidence on the impact of two network measures, namely closeness centrality and aggregate 
network constraint, on the market value of firms. This study focused on the board interlocks 
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and examined the impact of interlocking directorships on the firm value in the UK context. 
Further research could build on this study and examine the impact of different types of 
connections such as political, personal and family ties on the market value of firms.  
Second, social and human capital are selected as the key constructs in this study based on the 
rationale that these forms have been subject to significant theoretical development and 
empirical attention in prior research. Value relevance literature could be advanced by 
examining whether other non-physical, non-financial forms of capital such as cultural and 
symbolic capital have a significant role in explaining firms’ market value.  
9.4.2 Implications for Business Practitioners 
This study offers a few important implications for firms listed on FTSE All Share index. This 
thesis examines the extent to which social and human capital possessed at organisational level 
influence the market value of firms.  
First, this study highlights the importance of network positions to firms’ market value. Results 
demonstrate that firms with higher closeness centrality and lower aggregate constraint enjoy 
higher values in the market. This finding underlines the significance of possessing a high 
volume of connections and bridging positions in the network.  
Network measures such as closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality and effective size 
demonstrate an increasing trend during the period leading up to 2007-08 financial crisis. It is 
observed that the maximum value for eigenvector centrality in Year 2007 is the highest across 
10-year period. Results suggest that, in the periods leading up to the crisis, directors with higher 
stocks of social capital are more desired by firms as they are expected to contribute to 
organisational performance in various dimensions such as increasing board effectiveness, 
signalling organisational legitimacy, providing access to resources and other ties as well as 
demonstrating greater strategic leadership during times of uncertainty.  
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Third, organisational human capital is found to influence a firm’s network position. Results 
demonstrate that majority of human capital measures are significantly linked to firms’ network 
measures. This suggests that organisational human capital is a determinant of organisational 
social capital. Despite failing to provide empirical evidence on the direct impact of human 
capital on the firm market value, findings of this study suggest that human capital possessed at 
organisational level is a driver of the firm’s position in the network.  
Fourth, the presence of qualified directors is found to have a significant impact on the market 
value of firms. Boards’ professional qualification score is associated with the firm value and 
this association is robust to the choice of deflators. Firms could benefit from this finding by 
ensuring that they have directors with financial expertise on their boards. Further qualitative 
research may be required to investigate how qualified directors influence board dynamics and 
contribute to the decision-making processes.  
9.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis needs to be examined in the light of its limitations. The limitations reported in this 
study relate to general limitations of theoretical or conceptual issues as well as its chosen 
methodology. The study should be interpreted under the following limitations: 
• Literature on board social capital, empirical literature in particular, is not so extensive and 
most of the issues which are comparatively new to the research context may cause 
inconsistencies and drawbacks in the assumptions and findings.  
• The sample consists of non-financial firms listed on FTSE All Share index operating in 
various industries, a fact which indicates that this study is not able to make generalisations at 
the industry level. The results are representative of medium and large-sized firms in the UK, 
and are not necessarily generalisable to specific sectors and to other countries.   
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• A number of constructs representing organisational social and human capital have been 
examined in order to give a holistic perspective rather than concentrating on one issue.  
• This study focused on board of directors as being representative of human and social capital 
possessed at organisational level. Despite acknowledging that human and social capital 
possessed by an organisation’s workforce may be equally significant in determining firm’s  
financial and market performance, board of directors as “the very uppermost echelon of 
corporations” (Johnson, 2004: 39) are deemed to play a critical role of monitoring and advising 
management as well as assisting firms with resource dependence that in turn influences firms’ 
financial performance (He and Huang, 2011; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Daily and 
Ellstrand, 1996).  
• Network and human capital measures are firstly aggregated, and then averaged to create 
variables at board level. Despite performing a factor analysis to create a SHC index at the firm 
level, this approach may also pose some limitations on the findings of this study.  
• This study focuses on external organisational social capital and fails to account for internal 
organisational social capital in the analyses. The selected sample comprises firms listed on 
FTSE All Share index which disclose information on annual reports and whose market values 
are publicly available. Factors such as accessibility of boardrooms, longitudinal nature of the 
data analysed and difficulties in the measurement and interpretation of internal organisational 
social capital for a large sample influenced the decision of excluding internal dimension of 
organisational social capital in this study.  
• This study employs quantitative methods, which highlight the limitations of the techniques 
used in order to assure reliability unlike qualitative research methods which provide 
explanations and further theorisation (Robson, 2002). The use of qualitative methods could 
provide insights into how board members interact with each other during the decision-making 
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processes and how those interactions influence the functioning of the board. This could be 
addressed in future research.  
• In prior studies, organisational performance is referred to as an outcome of environmental, 
structural and managerial factors (Papadakis and Lioukas, 1996; Rajagopalan, Rasheed and 
Datta, 1993). Therefore, the lack of a strong relationship between organisational social and 
human capital and firms’ market value should be interpreted with caution. These relationships 
may be contingent upon various environmental and structural circumstances or there could be 
confounding effects.  
• Finally, this study adopted an extension of the Ohlson (1995) model to test the association 
between organisational social and human capital and market value of firms. The model itself 
poses a number of limitations74, which should be taken into consideration when interpreting 
the findings of this study.  
9.6 SUGGESTED AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on the findings of this study, this section presents various avenues for future research. 
First, future research should examine the relationship between organisational social and human 
capital and firms’ market value in different contexts. Researchers could explore this 
relationship in emerging and developing economies (e.g. Brazil, India, Russia, China and 
Turkey) to identify to what extent social and human capital possessed at the board level 
influence market value of firms. This will open up a promising research avenue on value-
relevance of organisational social and human capital in different cultural or national settings.  
Second, researchers could focus on the boards of directors as decision-making groups and 
explore the processes and factors that affect board effectiveness. Board processes include, but 
are not limited to, power, politics, learning and changing, and creativity and risk (Pettigrew 
                                                             
74 Limitations of the Ohlson (1995) Model are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  
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and McNulty, 1998; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).  It will be useful for executives to determine 
the factors that enhance board performance and, in turn, organisational performance.  
Third, the lack of empirical research on simultaneous analyses of social and human capital at 
the board level suggests that further research may offer fruitful direction for future research. 
Furthermore, different measures of board characteristics could provide extant research with 
more interesting findings. 
Fourth, the findings of this study are based on a quantitative longitudinal research design. 
Future research could use qualitative longitudinal methods as well as case studies to examine 
the validity of the findings. A qualitative research design could also offer useful insights into 
the functioning of boards and the interactions among board members.  
Finally, another significant research direction is to examine the association between other 
dimensions of organisational social capital and firms’ market value. This thesis focuses solely 
on the structural dimension of organisational social capital based on the rationale presented in 
the Chapter Two. Future research could investigate the value relevance of cognitive and 
relational dimensions of organisational social capital, which would make a useful contribution 
to social capital and value relevance literatures.  
9.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the study which have been derived from the findings 
of univariate and multiple regression analyses as reported in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
Furthermore, implications of the study for academics and practitioners are summarised with an 
aim to stimulate further interest in the investigation of determinants of firm market value. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with suggesting several avenues for further research that could 
provide useful insights into organisational social and human capital, and how they affect the 
market value of firms in different contexts.  
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Table 2.1: Definitions of Social Capital 
External vs. Internal Author Definitions of Social Capital 
External Baker 
“a resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then 
use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes in the 
relationship among actors” (1990: 619). 
 
Bell iveau, 
O’Reil ly and 
Wade 
“an individual’s personal network and elite institutional affiliations” 
(1996: 1572). 
 Bourdieu 
“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (1985: 248). 
  
“made up of social obligations (connections) which is convertible, in 
certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized 
in the form of a title of nobility” (1985: 243). 
 Bourdieu and Wacquant 
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition” (1992: 119). 
 Boxman, De Graaf and Flap 
“the number of people who can be expected to provide support and 
the resources those people have at their disposal” (1991: 52). 
 Burt 
“friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you 
receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital” (1992: 
9). 
  “the brokerage opportunities in a network” (1997b: 355). 
 Knoke 
“the process by which social actors create and mobilize their network 
connections within and between organizations to gain access to 
other social actors' resources” (1999: 18). 
 Portes “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (1998: 6). 
Internal Brehm and Rahn  
“the web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitate 
resolution of collective action problems” (1997: 999). 
 Coleman 
“Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a 
variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: 
They all  consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate 
certain actions of individuals who are within the structure”         (1990: 
302). 
 Fukuyama “the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (1995: 10). 
  
“Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set 
of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that 
permit cooperation among them” (1997). 
 Inglehart “a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge” (1997: 188). 
 Portes and Sensenbrenner 
“those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the 
economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if 
these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere” 
(1993: 1323). 
 Putnam 
“features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social 
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit”      (1995: 67). 
 
Thomas 
 
 
“those voluntary means and processes developed within civil society 
which promote development for the collective whole” (1996: 11). 
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Both Adler and Kwon 
“Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its 
source lies in the structure and content of the actor's social relations. 
Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it 
makes available to the actor” (2002: 23) 
 Loury 
“naturally occurring social relationships among persons which 
promote or assist the acquisition of skil ls and traits valued in the 
marketplace... an asset which may be as significant as financial 
bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our 
society” (1992: 100). 
 Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
“the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises 
both the network and the assets that may be mobilized through that 
network” (1998: 243). 
 Pennar “the web of social relationships that influences individual behavior and thereby affects economic growth” (1997: 154). 
 
Schiff 
“the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations 
among people and are inputs or arguments of the production and/or 
util ity function” (1992: 160). 
 Woolcock “the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social networks” (1998: 153). 
Adapted from Adler and Kwon (2002: 20). 
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  Table 2.2: Framework for Conceptualising Inter-organisational Networks 
Structure Function  Consequences 
Open Networks 
Members do not all know each 
other 
Inclusive – heterogeneous 
membership 
 
Information arbitrage 
Negotiation power 
Control 
 
Competitive advantage 
Differentiation in 
performance 
Value creation  
Maintenance costs 
Closed Networks 
Members know each other 
Exclusive – homogeneous 
membership 
 
 
Information diffusion 
Reciprocity 
Support 
Maintaining collective norms 
 
Trust 
Sense of belonging 
Obligations 
Effective sanctions 
Exclusion 
Adapted from Antcliff, Saundry and Stuart (2007).  
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Table 7.1: Dependent, Independent Variables, and Their Definitions 
 DEFINITIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
  
MV Market value of firm i at year t 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Accounting Variables  
BV Book value of firm i at year t 
E Net income of firm i at year t 
DIV Dividends of firm i at year t 
R&D R&D expenditure of firm i at year t 
CC Capital contributions of firm i at year t 
CE Capital expenditure of firm i at year t 
Social Capital Variables  
DEGCEN Average degree centrality score of a firm’s board 
CLOSCEN Average closeness centrality score of a firm’s board 
BETCEN Average betweenness centrality score of a firm’s board 
EIGCEN Average eigenvector centrality score of a firm’s board 
EFSIZE Average effective size of a firm’s board 
AGGCON Average aggregate constraint score of a firm’s board 
Human Capital Variables  
HIGHDEG Average highest degree score of a firm’s board 
PROF Average professional qualifications score of a firm’s board 
ELITE Average elite education score of a firm’s board 
AGE Average director age of a firm’s board 
BRDEXP Average prior board experience of a firm’s board 
ORGTEN Average organisational tenure of a firm’s board 
Control Variables  
BRDIND The proportion of non-executive directors on a firm’s board 
IND Industry dummies 
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Table 7.2: List of Bachelor Degrees 
AB 
AB (High Hons) 
AB (Hons) 
AB (Summa Cum Laude) 
AB (cum laude) 
AB (magna cum laude) 
AB Degree 
B Acc(Hons) 
BA 
BA (Cum Laude) 
BA (Distinction) 
BA (Hons) 
BA (magna cum laude) 
BA (summa cum laude) 
BA Accountancy & Economics 
BA in Business and Industrial Administration 
BA in Engineering and Applied Physics 
BA in Political Science 
BAS (Bachelor of Arts and Science) 
BASc 
BAppSc (Bachelor of Applied Science) 
BBA 
BBA (Cum Laude) 
BBA (Hons) 
BBA (magna cum laude) 
BBA (summa cum laude) 
BBS (Bachelor of Business Studies) 
BBS (Hons) 
BCA 
BCL 
BCh (Bachelor of Surgery) 
BCom 
BCom (Distinction) 
BCom (Hons) 
BComm 
BComm (Hons) 
BCompt (Hons) 
BE 
BE (Hons) 
BEc 
BEc (Hons) 
BEcon 
BEcon (Hons) 
BEd 
BEd (Hons) 
BEng 
BEng (Distinction) 
BEng (Hons) 
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BFA (Bachelors of Fine Arts Program) 
BJ 
BM 
BME 
BPharm 
BPhil 
BPhil in Economics 
BS 
BS (Distinction) 
BS (Hons) 
BS (Phi Beta Kappa) 
BS (cum laude) 
BS (magna Cum Laude) 
BS (summa Cum Laude) 
BS in Mechanical Engineering 
BSBA 
BSBA (Hons) 
BSBA (cum laude) 
BSBA (magna cum laude) 
BSE 
BSE (summa cum laude) 
BSEE 
BSME 
BSc 
BSc (Distinction) 
BSc (Eng) 
BSc (Hons) 
BSc (Hons) in Mathematics 
BSc (Hons) in Mineral Project Appraisal 
BSc (Tech) 
BSc Chemistry 
BSc in Chemistry 
BSc in Economics 
BSocSc (Bachelor of Social Sciences) 
BTEC 
BTech 
BTech (Hons) 
Baccalaureus Procurationis (BProc) 
Bachelor of Accounting Science (BCompt) 
Bachelor of Applied Arts and Sciences 
Bachelor of Applied Science (BAS) 
Bachelor of Business Science (Hons) 
Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS) 
Bachelor of Education 
Bachelor of Jurisprudence 
Bachelor of Laws 
Bachelor of Social Science (BSocSc) (Hons) 
Bachelor of Social Sciences (BSocSc) 
Bachelor's Degree 
Bachelor's Degree (Hons) 
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Bachelor's Degree (cum laude) 
Bachelor's Degree (magna cum laude) 
Bbus (Bachelor of Business) 
Degree 
Degree (Hons) 
Degree (Hons) in Physics 
Degree (Joint Hons) 
Degree (summa cum laude) 
Degree in Biochemistry 
Degree in Ecoomics 
Degree in Historical Science 
Degree in History 
Degree in Mathematics 
Degree in Mining Engineering 
LLB 
LLB (Hons) 
LLB (magna cum laude) 
LLL 
LLL (Hons) 
MBBCh 
MBBS 
MBBS (Hons) 
MBChB 
SB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
Table 7.3: List of Master’s Degrees 
DEA 
Executive MBA 
Executive Masters in Business Administration 
International MBA 
LLM 
LLM (Hons) 
LLM (cum laude) 
LLM (magna cum laude) 
MA 
MA (Hons) 
MA (cum laude) 
MA in History 
MA in Law 
MA in Law and Economics 
MASc 
MBA 
MBA (Cum Laude) 
MBA (Distinction) 
MBA (High Distinction) 
MBA (Hons) 
MBA (magna cum laude) 
MBSc 
MCT 
MCom 
MComm 
ME 
MEc 
MEd 
MEng 
MEng (Hons) 
MEngSc 
MFA 
MHA 
MPA 
MPH 
MPS (Master of Professional Studies) 
MPhil 
MS 
MS (Hons) 
MSE 
MSEE 
MSW 
MSc 
MSc (Hons) 
MSc (cum laude) 
MSc in Finance 
MSc in Mineral Project Appraisal 
MTech 
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Master of Applied Finance 
Master of Business Economics (MBE) 
Master of Business Leadership (MBL) 
Master of Economics 
Master of Environmental Science (MESc) 
Master of International Affairs 
Master of Letters (MLitt) 
Master of Management (MM) 
Master of Theology (ThM) 
Master's Degree (Hons) 
Master's Degree (summa cum laude) 
Masters (Hons) 
Masters Degree 
Masters Degree (Distinction) 
Masters in Literature 
Masters in Management Programme 
Masters in Public and Private Management (MPPM) 
Masters of International Management 
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Table 7.4: List of Doctorate Degrees 
DBA 
DBA (Hons) 
DDS 
DEng (Doctor of Engineering) 
DM (Doctor of Management) 
DMSc 
DPM 
DPhil 
DSc 
DSc (Hons) 
DUniv 
Doctor of Dental Medicine (DMD) 
Doctor of Economics 
Doctor of Education (DEd) 
Doctor of Jurisprudence 
Doctor of Law 
Doctor of Letters 
Doctor of Medicine and Master of Surgery (MDCM) 
Doctor of Osteopathy (DO) 
Doctor of Science 
Doctorate 
Doctorate (Hons) 
Doctorate of Ministry 
Dr Ing 
Honorary Doctor of Business Administration 
JD 
JD (Cum Laude) 
JD (Hons) 
JD (magna Cum Laude) 
LLD 
LLD (Hons) 
MD 
MD (Hons) 
MD (cum laude) 
MD (magna cum laude) 
PhD 
PhD (Hons) 
PhD (Magna Cum Laude) 
PhD (cum laude) 
PhD (summa cum laude) 
PhD in Mathematics 
PhD in Mechanical Engineering 
PhD in Sociology 
PharmD 
SJD 
ScD 
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Table 7.5: List of Science Degrees 
BA in Engineering and Applied Physics 
BCA 
BCh (Bachelor of Surgery) 
BE 
BE (Hons) 
BEng 
BEng (Distinction) 
BEng (Hons) 
BM 
BPharm 
BS in Mechanical Engineering 
BSE 
BSE (summa cum laude) 
BSEE 
BSME 
BSc (Eng) 
BSc (Hons) in Mathematics 
BSc (Tech) 
BSc Chemistry 
BSc in Chemistry 
BTech 
BTech (Hons) 
Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS) 
DDS 
DEng (Doctor of Engineering) 
DMSc 
DPM 
Degree (Hons) in Physics 
Degree in Biochemistry 
Degree in Mathematics 
Degree in Mining Engineering 
Doctor of Dental Medicine (DMD) 
Doctor of Medicine and Master of Surgery (MDCM) 
Doctor of Osteopathy (DO) 
Dr Ing 
MASc 
MBBCh 
MBBS 
MBBS (Hons) 
MBChB 
MBSc 
MCT 
MD 
MD (Hons) 
MD (cum laude) 
MD (magna cum laude) 
ME 
MEng 
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MEng (Hons) 
MEngSc 
MSE 
MSEE 
MTech 
Master of Environmental Science (MESc) 
PhD in Mathematics 
PhD in Mechanical Engineering 
PharmD 
ScD 
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Table 7.6: List of Non-science Degrees 
B Acc (Hons) 
BA Accountancy & Economics 
BA in Business and Industrial Administration 
BA in Political Science 
BAS (Bachelor of Arts and Science) 
BBA 
BBA (Cum Laude) 
BBA (Hons) 
BBA (magna cum laude) 
BBA (summa cum laude) 
BBS (Bachelor of Business Studies) 
BBS (Hons) 
BCL 
BCom 
BCom (Distinction) 
BCom (Hons) 
BComm 
BComm (Hons) 
BCompt (Hons) 
BEc 
BEc (Hons) 
BEcon 
BEcon (Hons) 
BEd 
BEd (Hons) 
BFA (Bachelors of Fine Arts Program) 
BJ 
BPhil in Economics 
BSBA 
BSBA (Hons) 
BSBA (cum laude) 
BSBA (magna cum laude) 
BSc in Economics 
BSocSc (Bachelor of Social Sciences) 
Bachelor of Accounting Science (BCompt) 
Bachelor of Applied Arts and Sciences 
Bachelor of Business Science (Hons) 
Bachelor of Education 
Bachelor of Jurisprudence 
Bachelor of Laws 
Bachelor of Social Science (BSocSc) (Hons) 
Bachelor of Social Sciences (BSocSc) 
Bbus (Bachelor of Business) 
DBA 
DBA (Hons) 
DM (Doctor of Management) 
Degree in Ecoomics 
Degree in Historical Science 
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Degree in History 
Doctor of Economics 
Doctor of Education (DEd) 
Doctor of Jurisprudence 
Doctor of Law 
Doctor of Letters 
Doctorate of Ministry 
Executive MBA 
Executive Masters in Business Administration 
Honorary Doctor of Business Administration 
International MBA 
JD 
JD (Cum Laude) 
JD (Hons) 
JD (magna Cum Laude) 
LLB 
LLB (Hons) 
LLB (magna cum laude) 
LLD 
LLD (Hons) 
LLL 
LLL (Hons) 
LLM 
LLM (Hons) 
LLM (cum laude) 
LLM (magna cum laude) 
MA in History 
MA in Law 
MA in Law and Economics 
MBA 
MBA (Cum Laude) 
MBA (Distinction) 
MBA (High Distinction) 
MBA (Hons) 
MBA (magna cum laude) 
MCom 
MComm 
MEc 
MFA 
MHA 
MPA 
MPH 
MPS (Master of Professional Studies) 
MSW 
MSc in Finance 
Master of Applied Finance 
Master of Business Economics (MBE) 
Master of Business Leadership (MBL) 
Master of Economics 
Master of International Affairs 
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Master of Letters (MLitt) 
Master of Management (MM) 
Master of Theology (ThM) 
Masters in Literature 
Masters in Management Programme 
Masters in Public and Private Management  (MPPM) 
Masters of International Management 
PhD in Sociology 
SJD 
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Table 7.7: List of Professional Qualifications 
ACA 
CA 
CFA 
CMA 
CPA 
Certificate for Financial Advisors (CeFA) 
Certified 
Certified Accountant 
Certified Diploma in Accounting & Finance (CDipAF) 
Certified Finance and Treasury Professional 
Certified Financial Planner 
Certified Financial Planner (CFP) 
Certified Financial Risk Manager (CFRM) 
Certified General Accountant 
Certified Internal Auditor 
Certified Management Accountant 
Certified Management Consultant 
Certified Practising Accountant 
Certified Public Accountant 
Chartered Accountant 
Chartered Banker 
Chartered Certified Accountant 
Chartered Director 
Chartered Fellow 
Chartered Financial Analyst 
Chartered Financial Consultant 
Chartered Financial Planner 
Chartered Management Accountant 
Chartered Management Consultant  
Chartered Manager 
Chartered Marketer 
Chartered Public Finance Accountant (CPFA) 
Corporate Finance Qualification (CF) 
FCA 
Fellow Chartered Accountant 
ICAS 
Insolvency Practitioner (IP) 
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Table 7.8: Directors with “Associate, Associate Member, Companion, Fellow, and Member” Titles 
from Listed Institutions are Regarded as Possessing a Professional Qualification 
American Institute of Certified Management Accountants (AICMA) 
Association of Chartered Accountants in the United States (ACAUS) 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA USA) 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (UK) 
Australian Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada (CGA) 
Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment (CISI) (Securities & Investment Institute (SII) prior to 
01/11/2009) 
Chartered Institute of Bankers (CIB) (UK) 
Chartered Institute of Bankers in Scotland (CIOBS) 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (Hong Kong) 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (Malaysia) 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (Republic of Ireland) 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (UK) 
Chartered Institute of Marketing (CIM) (UK) 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) 
Chartered Management Institute (CMI) (UK) 
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA) (Formerly known as Hong Kong Society 
of Accountants (HKSA)) 
Institute of Certified Management Accountants (ICMA) 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Israel (ICPAI) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Australia (ICAA) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of British Columbia 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of South Africa 
Institute of Chartered Bankers 
Institute of Chartered Directors 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) 
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  Table 7.9: List of Elite Institutions 
All Souls College, Oxford University 
Balliol College, Oxford University 
Brasenose College, Oxford University 
Christ Church College, Oxford University 
Christ's College, Cambridge University 
Churchill College, Cambridge University 
Clare College, Cambridge University 
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University 
Corpus Christi College, Oxford University 
Darwin College, Cambridge University 
Downing College, Cambridge University 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge University 
Exeter College, Oxford University 
Girton College, Cambridge University 
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University 
Green College, Oxford University 
Hertford College, Oxford University 
Jesus College, Cambridge University 
Jesus College, Oxford University 
Judge Business School (Judge Institute of Management Studies prior to 09/2005), Cambridge 
University 
Keble College, Oxford University 
King's College Cambridge, University of Cambridge 
Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University 
Lincoln College, Oxford University 
Magdalen College, Oxford University 
Magdalene College, Cambridge University 
Mansfield College, Oxford University 
Merton College, Oxford University 
Murray Edwards College, Cambridge University (New Hall College, Cambridge University prior to 
06/2008) 
New College, Oxford University 
Newnham College, Cambridge University 
Nuffield College, Oxford University 
Oriel College, Oxford University 
Oxford University 
Pembroke College, Cambridge University 
Pembroke College, Oxford University 
Peterhouse College, Cambridge University 
Queen's College, Oxford University 
Queens' College, Cambridge University 
Robinson College, University of Cambridge 
Said Business School, Oxford University 
Selwyn College, Cambridge University 
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University 
Somerville College, Oxford University 
St Anne's College, Oxford University 
St Catharines College, Cambridge University 
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St Catherine's College, Oxford University 
St Cross College, Oxford University 
St Edmund Hall, Oxford University 
St Hilda's College, Oxford University 
St Hugh's College, Oxford University 
St John's College, Oxford University 
St John's College, University of Cambridge 
St Peter's College, Oxford University 
Templeton College, Oxford University 
Trinity College, Cambridge University 
Trinity College, Oxford University 
Trinity Hall, Cambridge University 
University College, Oxford University 
University of Cambridge 
Wadham College, Oxford University 
Wolfson College, Cambridge University 
Wolfson College, Oxford University 
Worcester College, Oxford University 
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Table 7.10: List of Russell Group Universities 
All Souls College, Oxford University 
Balliol College, Oxford University 
Brasenose College, Oxford University 
Cardiff Business School 
Cardiff University 
Christ Church College, Oxford University 
Christ's College, Cambridge University 
Churchill College, Cambridge University 
Clare College, Cambridge University 
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University 
Corpus Christi College, Oxford University 
Darwin College, Cambridge University 
Downing College, Cambridge University 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge University 
Exeter College, Oxford University 
Girton College, Cambridge University 
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University 
Hertford College, Oxford University 
Imperial College Business School 
Imperial College London (Department of Earth Science and Engineering) 
Imperial College London (Faculty of Natural Sciences) 
Imperial College London (The Imperial College of Science Technology and Medicine) 
Jesus College, Cambridge University 
Jesus College, Oxford University 
Judge Business School (Judge Institute of Management Studies prior to 09/2005), Cambridge 
University 
Keble College, Oxford University 
King's College Cambridge, University of Cambridge 
King's College London, University of London 
Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University 
Lincoln College, Oxford University 
London School of Economics (LSE) 
Magdalen College, Oxford University 
Magdalene College, Cambridge University 
Mansfield College, Oxford University 
Merton College, Oxford University 
Murray Edwards College, Cambridge University (New Hall College, Cambridge University prior to 
06/2008) 
New College, Oxford University 
Newcastle University (Formerly known as Newcastle Upon Tyne University) 
Newnham College, Cambridge University 
Nuffield College, Oxford University 
Oriel College, Oxford University 
Oxford University 
Pembroke College, Cambridge University 
Pembroke College, Oxford University 
Peterhouse College, Cambridge University 
Queen's College, Oxford University 
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Queen's University, Belfast 
Queens' College, Cambridge University 
Robinson College, University of Cambridge 
Said Business School, Oxford University 
Selwyn College, Cambridge University 
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University 
Somerville College, Oxford University 
St Anne's College, Oxford University 
St Catharines College, Cambridge University 
St Catherine's College, Oxford University 
St Cross College, Oxford University 
St Edmund Hall, Oxford University 
St Hilda's College, Oxford University 
St Hugh's College, Oxford University 
St John's College, Oxford University 
St John's College, University of Cambridge 
St Peter's College, Oxford University 
Trinity College, Cambridge University 
Trinity College, Oxford University 
Trinity Hall, Cambridge University 
University College London (UCL) 
University College, Oxford University 
University of Birmingham 
University of Bristol 
University of Cambridge 
University of Edinburgh 
University of Edinburgh Business School 
University of Glasgow 
University of Leeds 
University of Liverpool 
University of Manchester 
University of Nottingham 
University of Sheffield 
University of Southampton 
University of Warwick 
Wadham College, Oxford University 
Wolfson College, Cambridge University 
Wolfson College, Oxford University 
Worcester College, Oxford University 
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Table 7.11: List of Pre-1992 Universities 
Aberystwyth University 
All Souls College, Oxford University 
Aston University 
Balliol College, Oxford University 
Bangor University 
Brasenose College, Oxford University 
Brunel University 
Cardiff University 
Cass Business School, City University London 
Christ Church College, Oxford University 
Christ's College, Cambridge University 
Churchill College, Cambridge University 
City University London (CUL) 
Clare College, Cambridge University 
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University 
Corpus Christi College, Oxford University 
Cranfield University 
Darwin College, Cambridge University 
Downing College, Cambridge University 
Durham University 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge University 
Exeter College, Oxford University 
Girton College, Cambridge University 
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University 
Grey College, University of Durham 
Heriot-Watt University 
Hertford College, Oxford University 
Hull University Business School 
Jesus College, Cambridge University 
Jesus College, Oxford University 
Judge Business School (Judge Institute of Management Studies prior to 09/2005), Cambridge 
University 
Keble College, Oxford University 
Keele University 
King's College Cambridge, University of Cambridge 
King's College London, University of London 
Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University 
Lancaster University 
Lincoln College, Oxford University 
London School of Economics (LSE) 
Loughborough University 
Magdalen College, Oxford University 
Magdalene College, Cambridge University 
Mansfield College, Oxford University 
Merton College, Oxford University 
Murray Edwards College, Cambridge University (New Hall College, Cambridge University prior to 
06/2008) 
New College, Oxford University 
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Newcastle University (Formerly known as Newcastle Upon Tyne University) 
Newnham College, Cambridge University 
Nuffield College, Oxford University 
Oriel College, Oxford University 
Oxford University 
Pembroke College, Cambridge University 
Pembroke College, Oxford University 
Peterhouse College, Cambridge University 
Queen Mary, University of London (Formerly known as Queen Mary and Westfield College) 
Queen's College, Oxford University 
Queens' College, Cambridge University 
Robinson College, University of Cambridge 
Royal College of Art (RCA) (UK) 
Royal Holloway University of London 
Said Business School, Oxford University 
Selwyn College, Cambridge University 
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University 
Somerville College, Oxford University 
St Anne's College, Oxford University 
St Catharines College, Cambridge University 
St Catherine's College, Oxford University 
St Cross College, Oxford University 
St Edmund Hall, Oxford University 
St Hilda's College, Oxford University 
St Hugh's College, Oxford University 
St John's College, Oxford University 
St John's College, University of Cambridge 
St Peter's College, Oxford University 
Swansea University 
Trinity College, Cambridge University 
Trinity College, Oxford University 
Trinity Hall, Cambridge University 
University College, Oxford University 
University College, University of Durham 
University of Aberdeen 
University of Bath 
University of Birmingham 
University of Bradford 
University of Bristol 
University of Cambridge 
University of Dundee 
University of East Anglia 
University of Edinburgh 
University of Essex 
University of Exeter 
University of Glasgow 
University of Hull 
University of Kent 
University of Leeds 
University of Leicester 
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University of Liverpool 
University of London 
University of Manchester 
University of Nottingham 
University of Reading 
University of Salford 
University of Sheffield 
University of Southampton 
University of St Andrews 
University of Stirling 
University of Strathclyde 
University of Surrey 
University of Sussex 
University of Warwick 
University of York 
Wadham College, Oxford University 
Wolfson College, Cambridge University 
Wolfson College, Oxford University 
Worcester College, Oxford University 
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Table 7.12: List of Post-1992 Universities 
Anglia Ruskin University (Anglia Polytechnic University prior to 2005) 
Bath Spa University College 
Birmingham City University 
Bournemouth University 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
Coventry University 
De Montfort University (Leicester Polytechnic prior to 1992) 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
Imperial College London (The Imperial College of Science Technology and Medicine) 
Kingston University (Formerly known as Kingston Polytechnic) 
Leeds Metropolitan University 
Liverpool John Moores University 
London Metropolitan University 
London South Bank University 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
Middlesex University 
Napier University 
Northumbria University 
Nottingham Trent University 
Oxford Brookes University 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh (Formerly known as Queen Margaret College) 
Robert Gordon University 
Sheffield Hallam University 
Southampton Solent University 
Staffordshire University 
Teesside University 
Thames Valley University 
University College Northampton 
University of Bedfordshire 
University of Brighton 
University of Central Lancashire 
University of Chester 
University of Chichester 
University of Derby 
University of East London 
University of Glamorgan 
University of Gloucestershire 
University of Greenwich 
University of Hertfordshire 
University of Huddersfield 
University of Lincoln 
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST) 
University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
University of Plymouth 
University of Portsmouth 
University of Sunderland 
University of Wales Aberystwyth 
University of Wales Institute, Cardiff (UWIC) 
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University of Wales, Bangor 
University of Wales, Cardiff 
University of Wales, Swansea 
University of Westminster (Formerly known as Regent Street Polytechnic) (Polytechnic of Central 
London) 
University of Wolverhampton 
University of the Arts London 
University of the West of England 
Winchester College 
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Table 7.13: List of Group 1994 Universities 
Birkbeck College, London University 
Durham University 
Goldsmiths College, University of London 
Institute of Education (IOE) (UK) 
Lancaster University 
Loughborough University 
Queen Mary, University of London (Formerly known as Queen Mary and Westfield College) 
Royal Holloway University of London 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
University of Bath 
University of East Anglia 
University of Essex 
University of Exeter 
University of Leicester 
University of Reading 
University of St Andrews 
University of Surrey 
University of Sussex 
University of York 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by the number of shares 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
          
MV1 1757 4.59 5.04 1.58 3.11 5.57 3.41 0.17 55.99 
BV1 1757 1.87 2.34 0.65 1.21 2.19 5.49 0.07 38.16 
E1 1757 0.18 0.36 0.03 0.11 0.26 2.68 -1.56 3.59 
R&D1 1757 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 4.17 0.00 0.79 
D1 1757 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.17 4.22 0.00 1.94 
CC1 1757 -0.04 0.16 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -8.86 -2.83 0.82 
CE1 1757 0.26 0.58 0.05 0.12 0.26 7.72 0.00 7.96 
MV1 represents the market value per share. BV1 represents the book value per share. E1 represents the earnings per 
share. D1 represents the dividends per share. R&D1 represents the research and development expenditure per share. 
CC1 represents the capital contributions per share. CE1 represents the capital expenditures per share. 
  
Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by net sales or revenues 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
          
MV2 1731 1.48 1.83 0.55 0.97 1.74 5.38 0.10 27.38 
BV2 1731 0.57 0.66 0.23 0.41 0.67 6.27 0.03 12.56 
E2 1731 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.43 -0.88 0.56 
R&D2 1731 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.73 0.00 1.43 
D2 1731 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 1.82 0.00 0.20 
CC2 1731 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.76 -0.78 0.21 
CE2 1731 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.07 3.53 0.00 0.72 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. BV2 represents the book value deflated by net 
sales or revenues. E2 represents the earnings deflated by net sales or revenues. D2 represents the dividends deflated 
by net sales or revenues. R&D2 represents the research and development expenditure deflated by net sales or revenues. 
CC2 represents the capital contributions deflated by net sales or revenues. CE2 represents the capital expenditures 
deflated by net sales or revenues. 
  
Table 8.3: Descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by the opening market value 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
          
MV3 1716 1.12 0.40 0.86 1.11 1.34 0.59 0.21 2.76 
BV3 1716 0.52 0.36 0.28 0.43 0.66 1.66 0.04 2.56 
E3 1716 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 -2.74 -0.64 0.26 
R&D3 1716 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 3.17 0.00 0.17 
D3 1716 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 1.24 0.00 0.16 
CC3 1716 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -5.71 -0.48 0.15 
CE3 1716 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 2.49 0.00 0.52 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. BV3 represents the book value deflated by the 
opening market value. E3 represents the earnings deflated by the opening market value. D3 represents the dividends 
deflated by the opening market value. R&D3 represents the research and development expenditure deflated by the 
opening market value. CC3 represents the capital contributions deflated by the opening market value. CE3 represents 
the capital expenditures deflated by the opening market value.   
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Table 8.4: Descriptive statistics for accounting variables deflated by the closing book value 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
          
MV4 1746 3.23 2.89 1.51 2.43 3.81 3.07 0.32 26.62 
BV4 1746 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 . 1.00 1.00 
E4 1746 0.11 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.18 -1.11 1.07 
R&D4 1746 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 3.50 0.00 0.56 
D4 1746 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.11 3.17 0.00 0.82 
CC4 1746 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -4.74 -0.80 0.37 
CE4 1746 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.19 2.86 0.00 1.24 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. E4 represents the earnings deflated by the closing 
book value. D4 represents the dividends deflated by the closing book value. R&D4 represents the research and 
development expenditure deflated by the closing book value. CC4 represents the capital contributions deflated by the 
closing book value. CE4 represents the capital expenditures deflated by the closing book value. 
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Table 8.5: Descriptive Statistics for board-level network measures for the pooled sample 
  
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75   skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 1757 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.695 0.001 0.018 
Boardclosenesscentrality 1757 0.105 0.057 0.090 0.125 0.146 -0.962 0.001 0.186 
Boardbetweencentrality 1757 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.834 0.000 0.016 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 1757 0.314 1.530 0.000 0.004 0.055 10.134 0.000 29.854 
Boardeffectivesize 1757 3.736 2.199 1.933 3.446 5.131 0.750 1.000 13.925 
Boardaggregateconstraint 1757 0.378 0.148 0.274 0.347 0.439 1.354 0.134 1.125 
          
          
Tables 8.5a - 8.5j: Descriptive Statistics for board-level network measures in each annual cross-section 
->Year = 2001          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 136 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.940 0.001 0.016 
Boardclosenesscentrality 136 0.066 0.047 0.003 0.088 0.103 -0.471 0.001 0.137 
Boardbetweencentrality 136 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 1.989 0.000 0.010 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 136 0.082 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.007 7.974 0.000 4.492 
Boardeffectivesize 136 2.618 1.488 1.000 2.411 3.583 0.806 1.000 7.939 
Boardaggregateconstraint 136 0.431 0.162 0.322 0.393 0.493 1.279 0.152 1.125 
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-> Year = 2002          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 140 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.855 0.001 0.016 
Boardclosenesscentrality 140 0.065 0.047 0.003 0.088 0.103 -0.427 0.001 0.137 
Boardbetweencentrality 140 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 2.143 0.000 0.012 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 140 0.094 0.551 0.000 0.000 0.011 7.554 0.000 4.902 
Boardeffectivesize 140 2.653 1.534 1.000 2.283 3.690 0.799 1.000 7.849 
Boardaggregateconstraint 140 0.431 0.167 0.318 0.388 0.493 1.302 0.151 1.125 
          
          
          
-> Year = 2003          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 151 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 1.073 0.002 0.018 
Boardclosenesscentrality 151 0.081 0.052 0.004 0.103 0.121 -0.703 0.001 0.144 
Boardbetweencentrality 151 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 2.855 0.000 0.016 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 151 0.087 0.635 0.000 0.000 0.003 8.464 0.000 5.682 
Boardeffectivesize 151 3.057 1.678 1.686 3.012 4.294 0.497 1.000 8.701 
Boardaggregateconstraint 151 0.394 0.142 0.293 0.363 0.477 1.132 0.167 0.926 
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-> Year = 2004          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 161 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.584 0.002 0.016 
Boardclosenesscentrality 161 0.097 0.056 0.078 0.120 0.138 -0.928 0.001 0.164 
Boardbetweencentrality 161 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.353 0.000 0.010 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 161 0.344 1.440 0.000 0.004 0.097 7.860 0.000 15.325 
Boardeffectivesize 161 3.611 2.092 1.800 3.519 4.931 0.554 1.000 10.363 
Boardaggregateconstraint 161 0.381 0.154 0.274 0.351 0.444 1.381 0.134 0.926 
          
          
          
-> Year = 2005          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 176 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.564 0.002 0.015 
Boardclosenesscentrality 176 0.107 0.055 0.104 0.127 0.145 -1.157 0.001 0.174 
Boardbetweencentrality 176 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 2.010 0.000 0.015 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 176 0.396 1.327 0.000 0.013 0.143 6.516 0.000 13.335 
Boardeffectivesize 176 3.755 2.184 1.928 3.547 5.259 0.634 1.000 10.885 
Boardaggregateconstraint 176 0.383 0.154 0.286 0.348 0.447 1.381 0.135 0.926 
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-> Year = 2006          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 180 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.525 0.002 0.014 
Boardclosenesscentrality 180 0.109 0.055 0.106 0.128 0.145 -1.221 0.001 0.171 
Boardbetweencentrality 180 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.214 0.000 0.010 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 180 0.538 1.931 0.000 0.023 0.248 7.092 0.000 20.268 
Boardeffectivesize 180 3.846 2.321 1.882 3.528 5.358 0.766 1.000 12.904 
Boardaggregateconstraint 180 0.373 0.147 0.273 0.338 0.434 1.158 0.138 0.926 
          
          
          
-> Year = 2007          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 195 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.417 0.002 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 195 0.117 0.053 0.118 0.135 0.150 -1.524 0.001 0.168 
Boardbetweencentrality 195 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.409 0.000 0.011 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 195 0.296 2.699 0.000 0.002 0.017 9.942 0.000 29.854 
Boardeffectivesize 195 4.134 2.302 2.370 3.790 5.740 0.727 1.000 13.925 
Boardaggregateconstraint 195 0.360 0.142 0.264 0.340 0.417 1.559 0.155 0.926 
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-> Year = 2008          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 202 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.345 0.002 0.011 
Boardclosenesscentrality 202 0.117 0.053 0.117 0.137 0.150 -1.471 0.001 0.169 
Boardbetweencentrality 202 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.378 0.000 0.011 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 202 0.407 1.482 0.001 0.010 0.073 4.705 0.000 9.777 
Boardeffectivesize 202 4.130 2.164 2.543 3.860 5.696 0.393 1.000 9.803 
Boardaggregateconstraint 202 0.361 0.136 0.264 0.330 0.421 1.367 0.156 0.926 
          
          
          
-> Year = 2009          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 205 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.475 0.002 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 205 0.126 0.050 0.125 0.143 0.156 -1.796 0.001 0.184 
Boardbetweencentrality 205 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 1.948 0.000 0.013 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 205 0.269 1.150 0.000 0.004 0.034 5.402 0.000 7.459 
Boardeffectivesize 205 4.169 2.272 2.524 3.979 5.476 0.702 1.000 10.733 
Boardaggregateconstraint 205 0.358 0.133 0.266 0.330 0.410 1.339 0.142 0.926 
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-> Year = 2010          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 211 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.289 0.002 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 211 0.133 0.053 0.131 0.151 0.165 -1.792 0.001 0.186 
Boardbetweencentrality 211 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 1.773 0.000 0.013 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 211 0.463 1.550 0.006 0.038 0.221 5.559 0.000 12.007 
Boardeffectivesize 211 4.485 2.481 2.580 4.267 6.166 0.482 1.000 11.297 
Boardaggregateconstraint 211 0.348 0.137 0.245 0.321 0.412 1.396 0.139 0.926 
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Tables 8.6a - 8.6i: Descriptive Statistics for board-level network measures for the pooled sample classified by the industry 
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Basic Materials        
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 109 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.448 0.002 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 109 0.101 0.059 0.072 0.122 0.146 -0.804 0.001 0.184 
Boardbetweencentrality 109 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 2.716 0.000 0.013 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 109 0.388 1.228 0.000 0.004 0.090 3.881 0.000 6.646 
Boardeffectivesize 109 3.653 1.980 2.029 3.486 5.011 0.432 1.000 9.627 
Boardaggregateconstraint 109 0.366 0.138 0.249 0.339 0.463 1.026 0.185 0.926 
          
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Consumer Goods        
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 252 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.283 0.001 0.013 
Boardclosenesscentrality 252 0.103 0.060 0.078 0.123 0.149 -0.840 0.001 0.184 
Boardbetweencentrality 252 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.996 0.000 0.011 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 252 0.242 0.926 0.000 0.006 0.084 6.573 0.000 8.898 
Boardeffectivesize 252 3.542 2.198 1.857 3.200 4.823 0.822 1.000 10.744 
Boardaggregateconstraint 252 0.403 0.185 0.267 0.350 0.478 1.356 0.161 1.125 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Consumer Services 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 426 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.674 0.002 0.018 
Boardclosenesscentrality 426 0.107 0.056 0.092 0.128 0.146 -1.020 0.001 0.186 
Boardbetweencentrality 426 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.578 0.000 0.013 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 426 0.465 2.151 0.000 0.007 0.088 9.473 0.000 29.854 
Boardeffectivesize 426 3.943 2.245 2.071 3.787 5.364 0.719 1.000 13.925 
Boardaggregateconstraint 426 0.363 0.141 0.270 0.331 0.424 1.488 0.154 0.926 
          
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Health Care         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 71 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.900 0.003 0.013 
Boardclosenesscentrality 71 0.090 0.064 0.003 0.124 0.141 -0.539 0.002 0.166 
Boardbetweencentrality 71 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 1.817 0.000 0.008 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 71 0.226 0.678 0.000 0.003 0.088 3.980 0.000 4.105 
Boardeffectivesize 71 3.332 2.230 1.000 3.060 4.789 0.961 1.000 10.885 
Boardaggregateconstraint 71 0.393 0.146 0.272 0.354 0.493 0.446 0.183 0.648 
          
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Industrials         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 655 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.409 0.002 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 655 0.106 0.054 0.092 0.124 0.144 -1.043 0.001 0.182 
Boardbetweencentrality 655 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 1.791 0.000 0.016 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 655 0.162 0.860 0.000 0.003 0.031 9.404 0.000 12.007 
Boardeffectivesize 655 3.762 2.146 1.941 3.528 5.079 0.731 1.000 12.904 
Boardaggregateconstraint 655 0.382 0.136 0.301 0.356 0.432 1.595 0.160 0.926 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Oil & Gas         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 85 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.008 1.211 0.003 0.016 
Boardclosenesscentrality 85 0.118 0.051 0.116 0.134 0.146 -1.509 0.002 0.174 
Boardbetweencentrality 85 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 2.392 0.000 0.012 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 85 1.103 3.488 0.001 0.012 0.231 3.857 0.000 20.268 
Boardeffectivesize 85 3.775 2.373 2.067 3.111 4.444 1.019 1.000 10.206 
Boardaggregateconstraint 85 0.321 0.118 0.250 0.315 0.376 0.909 0.134 0.648 
          
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Technology         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 78 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.509 0.002 0.010 
Boardclosenesscentrality 78 0.086 0.060 0.002 0.114 0.132 -0.509 0.001 0.171 
Boardbetweencentrality 78 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 1.799 0.000 0.007 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 78 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.001 0.007 5.745 0.000 0.221 
Boardeffectivesize 78 2.899 1.911 1.000 2.628 3.604 1.022 1.000 7.891 
Boardaggregateconstraint 78 0.457 0.163 0.326 0.455 0.616 0.104 0.218 0.766 
          
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Telecommunications        
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 29 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.872 0.003 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 29 0.088 0.070 0.003 0.127 0.141 -0.396 0.002 0.169 
Boardbetweencentrality 29 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 1.223 0.000 0.009 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 29 0.150 0.398 0.000 0.001 0.011 2.750 0.000 1.537 
Boardeffectivesize 29 3.318 2.505 1.000 2.125 5.924 0.490 1.000 7.792 
Boardaggregateconstraint 29 0.409 0.156 0.298 0.412 0.512 0.145 0.185 0.648 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Utilities         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
Boarddegreecentrality 52 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.23 0.004 0.012 
Boardclosenesscentrality 52 0.132 0.048 0.125 0.153 0.162 -1.849 0.002 0.184 
Boardbetweencentrality 52 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 1.46 0.000 0.01 
Boardeigenvectorcentrality 52 0.571 1.628 0.005 0.049 0.271 3.703 0.000 8.055 
Boardeffectivesize 52 4.815 2.27 3.239 4.666 6.154 0.552 1 11.297 
Boardaggregateconstraint 52 0.288 0.111 0.217 0.258 0.321 1.492 0.139 0.648 
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Table 8.7: Descriptive Statistics for board-level human capital measures for the pooled sample 
 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 1757 3.79 2.16 2.36 3.33 4.75 1.45 0.00 18.00 
BoardAge 1757 55.15 3.44 52.89 55.31 57.50 -0.27 42.67 66.00 
Boardquotedboardstodate 1757 3.51 1.32 2.56 3.33 4.38 0.55 1.00 9.80 
BusyBoard 1757 1.95 0.61 1.50 1.86 2.29 1.02 1.00 5.00 
PriorBoardExperience 1757 1.56 0.92 0.88 1.44 2.11 0.80 0.00 6.20 
BoardEliteEdu 1757 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.20 1.04 0.00 0.67 
BoardProfQual 1757 0.33 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.43 0.51 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 1757 0.84 0.51 0.50 0.80 1.15 0.47 0.00 2.38 
BoardSciencedegree 1757 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.89 0.00 0.33 
BoardnonSciencedegree 1757 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.82 0.00 0.70 
BoardCambridge 1757 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.53 0.00 0.50 
BoardOxford 1757 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.83 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 1757 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.55 0.00 0.88 
BoardGroup1994 1757 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67 0.00 0.50 
BoardPre1992Uni 1757 0.30 0.20 0.15 0.29 0.43 0.34 0.00 0.88 
BoardPost1992Uni 1757 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.45 0.00 0.38 
BoardIndependence (%) 1757 59.62 14.42 50.00 60.00 71.43 -0.35 0 100 
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Table 8.7a - 8.7j: Descriptive Statistics for board-level human capital measures in each annual cross-section 
-> Year = 2001          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 136 3.67 2.33 2.13 3.18 4.65 1.59 0.00 14.40 
BoardAge 136 53.92 3.74 51.58 54.29 56.43 -0.37 42.67 62.00 
Boardquotedboardstodate 136 3.11 1.32 2.14 2.88 3.88 0.78 1.00 7.23 
BusyBoard 136 1.93 0.72 1.43 1.76 2.25 1.22 1.00 4.62 
PriorBoardExperience 136 1.18 0.75 0.60 1.04 1.71 0.66 0.00 3.47 
BoardEliteEdu 136 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.90 0.00 0.57 
BoardProfQual 136 0.30 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.43 0.69 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 136 0.80 0.50 0.38 0.75 1.12 0.52 0.00 2.11 
BoardSciencedegree 136 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.07 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 136 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.82 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 136 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.49 0.00 0.43 
BoardOxford 136 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.67 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 136 0.25 0.20 0.11 0.25 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.86 
BoardGroup1994 136 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.52 0.00 0.33 
BoardPre1992Uni 136 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.25 0.41 0.34 0.00 0.75 
BoardPost1992Uni 136 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.43 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 136 53.91 16.85 42.86 50 66.67 -0.13 0 100 
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-> Year = 2002 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 140 4.14 2.29 2.76 3.54 5.00 1.67 0.83 15.40 
BoardAge 140 54.40 3.66 51.67 55.00 56.93 -0.42 44.38 62.14 
Boardquotedboardstodate 140 3.22 1.30 2.35 3.00 4.00 0.62 1.00 7.43 
BusyBoard 140 1.93 0.68 1.50 1.82 2.20 1.06 1.00 4.40 
PriorBoardExperience 140 1.29 0.81 0.69 1.17 1.75 0.60 0.00 3.43 
BoardEliteEdu 140 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.93 0.00 0.60 
BoardProfQual 140 0.30 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.75 
BoardHighestDegree 140 0.85 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.17 0.42 0.00 2.17 
BoardSciencedegree 140 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.11 0.00 0.22 
BoardnonSciencedegree 140 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.54 0.00 0.50 
BoardCambridge 140 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.52 0.00 0.50 
BoardOxford 140 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.30 0.00 0.43 
BoardRussellGroup 140 0.28 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.40 0.46 0.00 0.83 
BoardGroup1994 140 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.44 0.00 0.50 
BoardPre1992Uni 140 0.31 0.20 0.17 0.29 0.50 0.19 0.00 0.83 
BoardPost1992Uni 140 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.59 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 140 54.60 15.65 42.86 50.00 66.67 -0.26 0.00 83.33 
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-> Year = 2003          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 151 3.91 2.32 2.33 3.44 4.90 1.45 0.23 13.83 
BoardAge 151 54.29 3.27 52.29 54.67 56.57 -0.42 43.29 61.33 
Boardquotedboardstodate 151 3.19 1.21 2.29 3.13 3.80 0.49 1.00 6.75 
BusyBoard 151 1.87 0.63 1.45 1.75 2.13 1.23 1.00 4.40 
PriorBoardExperience 151 1.32 0.78 0.78 1.25 1.77 0.61 0.00 3.89 
BoardEliteEdu 151 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.90 0.00 0.57 
BoardProfQual 151 0.31 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.43 0.52 0.00 0.83 
BoardHighestDegree 151 0.83 0.50 0.40 0.83 1.10 0.56 0.00 2.30 
BoardSciencedegree 151 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.60 0.00 0.33 
BoardnonSciencedegree 151 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.56 0.00 0.50 
BoardCambridge 151 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.70 0.00 0.50 
BoardOxford 151 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.31 0.00 0.40 
BoardRussellGroup 151 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.58 0.00 0.86 
BoardGroup1994 151 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.47 0.00 0.50 
BoardPre1992Uni 151 0.31 0.19 0.17 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.00 0.86 
BoardPost1992Uni 151 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.15 0.00 0.20 
BoardIndependence (%) 151 53.95 14.47 44.44 54.55 64.71 -0.31 0.00 84.62 
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-> Year = 2004          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 161 3.78 1.94 2.40 3.46 4.92 1.03 0.86 10.88 
BoardAge 161 54.72 3.14 52.86 55.00 56.83 -0.46 44.86 61.57 
Boardquotedboardstodate 161 3.30 1.30 2.43 3.20 4.00 1.15 1.00 9.80 
BusyBoard 161 1.92 0.65 1.43 1.83 2.22 1.18 1.00 4.50 
PriorBoardExperience 161 1.38 0.84 0.80 1.25 1.89 1.39 0.00 6.00 
BoardEliteEdu 161 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.88 0.00 0.67 
BoardProfQual 161 0.32 0.16 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.62 0.00 0.83 
BoardHighestDegree 161 0.84 0.51 0.50 0.78 1.10 0.56 0.00 2.30 
BoardSciencedegree 161 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.04 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 161 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.73 0.00 0.56 
BoardCambridge 161 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.47 0.00 0.50 
BoardOxford 161 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.42 0.00 0.44 
BoardRussellGroup 161 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.00 0.83 
BoardGroup1994 161 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.32 0.00 0.29 
BoardPre1992Uni 161 0.31 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.43 0.34 0.00 0.83 
BoardPost1992Uni 161 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.40 0.00 0.27 
BoardIndependence (%) 161 57.04 14.55 50.00 57.14 66.67 0.09 14.29 100 
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-> Year = 2005          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 176 3.65 2.00 2.22 3.16 4.73 1.06 0.00 11.50 
BoardAge 176 54.82 3.21 52.63 55.00 57.14 -0.46 43.50 61.33 
Boardquotedboardstodate 176 3.40 1.27 2.47 3.24 4.29 0.46 1.00 7.13 
BusyBoard 176 1.97 0.62 1.50 1.90 2.35 0.74 1.00 3.88 
PriorBoardExperience 176 1.43 0.83 0.85 1.22 2.00 0.62 0.00 3.83 
BoardEliteEdu 176 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.85 0.00 0.55 
BoardProfQual 176 0.33 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.83 
BoardHighestDegree 176 0.85 0.52 0.50 0.78 1.13 0.48 0.00 2.25 
BoardSciencedegree 176 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 176 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.75 0.00 0.60 
BoardCambridge 176 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.46 0.00 0.43 
BoardOxford 176 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.68 0.00 0.45 
BoardRussellGroup 176 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.00 0.78 
BoardGroup1994 176 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.14 0.00 0.33 
BoardPre1992Uni 176 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.44 0.29 0.00 0.78 
BoardPost1992Uni 176 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.53 0.00 0.38 
BoardIndependence (%) 176 58.68 13.43 50.00 57.14 66.67 -0.09 25.00 88.89 
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-> Year = 2006 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 180 3.65 2.02 2.47 3.25 4.42 1.17 0.25 12.13 
BoardAge 180 55.25 3.14 53.22 55.65 57.41 -0.49 43.38 61.67 
Boardquotedboardstodate 180 3.55 1.24 2.75 3.39 4.37 0.35 1.00 7.00 
BusyBoard 180 2.01 0.59 1.57 2.00 2.33 0.65 1.00 3.79 
PriorBoardExperience 180 1.54 0.86 0.89 1.42 2.11 0.54 0.00 4.17 
BoardEliteEdu 180 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.97 0.00 0.54 
BoardProfQual 180 0.34 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.43 0.25 0.00 0.83 
BoardHighestDegree 180 0.85 0.53 0.50 0.75 1.20 0.48 0.00 2.38 
BoardSciencedegree 180 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.81 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 180 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.98 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 180 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.33 0.00 0.38 
BoardOxford 180 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.12 2.02 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 180 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.22 0.38 0.59 0.00 0.78 
BoardGroup1994 180 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.00 0.38 
BoardPre1992Uni 180 0.30 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.41 0.00 0.86 
BoardPost1992Uni 180 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.24 0.00 0.25 
BoardIndependence (%) 180 60.21 12.55 50.00 60.00 69.62 -0.05 25.00 88.89 
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-> Year = 2007          
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 195 3.64 2.17 2.33 3.22 4.33 1.48 0.00 13.13 
BoardAge 195 55.32 3.30 53.25 55.38 57.38 -0.19 46.50 63.83 
Boardquotedboardstodate 195 3.66 1.27 2.80 3.50 4.56 0.41 1.00 7.38 
BusyBoard 195 2.01 0.58 1.57 2.00 2.33 0.62 1.00 3.71 
PriorBoardExperience 195 1.65 0.89 1.00 1.57 2.20 0.60 0.00 4.67 
BoardEliteEdu 195 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.15 1.22 0.00 0.53 
BoardProfQual 195 0.34 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.43 0.54 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 195 0.84 0.52 0.50 0.80 1.17 0.52 0.00 2.33 
BoardSciencedegree 195 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.81 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 195 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.74 0.00 0.60 
BoardCambridge 195 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.56 0.00 0.43 
BoardOxford 195 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.25 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 195 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.66 0.00 0.88 
BoardGroup1994 195 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.36 0.00 0.29 
BoardPre1992Uni 195 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.29 0.44 0.32 0.00 0.88 
BoardPost1992Uni 195 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.05 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 195 61.59 12.59 50.00 62.50 71.43 -0.06 25.00 100 
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-> Year = 2008 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 202 3.64 2.19 2.20 3.25 4.67 1.34 0.00 12.56 
BoardAge 202 55.47 3.46 52.83 55.86 57.89 -0.26 45.40 62.71 
Boardquotedboardstodate 202 3.68 1.29 2.80 3.50 4.57 0.44 1.00 7.44 
BusyBoard 202 1.95 0.54 1.60 1.90 2.22 1.09 1.00 4.67 
PriorBoardExperience 202 1.73 0.95 1.00 1.61 2.40 0.55 0.00 4.83 
BoardEliteEdu 202 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.17 1.22 0.00 0.56 
BoardProfQual 202 0.35 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.43 0.54 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 202 0.86 0.52 0.50 0.80 1.22 0.43 0.00 2.27 
BoardSciencedegree 202 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.57 0.00 0.22 
BoardnonSciencedegree 202 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.79 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 202 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.54 0.00 0.38 
BoardOxford 202 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.16 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 202 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.36 0.43 0.00 0.75 
BoardGroup1994 202 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.97 0.00 0.50 
BoardPre1992Uni 202 0.31 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.40 0.00 0.88 
BoardPost1992Uni 202 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.37 0.00 0.29 
BoardIndependence (%) 202 62.46 13.49 50.00 62.50 71.43 -0.50 0 100 
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-> Year = 2009 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 205 3.78 2.01 2.33 3.44 4.82 1.24 0.50 12.00 
BoardAge 205 55.92 3.39 53.33 56.14 58.22 0.01 45.67 65.00 
Boardquotedboardstodate 205 3.78 1.40 2.78 3.56 4.67 0.57 1.00 8.50 
BusyBoard 205 1.94 0.60 1.56 1.82 2.25 1.50 1.00 5.00 
PriorBoardExperience 205 1.84 1.04 1.00 1.67 2.50 0.73 0.00 5.80 
BoardEliteEdu 205 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.17 1.28 0.00 0.63 
BoardProfQual 205 0.34 0.17 0.22 0.33 0.43 0.61 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 205 0.84 0.51 0.44 0.80 1.14 0.47 0.00 2.22 
BoardSciencedegree 205 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.37 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 205 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.91 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 205 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.70 0.00 0.43 
BoardOxford 205 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.06 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 205 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.38 0.47 0.00 0.80 
BoardGroup1994 205 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.54 0.00 0.43 
BoardPre1992Uni 205 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.28 0.00 0.80 
BoardPost1992Uni 205 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.39 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 205 64.07 13.59 55.56 62.50 71.43 -0.20 0 100 
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-> Year = 2010 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 211 4.05 2.31 2.46 3.67 5.00 1.87 0.33 18.00 
BoardAge 211 56.35 3.42 53.88 56.40 58.80 0.03 45.80 66.00 
Boardquotedboardstodate 211 3.85 1.35 2.89 3.75 4.63 0.44 1.00 8.60 
BusyBoard 211 1.94 0.54 1.57 1.88 2.29 0.87 1.00 4.50 
PriorBoardExperience 211 1.91 1.02 1.17 1.80 2.50 0.80 0.00 6.20 
BoardEliteEdu 211 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.18 1.08 0.00 0.63 
BoardProfQual 211 0.34 0.17 0.22 0.33 0.43 0.65 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 211 0.87 0.50 0.50 0.86 1.20 0.32 0.00 2.20 
BoardSciencedegree 211 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.69 0.00 0.33 
BoardnonSciencedegree 211 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.25 0.93 0.00 0.70 
BoardCambridge 211 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.27 0.00 0.33 
BoardOxford 211 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.02 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 211 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.51 0.00 0.82 
BoardGroup1994 211 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.21 0.00 0.43 
BoardPre1992Uni 211 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.29 0.43 0.37 0.00 0.83 
BoardPost1992Uni 211 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.08 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 211 64.05 13.49 55.56 66.67 71.43 -1.07 0 90.91 
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Table 8.8a - 8.8i: Descriptive Statistics for board-level human capital measures for the pooled sample classified by the 
industry 
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Basic Materials 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 109 3.62 2.15 2.00 3.14 4.83 0.75 0.00 9.50 
BoardAge 109 56.65 3.68 54.88 57.43 59.17 -0.55 46.86 65.70 
Boardquotedboardstodate 109 3.93 1.39 3.00 3.82 5.08 0.04 1.00 7.23 
BusyBoard 109 2.46 0.89 1.86 2.33 2.86 0.60 1.00 4.67 
PriorBoardExperience 109 1.46 0.80 0.88 1.33 1.91 0.45 0.00 3.91 
BoardEliteEdu 109 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.21 1.02 0.00 0.55 
BoardProfQual 109 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.36 0.71 0.00 0.67 
BoardHighestDegree 109 1.26 0.52 1.00 1.20 1.50 0.10 0.00 2.30 
BoardSciencedegree 109 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.87 0.00 0.23 
BoardnonSciencedegree 109 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.40 0.31 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 109 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.72 0.00 0.29 
BoardOxford 109 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.08 0.00 0.47 
BoardRussellGroup 109 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.00 0.64 
BoardGroup1994 109 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.62 0.00 0.20 
BoardPre1992Uni 109 0.24 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.36 0.55 0.00 0.71 
BoardPost1992Uni 109 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.72 0.00 0.14 
BoardIndependence (%) 109 69.60 13.71 57.14 71.43 81.82 -0.28 40 90.91 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Consumer Goods        
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 252 3.97 2.27 2.43 3.33 5.14 1.09 0.00 12.71 
BoardAge 252 55.58 2.86 53.60 55.61 57.38 0.32 48.50 66.00 
Boardquotedboardstodate 252 3.50 1.49 2.33 3.20 4.50 0.56 1.00 8.00 
BusyBoard 252 1.95 0.67 1.43 1.83 2.35 0.89 1.00 5.00 
PriorBoardExperience 252 1.55 0.97 0.80 1.39 2.20 0.68 0.00 4.67 
BoardEliteEdu 252 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.60 0.00 0.63 
BoardProfQual 252 0.34 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.43 0.44 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 252 0.72 0.58 0.20 0.67 1.08 0.49 0.00 2.08 
BoardSciencedegree 252 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 0.00 0.18 
BoardnonSciencedegree 252 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.09 0.20 1.26 0.00 0.70 
BoardCambridge 252 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.76 0.00 0.38 
BoardOxford 252 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 2.90 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 252 0.22 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.87 0.00 0.80 
BoardGroup1994 252 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.29 0.00 0.33 
BoardPre1992Uni 252 0.25 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.40 0.69 0.00 0.80 
BoardPost1992Uni 252 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.81 0.00 0.38 
BoardIndependence (%) 252 59.85 16.58 50 60 71.43 -0.08 14.29 100 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Consumer Services        
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 426 3.86 2.36 2.17 3.43 5.00 1.10 0.00 13.50 
BoardAge 426 54.19 3.76 51.56 53.82 56.83 0.12 42.67 64.63 
Boardquotedboardstodate 426 3.69 1.43 2.71 3.61 4.56 0.54 1.00 9.80 
BusyBoard 426 1.96 0.63 1.50 1.86 2.29 0.96 1.00 4.50 
PriorBoardExperience 426 1.73 1.03 1.00 1.67 2.29 0.88 0.00 6.20 
BoardEliteEdu 426 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.17 1.06 0.00 0.57 
BoardProfQual 426 0.32 0.15 0.22 0.33 0.43 0.02 0.00 0.75 
BoardHighestDegree 426 0.74 0.43 0.44 0.75 1.00 0.35 0.00 2.09 
BoardSciencedegree 426 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.33 0.00 0.14 
BoardnonSciencedegree 426 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.74 0.00 0.60 
BoardCambridge 426 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.63 0.00 0.38 
BoardOxford 426 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.80 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 426 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.33 0.61 0.00 0.88 
BoardGroup1994 426 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.00 0.50 
BoardPre1992Uni 426 0.31 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.88 
BoardPost1992Uni 426 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.17 0.00 0.22 
BoardIndependence (%) 426 59.10 15.43 50.00 60.00 71.43 -0.66 0 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
253 
 
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Health Care         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 71 3.33 1.79 2.15 3.00 4.25 1.12 0.71 9.29 
BoardAge 71 56.95 3.71 55.00 57.33 59.85 -0.66 45.67 63.63 
Boardquotedboardstodate 71 4.11 1.18 3.17 4.07 5.00 0.15 1.56 6.87 
BusyBoard 71 2.25 0.63 1.75 2.14 2.71 0.32 1.17 3.44 
PriorBoardExperience 71 1.86 0.79 1.38 1.79 2.29 0.09 0.14 3.47 
BoardEliteEdu 71 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.58 0.00 0.50 
BoardProfQual 71 0.26 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.33 -0.11 0.00 0.44 
BoardHighestDegree 71 1.52 0.56 1.00 1.75 1.93 -0.66 0.17 2.25 
BoardSciencedegree 71 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.31 0.00 0.20 
BoardnonSciencedegree 71 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.33 -0.30 0.00 0.47 
BoardCambridge 71 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.78 0.00 0.43 
BoardOxford 71 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.01 0.00 0.25 
BoardRussellGroup 71 0.36 0.21 0.22 0.36 0.50 0.04 0.00 0.86 
BoardGroup1994 71 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.74 0.00 0.33 
BoardPre1992Uni 71 0.39 0.20 0.29 0.38 0.50 -0.12 0.00 0.75 
BoardPost1992Uni 71 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.06 0.00 0.22 
BoardIndependence (%) 71 69.99 10.63 66.67 72.73 76.92 -1.28 33.33 86.67 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Industrials         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 655 3.65 2.02 2.43 3.27 4.43 2.03 0.00 15.40 
BoardAge 655 55.26 2.97 53.44 55.50 57.30 -0.29 44.43 63.13 
Boardquotedboardstodate 655 3.34 1.17 2.50 3.22 4.17 0.45 1.00 7.38 
BusyBoard 655 1.84 0.47 1.50 1.80 2.14 0.51 1.00 3.50 
PriorBoardExperience 655 1.50 0.88 0.88 1.33 2.00 0.68 0.00 4.17 
BoardEliteEdu 655 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.17 1.04 0.00 0.67 
BoardProfQual 655 0.38 0.16 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.52 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 655 0.73 0.40 0.43 0.71 1.00 0.41 0.00 2.17 
BoardSciencedegree 655 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.18 0.00 0.33 
BoardnonSciencedegree 655 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.89 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 655 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.70 0.00 0.50 
BoardOxford 655 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.78 0.00 0.50 
BoardRussellGroup 655 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.00 0.86 
BoardGroup1994 655 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.97 0.00 0.50 
BoardPre1992Uni 655 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.29 0.43 0.40 0.00 0.86 
BoardPost1992Uni 655 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.28 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 655 56.98 12.84 50.00 57.14 66.67 -0.29 0 100 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Oil & Gas         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 85 4.47 1.60 3.57 4.36 5.46 0.13 0.86 8.67 
BoardAge 85 57.27 2.33 55.78 57.36 59.00 -0.39 50.50 61.29 
Boardquotedboardstodate 85 3.47 1.38 2.40 3.00 4.63 0.78 1.33 7.00 
BusyBoard 85 1.94 0.55 1.55 1.78 2.25 0.84 1.17 3.40 
PriorBoardExperience 85 1.53 0.93 0.80 1.30 2.11 1.07 0.17 5.00 
BoardEliteEdu 85 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.20 -0.26 0.00 0.33 
BoardProfQual 85 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.40 
BoardHighestDegree 85 1.25 0.45 0.92 1.17 1.44 0.73 0.29 2.38 
BoardSciencedegree 85 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.00 0.17 
BoardnonSciencedegree 85 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.67 
BoardCambridge 85 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.20 
BoardOxford 85 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.01 0.00 0.30 
BoardRussellGroup 85 0.32 0.14 0.22 0.30 0.43 0.23 0.00 0.71 
BoardGroup1994 85 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.20 0.00 0.17 
BoardPre1992Uni 85 0.34 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.42 0.73 0.00 0.83 
BoardPost1992Uni 85 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.00 0.17 
BoardIndependence (%) 85 60.27 11.56 50.00 60.00 66.67 0.27 37.50 81.82 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Technology         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 78 4.40 2.78 2.67 3.67 5.83 1.81 0.57 18.00 
BoardAge 78 52.98 4.65 49.80 53.09 57.00 -0.31 43.29 60.89 
Boardquotedboardstodate 78 2.95 1.03 2.00 3.07 3.75 0.18 1.17 6.00 
BusyBoard 78 1.96 0.53 1.50 2.00 2.25 0.57 1.17 4.00 
PriorBoardExperience 78 0.99 0.60 0.50 1.00 1.50 0.07 0.00 2.20 
BoardEliteEdu 78 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.65 0.00 0.44 
BoardProfQual 78 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.32 0.38 1.43 0.00 1.00 
BoardHighestDegree 78 0.94 0.44 0.67 0.85 1.30 -0.03 0.00 1.80 
BoardSciencedegree 78 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.72 0.00 0.25 
BoardnonSciencedegree 78 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.63 0.00 0.50 
BoardCambridge 78 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.78 0.00 0.33 
BoardOxford 78 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.55 0.00 0.20 
BoardRussellGroup 78 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.25 0.44 0.41 0.00 0.82 
BoardGroup1994 78 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.86 0.00 0.20 
BoardPre1992Uni 78 0.35 0.23 0.14 0.40 0.56 -0.42 0.00 0.70 
BoardPost1992Uni 78 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.79 0.00 0.33 
BoardIndependence (%) 78 60.19 14.86 50.00 66.67 66.67 -0.86 0 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
        
 
 
257 
 
-> ICB_Industry_Name = Telecommunications        
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 29 3.02 1.05 2.38 3.00 3.71 0.08 1.00 5.00 
BoardAge 29 53.33 3.24 51.00 54.13 55.23 -0.41 45.80 59.50 
Boardquotedboardstodate 29 3.49 1.45 2.44 3.00 3.69 1.27 2.00 6.88 
BusyBoard 29 1.88 0.67 1.40 1.67 2.23 0.95 1.00 3.50 
PriorBoardExperience 29 1.61 0.89 1.00 1.29 1.62 1.47 0.67 3.88 
BoardEliteEdu 29 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.15 1.68 0.00 0.60 
BoardProfQual 29 0.39 0.10 0.33 0.38 0.40 1.07 0.25 0.60 
BoardHighestDegree 29 0.86 0.69 0.22 0.60 1.46 0.40 0.00 2.13 
BoardSciencedegree 29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 
BoardnonSciencedegree 29 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.51 0.00 0.40 
BoardCambridge 29 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.08 0.13 1.79 0.00 0.50 
BoardOxford 29 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.00 0.20 
BoardRussellGroup 29 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.38 0.56 0.00 0.60 
BoardGroup1994 29 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.73 0.00 0.13 
BoardPre1992Uni 29 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.07 0.00 0.60 
BoardPost1992Uni 29 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.08 
BoardIndependence (%) 29 62.66 12.52 53.85 62.50 71.43 -0.73 28.57 80.00 
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-> ICB_Industry_Name = Utilities         
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 skewness min max 
                    
BoardOrgTenure 52 3.32 1.66 2.10 2.89 4.52 0.52 0.00 6.57 
BoardAge 52 54.76 2.39 53.00 54.85 56.35 0.46 50.22 61.20 
Boardquotedboardstodate 52 3.47 0.88 2.87 3.13 3.84 1.15 2.40 5.69 
BusyBoard 52 1.88 0.30 1.65 1.79 2.05 0.56 1.33 2.54 
PriorBoardExperience 52 1.59 0.64 1.14 1.38 1.90 1.03 0.80 3.15 
BoardEliteEdu 52 0.21 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.50 
BoardProfQual 52 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.25 -0.85 0.00 0.38 
BoardHighestDegree 52 1.10 0.37 0.89 1.14 1.32 -0.18 0.20 1.83 
BoardSciencedegree 52 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.13 0.00 0.18 
BoardnonSciencedegree 52 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.30 0.15 0.00 0.50 
BoardCambridge 52 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.37 0.00 0.22 
BoardOxford 52 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.28 -0.06 0.00 0.40 
BoardRussellGroup 52 0.37 0.20 0.29 0.38 0.50 -0.29 0.00 0.75 
BoardGroup1994 52 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.25 0.00 0.17 
BoardPre1992Uni 52 0.45 0.20 0.35 0.50 0.59 -0.82 0.00 0.75 
BoardPost1992Uni 52 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.14 0.00 0.20 
BoardIndependence (%) 52 57.19 7.32 54.55 58.33 61.54 -1.58 28.57 70.00 
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Table 8.9a: Correlation Matrix for Accounting Variables 
  
 MV1 BV1 E1 RD1 D1 CC1 CE1 
MV1 1       
        
BV1 0.6192* 1      
 0.0000       
        
E1 0.6177* 0.5573* 1     
 0.0000 0.0000      
        
RD1 0.1960* 0.0670* 0.3066* 1    
 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000     
        
D1 0.6140* 0.6113* 0.3888* 0.1698* 1   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
        
CC1 -0.1811* -0.1150* -0.0417 0.0079 0.0093 1  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0804 0.7413 0.6954   
        
CE1 0.4775* 0.6752* 0.4128* -0.0012 0.5183* -0.0646* 1 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9603 0.0000 0.0067  
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Table 8.9b: Correlation Matrix for Network Measures 
 
  DegreeCen CloseCen BetweenCen EigenvectorCen Effectivesize AggregateCons 
DegreeCen 1      
       
       
CloseCen 0.5796* 1     
 0.0000      
       
BetweenCen 0.6324* 0.5960* 1    
 0.0000 0.0000     
       
EigenvectorCen 0.3311* 0.1772* 0.1259* 1   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
       
EffectiveSize 0.7425* 0.7629* 0.8440* 0.2564* 1  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
       
AggregateCons -0.8500* -0.7502* -0.5977* -0.2202* -0.7406* 1 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
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Table 8.9c: Correlation Matrix for Human Capital Measures 
  BoardAge Boardquoted BusyBoard BoardOrgTen PriorBoardExp BoardEliteEdu BoardProf BoardCamb BoardOxf Russell 
BoardAge 1          
           
Boardquotedtodate 0.2905* 1         
 0.0000          
           
BusyBoard 0.2694* 0.7847* 1        
 0.0000 0.0000         
           
BoardOrgTenure 0.2087* -0.1987* -0.1812* 1       
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000        
           
PriorBoardExp 0.2377* 0.9125* 0.4625* -0.1646* 1      
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
           
BoardEliteEdu 0.0585* 0.1648* 0.1437* -0.1222* 0.1408* 1     
 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000      
           
BoardProfQual -0.0908* -0.0229 -0.0971* 0.0071 0.0313 -0.2145* 1    
 0.0001 0.3379 0.0000 0.7665 0.1892 0.0000     
           
BoardCamb 0.0425 0.1137* 0.1515* -0.0756* 0.0627* 0.6873* -0.1206* 1   
 0.0749 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000    
           
BoardOxf 0.0397 0.1174* 0.0522* -0.0955* 0.1335* 0.7156* -0.1792* -0.0155 1  
 0.0962 0.0000 0.0286 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5149   
           
BoardRussell 0.0076 0.1857* 0.1369* -0.1072* 0.1752* 0.6784* -0.1226* 0.4912* 0.4615*       1 
 0.7490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
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Table 8.10: Univariate Analyses - Network Measures –Market value deflated by the number of shares 
 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 
Boarddegreecentrality -139.563      
 (1.52)      
Boardclosenesscentrality  13.053     
  (4.88)***     
Boardbetweennesscentrality   11.877    
   (0.20)    
Boardeigenvectorcentrality    0.058   
    (1.24)   
Boardeffectivesize     0.207  
     (2.91)***  
Boardaggregateconstraint      -4.125 
      (4.62)*** 
_cons 5.461 3.217 4.566 4.570 3.816 6.148 
 (9.53)*** (11.44)*** (40.08)*** (310.26)*** (14.39)*** (18.21)*** 
R-squared_within 0.003 0.036 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.013 
R-squared_between 0.091 0.015 0.005 0.012 0.024 0.060 
R-squared_overall 0.049 0.031 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.051 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of observations 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. 
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Table 8.11: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the number of shares 
 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 
BoardAge 0.201        
 (4.38)***        
Boardquotedboardstod
ate 
 0.146       
  (0.86)       
BusyBoard   -0.324      
   (0.82)      
BoardOrgTenure    0.155     
    (2.13)**     
PriorBoardExp     0.378    
     (1.93)*    
BoardEliteEducation      0.444   
      (0.30)   
BoardProfQual       1.881  
       (1.75)*  
BoardHighestDegree        0.113 
        (0.14) 
_cons -6.470 4.076 5.220 4.002 3.998 4.536 3.969 4.493 
 (2.57)** (6.83)*** (6.75)*** (14.51)*** (13.06)*** (25.50)*** (11.19)*** (6.55)*** 
R-squared_within 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.055 0.032 0.087 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.069 0.084 
R-squared_overall 0.044 0.036 0.059 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.031 0.063 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of 
observations 
1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. 
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Table 8.12: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the number of shares 
 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 MV1 
BoardCambridge -2.563        
 (1.50)        
BoardOxford  2.991       
  (0.97)       
BoardScienceDegree   5.840      
   (1.08)      
BoardnonScienceDeg
ree 
   4.805     
    (1.93)*     
BoardRussellGroup     -0.001    
     (0.00)    
BoardPre1992_Uni      0.314   
      (0.37)   
BoardPost1992_Uni       0.844  
       (0.38)  
BoardGroup1994        1.232 
        (0.69) 
_cons 4.739 4.409 4.488 3.855 4.589 4.494 4.568 4.550 
 (47.26)*** (23.74)*** (48.08)*** (10.16)*** (15.88)*** (17.38)*** (82.62)*** (82.00)*** 
R-squared_within 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.000 0.007 0.060 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.003 0.033 0.041 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of 
observations 
1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. 
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Table 8.13: Univariate Analyses - Network Measures –Market value deflated by net sales or revenues 
 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 
Boarddegreecentrality -12.968      
 (0.57)      
Boardclosenesscentrality  0.590     
  (0.58)     
Boardbetweennesscentrality   1.192    
   (0.07)    
Boardeigenvectorcentrality    -0.002   
    (0.42)   
Boardeffectivesize     0.010  
     (0.55)  
Boardaggregateconstraint      -0.090 
      (0.24) 
_cons 1.565 1.420 1.480 1.483 1.444 1.516 
 (10.82)*** (13.14)*** (44.53)*** (774.72)*** (20.39)*** (10.77)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.011 0.025 0.031 0.006 0.035 0.007 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.000 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of observations 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
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Table 8.14: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by net sales or revenues 
   MV2      MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 
BoardAge 0.015        
 (0.86)        
Boarquotedboardsto 
date 
 0.008       
  (0.25)       
BusyBoard   0.022      
   (0.33)      
BoardOrgTenure    0.038     
    (1.50)     
PriorBoardExp     0.005    
     (0.13)    
BoardEliteEducation      0.402   
      (1.23)   
BoardProfQual       0.573  
       (2.73)***  
BoardHighestDeg        0.106 
        (0.74) 
_cons 0.640 1.453 1.440 1.339 1.474 1.435 1.295 1.393 
 (0.65) (12.35)*** (10.92)*** (13.99)*** (22.63)*** (36.73)*** (18.79)*** (11.43)*** 
R-squared_within 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.016 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.023 0.062 
R-squared_overall 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.016 0.049 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of 
observations 
1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
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Table 8.15:  Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by net sales or revenues 
        MV2     MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 
BoardCambridge 0.517        
 (1.10)        
BoardOxford  0.272       
  (0.68)       
BoardScienceDegree   -0.062      
   (0.08)      
BoardnonScienceDeg
ree 
   0.202     
    (0.65)     
BoardRussellGroup     0.463    
     (1.72)*    
BoardPre1992_Uni      0.377   
      (1.64)   
BoardPost1992_Uni       0.370  
       (0.55)  
BoardGroup1994        -0.479 
        (1.08) 
_cons 1.452 1.466 1.484 1.451 1.363 1.369 1.473 1.497 
 (52.52)*** (60.39)*** (99.65)*** (30.17)*** (19.50)*** (19.84)*** (85.46)*** (108.68)*** 
R-squared_within 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.020 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 
R-squared_overall 0.008 0.000 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of 
observations 
     1,731      1,731      1,731      1,731      1,731      1,731     1,731 1,731 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
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Table 8.16: Univariate Analyses – Network Measures –Market value deflated by the opening market value 
 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 
Boarddegreecentrality 2.162      
 (0.24)      
Boardclosenesscentrality  0.555     
  (1.93)*     
Boardbetweennesscentrality   1.231    
   (0.18)    
Boardeigenvectorcentrality    -0.001   
    (0.08)   
Boardeffectivesize     0.006  
     (0.82)  
Boardaggregateconstraint      -0.217 
      (1.44) 
_cons 1.111 1.067 1.122 1.125 1.103 1.207 
 (19.33)*** (35.63)*** (90.39)*** (417.12)*** (41.02)*** (21.21)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
R-squared_between 0.005 0.010 0.025 0.012 0.029 0.000 
R-squared_overall 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Number of observations 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. 
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Table 8.17: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the opening market value 
      MV3      MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 
BoardAge 0.009        
 (1.24)        
Boardquotedboardstod
ate 
 0.005       
  (0.30)       
BusyBoard   -0.028      
   (0.90)      
BoardOrgTenure    -0.002     
    (0.32)     
PriorBoardExp     0.019    
     (0.96)    
BoardEliteEducation      -0.002   
      (0.01)   
BoardProfQual       0.269  
       (2.08)**  
BoardHighestDegree        -0.017 
        (0.29) 
_cons 0.637 1.108 1.179 1.134 1.095 1.125 1.037 1.139 
 (1.62) (20.46)*** (19.53)*** (38.86)*** (35.45)*** (63.33)*** (24.57)*** (23.48)*** 
R-squared_within 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.039 0.006 0.000 0.016 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.000 
R-squared_overall 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 240 240 240         240 
Number of 
observations 
   1,716      1,716      1,716      1,716      1,716      1,716      1,716        1,716 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. 
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Table 8.18: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the opening market value 
 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 
BoardCambridge 0.021        
 (0.09)        
BoardOxford  -0.022       
  (0.11)       
BoardScienceDegree   -0.058      
   (0.17)      
BoardnonScienceDe
gree 
   -0.154     
    (1.02)     
BoardRussellGroup     -0.013    
     (0.13)    
BoardPre1992_Uni      -0.013   
      (0.14)   
BoardPost1992_Uni       0.320  
       (0.99)  
BoardGroup1994        -0.219 
        (0.94) 
_cons 1.123 1.126 1.126 1.148 1.128 1.129 1.117 1.131 
 (82.07)*** (91.13)*** (173.87)*** (49.58)*** (41.54)*** (38.99)*** (137.76)*** (159.22)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.021 0.010 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Number of 
observations 
1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. 
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Table 8.19: Univariate Analyses - Network Measures –Market value deflated by the closing book value 
  MV4  MV4  MV4  MV4  MV4  MV4 
Boarddegreecentrality -37.899      
 (0.78)      
Boardclosenesscentrality  -0.080     
  (0.06)     
Boardbetweennesscentrality   -54.690    
   (1.28)    
Boardeigenvectorcentrality    -0.007   
    (0.12)   
Boardeffectivesize     -0.023  
     (0.66)  
Boardaggregateconstraint      0.004 
      (0.01) 
_cons 3.469 3.239 3.333 3.233 3.315 3.230 
 (11.38)*** (21.77)*** (41.62)*** (163.30)*** (26.05)*** (12.67)*** 
R-squared_within 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.011 
R-squared_overall 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
272 
 
Table 8.20: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the closing book value 
    MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4 
BoardAge -0.059        
 (1.64)        
Boardquotedboardstod
ate 
 -0.061       
  (0.71)       
BusyBoard   0.106      
   (0.60)      
BoardOrgTenure    -0.061     
    (1.19)     
PriorBoardExp     -0.143    
     (1.29)    
BoardEliteEducation      0.117   
      (0.15)   
BoardProfQual       0.160  
       (0.22)  
BoardHighestDegree        -0.182 
        (0.65) 
_cons 6.468 3.446 3.023 3.461 3.454 3.217 3.179 3.386 
 (3.28)*** (11.40)*** (8.79)*** (17.94)*** (19.93)*** (35.90)*** (13.58)*** (14.17)*** 
R-squared_within 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004 
R-squared_overall 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of 
observations 
1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. 
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Table 8.21: Univariate Analyses – Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the closing book value 
        MV4      MV4         MV4      MV4     MV4     MV4    MV4    MV4 
BoardCambridge -0.231        
 (0.22)        
BoardOxford  0.393       
  (0.43)       
BoardScienceDegree   1.089      
   (0.64)      
BoardnonScienceDeg
ree 
   -0.149     
    (0.17)     
BoardRussellGroup     -0.151    
     (0.28)    
BoardPre1992_Uni      -0.569   
      (1.06)   
BoardPost1992_Uni       0.562  
       (0.38)  
BoardGroup1994        -1.813 
        (1.52) 
_cons 3.245 3.207 3.211 3.254 3.270 3.401 3.217 3.286 
 (52.33)*** (57.40)*** (100.70)*** (24.76)*** (23.29)*** (21.17)*** (85.97)*** (90.95)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
R-squared_between 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.001 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of 
observations 
1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. 
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Table 8.22: Univariate Analyses – Total Network Measures –Market value deflated by the number of shares 
     MV1   MV1  MV1   MV1   MV1   MV1 
totalnormaliseddegreecentrality -0.226      
 (0.04)      
totalclosenesscentrality  1.690     
  (5.26)***     
totalbetweennesscentrality   1.312    
   (0.22)    
totalneigencentrality    0.003   
    (1.04)   
totaleffectivesize     0.029  
     (3.48)***  
totalaggregateconstraint      -0.373 
      (1.96)* 
_cons 4.601 3.071 4.567 4.579 3.670 5.644 
 (14.42)*** (10.65)*** (47.61)*** (502.15)*** (13.89)*** (10.46)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.004 
R-squared_between 0.106 0.068 0.030 0.013 0.072 0.001 
R-squared_overall 0.063 0.074 0.013 0.007 0.056 0.004 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of observations 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. 
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Table 8.23: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the number of shares 
    MV1   MV1    MV1    MV1  MV1   MV1   MV1      MV1 
totalAge 0.005        
 (3.60)***        
totalquotedboardstod
ate 
 0.036       
  (1.95)*       
totalquotedcurrent   0.007      
   (0.21)      
totalOrgtenure    0.031     
    (2.91)***     
totalBoardExp     0.070    
     (2.77)***    
totalEliteEducation      0.187   
      (0.61)   
totalProfessionalQual       0.428  
       (3.59)***  
totalHighestDegree        0.075 
        (0.83) 
_cons 2.456 3.554 4.475 3.634 3.685 4.398 3.510 4.041 
 (4.15)*** (6.69)*** (8.11)*** (11.07)*** (11.30)*** (14.11)*** (11.67)*** (6.12)*** 
R-squared_within 0.013 0.006 0.000 0.016 0.012 0.002 0.013 0.003 
R-squared_between 0.128 0.126 0.170 0.027 0.066 0.024 0.018 0.134 
R-squared_overall 0.088 0.105 0.114 0.015 0.067 0.015 0.003 0.101 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of 
observations 
1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. 
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Table 8.24: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the number of shares 
       MV1      MV1     MV1   MV1   MV1     MV1   MV1   MV1 
totalCambridge -0.464        
 (1.66)*        
totalOxford  0.638       
  (1.17)       
totalScience   1.138      
   (1.59)      
totalnonScience    0.643     
    (2.01)**     
totalRussell     0.131    
     (0.73)    
totalPre1992      0.141   
      (1.08)   
totalPost1992       0.127  
       (0.35)  
totalGroup1994        0.162 
        (0.60) 
_cons 4.819 4.257 4.411 3.735 4.307 4.239 4.562 4.549 
 (34.77)*** (15.03)*** (39.48)*** (8.80)*** (11.12)*** (13.14)*** (59.65)*** (68.15)*** 
R-squared_within 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.003 0.032 0.093 0.071 0.018 0.013 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_overall 0.001 0.020 0.060 0.084 0.010 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of 
observations 
1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. 
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Table 8.25: Univariate Analyses – Total Network Measures –Market value deflated by net sales or revenues 
 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 
totalnormaliseddegreecentrality -0.761      
 (0.47)      
totalclosenesscentrality  0.063     
  (0.49)     
totalbetweennesscentrality   -0.080    
   (0.05)    
totaleigencentrality    -0.000   
    (1.06)   
totaleffectivesize     0.001  
     (0.57)  
totalaggregateconstraint      0.029 
      (0.49) 
_cons 1.525 1.425 1.484 1.484 1.442 1.400 
 (16.88)*** (12.20)*** (51.67)*** (1,323.86)*** (20.51)*** (8.32)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.001 0.007 0.018 0.003 0.012 0.051 
R-squared_overall 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.019 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of observations 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
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Table 8.26: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by net sales or revenues 
    MV2      MV2     MV2      MV2     MV2   MV2   MV2   MV2 
totalAge 0.000        
 (0.41)        
totalquotedboardstod
ate 
 0.001       
  (0.32)       
totalquotedcurrent   0.003      
   (0.41)      
totalOrgtenure    0.006     
    (1.60)     
totalBoardExp     0.001    
     (0.17)    
totalEliteEducation      0.032   
      (0.68)   
totalProfessionalQual       0.068  
       (2.50)**  
totalHighestDegree        0.007 
        (0.40) 
_cons 1.399 1.442 1.434 1.312 1.469 1.450 1.312 1.430 
 (6.96)*** (11.40)*** (12.00)*** (12.24)*** (18.63)*** (30.39)*** (19.19)*** (10.87)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.019 0.035 
R-squared_overall 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.006 0.039 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of 
observations 
  1,731     1,731     1,731      1,731     1,731     1,731     1,731     1,731 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
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Table 8.27: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by net sales or revenues 
     MV2   MV2    MV2      MV2     MV2    MV2   MV2   MV2 
totalCambridge 0.039        
 (0.60)        
totalOxford  0.023       
  (0.43)       
totalScience   0.012      
   (0.12)      
totalnonScience    0.016     
    (0.43)     
totalRussellGroup     0.054    
     (1.35)    
totalPre1992      0.042   
      (1.16)   
totalPost1992       0.031  
       (0.36)  
totalGroup1994        -0.094 
        (1.43) 
_cons 1.463 1.471 1.480 1.461 1.367 1.379 1.476 1.506 
 (44.25)*** (53.12)*** (80.23)*** (29.14)*** (15.93)*** (15.42)*** (80.98)*** (92.47)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
R-squared_overall 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.001 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of 
observations 
1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. 
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       Table 8.28: Univariate Analyses – Total Network Measures –Market value deflated by the opening market value 
    MV3   MV3      MV3    MV3   MV3    MV3 
totalnormaliseddegreecentrality -0.075      
 (0.14)      
totalclosenesscentrality  0.044     
  (1.44)     
totalbetweennesscentrality   -0.137    
   (0.22)    
totaleigencentrality    -0.000   
    (0.68)   
totaleffectivesize     0.000  
     (0.40)  
totalaggregateconstraint      -0.027 
      (1.19) 
_cons 1.129 1.085 1.127 1.126 1.115 1.200 
 (37.94)*** (39.77)*** (110.46)*** (617.36)*** (49.01)*** (18.90)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.010 0.031 
R-squared_overall 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Number of observations 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. 
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Table 8.29 - Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the opening market value 
      MV3     MV3    MV3   MV3   MV3   MV3    MV3    MV3 
totalAge 0.000        
 (0.06)        
totalquotedboardstodate  -0.000       
  (0.24)       
totalquotedcurrent   -0.004      
   (1.27)      
totalOrgtenure    -0.000     
    (0.02)     
totalBoardExp     0.002    
     (0.63)    
totalEliteEducation      0.007   
      (0.40)   
totalProfessionalQual       0.024  
       (1.59)  
totalHighestDegree        -0.001 
        (0.10) 
_cons 1.120 1.136 1.185 1.125 1.105 1.118 1.065 1.129 
 (16.64)*** (22.90)*** (25.05)*** (35.31)*** (35.25)*** (67.78)*** (28.35)*** (28.14)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Number of observations 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. 
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Table 8.30: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the opening market value 
   MV3        MV3        MV3   MV3   MV3   MV3     MV3    MV3 
totalCambridge 0.006        
 (0.21)        
totalOxford  0.006       
  (0.29)       
totalScience   -0.006      
   (0.17)      
totalnonScience    -0.013     
    (0.77)     
totalRussellGroup     0.001    
     (0.06)    
totalPre1992      0.001   
      (0.06)   
totalPost1992       0.026  
       (0.65)  
totalGroup1994        -0.019 
        (0.63) 
_cons 1.122 1.122 1.126 1.142 1.123 1.123 1.119 1.129 
 (75.20)*** (108.34)*** (180.63)*** (49.56)*** (43.98)*** (42.30)*** (131.31)*** (153.14)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared_between 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.007 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Number of observations 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. 
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         Table 8.31 - Univariate Analyses – Total Network Measures –Market value deflated by the closing book value 
    MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4        MV4 
totalnormaliseddegreecentrality -1.931      
 (0.57)      
totalclosenesscentrality  -0.069     
  (0.42)     
totalbetweennesscentrality   -5.604    
   (0.99)    
totalNeigencentrality    -0.000   
    (0.04)   
totaleffectivesize     -0.003  
     (0.77)  
totalaggregateconstraint      0.155 
      (1.54) 
_cons 3.338 3.293 3.322 3.232 3.336 2.791 
 (17.59)*** (22.47)*** (36.34)*** (207.09)*** (24.28)*** (9.77)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.016 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 
R-squared_overall 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. 
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Table 8.32: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the closing book value 
 MV4         MV4    MV4   MV4  MV4   MV4   MV4   MV4 
totalAge -0.000        
 (0.25)        
totalquotedboardstodate  -0.003       
  (0.28)       
totalquotedcurrent   0.012      
   (0.68)      
totalOrgtenure    -0.008     
    (1.35)     
totalBoardExp     -0.015    
     (0.89)    
totalEliteEducation      -0.037   
      (0.35)   
totalProfessionalQual       0.028  
       (0.38)  
totalHighestDegree        -0.025 
        (0.85) 
_cons 3.315 3.326 3.034 3.481 3.421 3.268 3.161 3.416 
 (9.94)*** (9.82)*** (10.44)*** (18.75)*** (15.99)*** (30.84)*** (17.26)*** (15.60)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
R-squared_between 0.027 0.011 0.011 0.031 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.012 
R-squared_overall 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. 
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Table 8.33: Univariate Analyses – Total Human Capital Measures –Market value deflated by the closing book value 
     MV4    MV4     MV4   MV4   MV4     MV4    MV4  MV4 
totalCambridge -0.082        
 (0.71)        
totalOxford  -0.001       
  (0.00)       
totalScience   0.123      
   (0.58)      
totalnonScience    -0.009     
    (0.09)     
totalRussellGroup     -0.050    
     (0.77)    
totalPre1992      -0.081   
      (1.24)   
totalPost1992       0.003  
       (0.02)  
totalGroup1994        -0.274 
        (1.66)* 
_cons 3.272 3.231 3.210 3.243 3.338 3.431 3.230 3.297 
 (57.10)*** (44.70)*** (86.05)*** (24.88)*** (24.07)*** (21.25)*** (69.65)*** (82.79)*** 
R-squared_within 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
R-squared_between 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
R-squared_overall 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Number of observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. 
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                                  Table 8.34: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) - Number of shares as deflator 
   MV1   MV1   MV1   MV1      MV1 
BV1 0.911 0.611 0.577 0.512 0.044 
 (3.16)*** (1.93)* (2.01)** (1.85)* (0.78) 
E1 3.706 4.032 3.971 3.933 1.561 
 (5.62)*** (6.10)*** (6.00)*** (5.94)*** (2.04)** 
D1  7.257 7.349 7.184 0.981 
  (4.26)*** (4.53)*** (4.43)*** (0.90) 
R&D1   2.723 2.837 -0.150 
   (1.33) (1.39) (0.16) 
CC1   -2.505 -2.533 -2.216 
   (2.08)** (2.08)** (1.29) 
CE1    0.466 0.028 
    (1.21) (0.12) 
lagMV1_1     0.890 
     (12.37)*** 
_cons 2.150 1.695 1.556 1.571 0.263 
 (4.55)*** (4.36)*** (4.06)*** (4.12)*** (1.80)* 
R-squared_within 0.310 0.366 0.383 0.385 0.461 
R-squared_between 0.541 0.604 0.616 0.614 0.962 
R-squared_overall 0.485 0.560 0.577 0.577 0.834 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 228 
Number of observations 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,478 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. BV1 represents the book value per share. E1 represents the earnings per share. D1 
represents the dividends per share. R&D1 represents the research and development expenditure per share. CC1 represents the 
capital contributions per share. CE1 represents the capital expenditures per share. LagMV1_1 is the MV1 with one year lag. 
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                                    Table 8.35: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) with firm-fixed effects- Number of shares as deflator 
   MV1   MV1   MV1   MV1   MV1 
BV1 0.920 0.671 0.639 0.564 0.374 
 (2.56)** (1.80)* (1.83)* (1.67)* (1.87)* 
E1 3.406 3.815 3.690 3.656 2.080 
 (5.37)*** (6.15)*** (6.02)*** (5.93)*** (2.38)** 
D1  6.817 6.745 6.587 2.903 
  (4.79)*** (5.06)*** (4.87)*** (2.15)** 
R&D1   4.966 4.930 3.295 
   (2.05)** (2.05)** (1.59) 
CC1   -2.213 -2.258 -1.539 
   (2.21)** (2.21)** (1.59) 
CE1    0.574 -1.044 
    (1.68)* (1.42) 
lagMV1_1     0.518 
     (4.63)*** 
_cons 2.246 1.722 1.543 1.560 1.072 
 (3.35)*** (2.91)*** (2.73)*** (2.77)*** (2.61)*** 
R-squared_within 0.310 0.367 0.385 0.387 0.490 
R-squared_between 0.536 0.598 0.602 0.600 0.861 
R-squared_overall 0.482 0.556 0.568 0.569 0.790 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 228 
Number of observations 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,478 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV1 represents the market value per share. BV1 represents the book value per share. E1 represents the earnings per share. 
D1 represents the dividends per share. R&D1 represents the research and development expenditure per share. CC1 represents 
capital contributions per share. CE1 represents the capital expenditures per share. LagMV1_1 is the MV1 with one year lag. 
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                                    Table 8.36: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) - Net sales/revenues as deflator 
 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 
BV2 1.101 1.099 1.016 0.943 0.455 
 (6.41)*** (6.64)*** (5.93)*** (5.05)*** (4.36)*** 
E2 2.155 2.411 2.341 2.240 0.175 
 (2.52)** (2.73)*** (2.70)*** (2.74)*** (0.19) 
D2  10.226 11.007 9.591 7.468 
  (4.14)*** (4.14)*** (3.40)*** (4.70)*** 
R&D2   2.339 2.584 2.657 
   (1.57) (1.78)* (1.85)* 
CC2   -0.996 -0.805 0.437 
   (1.08) (0.94) (0.26) 
CE2    3.507 0.246 
    (1.72)* (0.34) 
lagMV2_1     0.607 
     (8.08)*** 
_cons 0.837 0.482 0.428 0.291 -0.016 
 (6.51)*** (3.59)*** (3.30)*** (2.12)** (0.17) 
R-squared_within 0.033 0.053 0.061 0.085 0.133 
R-squared_between 0.618 0.683 0.659 0.672 0.882 
R-squared_overall 0.430 0.486 0.499 0.505 0.720 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 224 
Number of observations 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,445 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. BV2 represents the book value deflated by net sales or 
revenues. E2 represents the earnings deflated by net sales or revenues. D2 represents the dividends deflated by net sales or 
revenues. R&D2 represents the research and development expenditure deflated by net sales or revenues. CC2 represents the 
capital contributions deflated by net sales or revenues. CE2 represents the capital expenditures deflated by net sales or 
revenues. LagMV2_1 is the MV2 with one year lag. 
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                                     Table 8.37: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) with firm-fixed effects- Net sales/revenues as deflator 
 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 MV2 
BV2 0.605 0.563 0.460 0.408 0.502 
 (1.91)* (1.79)* (1.56) (1.38) (3.13)*** 
E2 0.972 1.124 1.289 1.248 0.273 
 (1.23) (1.40) (2.03)** (2.01)** (0.32) 
D2  8.064 8.673 7.466 5.968 
  (3.37)*** (3.31)*** (2.98)*** (2.41)** 
R&D2   6.163 6.000 5.904 
   (1.74)* (1.73)* (1.50) 
CC2   -0.534 -0.341 0.240 
   (0.52) (0.36) (0.17) 
CE2    3.287 -0.034 
    (1.62) (0.04) 
lagMV2_1     0.309 
     (3.95)*** 
_cons 1.084 0.836 0.720 0.586 0.365 
 (5.80)*** (4.10)*** (3.51)*** (3.03)*** (1.83)* 
R-squared_within 0.034 0.056 0.071 0.097 0.149 
R-squared_between 0.608 0.682 0.383 0.423 0.691 
R-squared_overall 0.422 0.471 0.387 0.426 0.645 
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 224 
Number of observations 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,731 1,445 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV2 represents the market value deflated by net sales or revenues. BV2 represents the book value deflated by net sales or 
revenues. E2 represents the earnings deflated by net sales or revenues. D2 represents the dividends deflated by net sales or 
revenues. R&D2 represents the research and development expenditure deflated by net sales or revenues. CC2 represents the 
capital contributions deflated by net sales or revenues. CE2 represents the capital expenditures deflated by net sales or 
revenues. LagMV2_1 is the MV2 with one year lag. 
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                               Table 8.38: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) - Opening market value as deflator 
 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 
BV3 0.251 0.243 0.215 0.203 0.188 
 (6.32)*** (6.08)*** (5.73)*** (5.43)*** (4.51)*** 
E3 0.952 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.629 
 (5.93)*** (5.99)*** (5.79)*** (5.80)*** (3.21)*** 
D3  0.669 0.900 0.793 0.310 
  (1.07) (1.47) (1.29) (0.46) 
R&D3   0.052 0.108 0.308 
   (0.09) (0.18) (0.49) 
CC3   -0.713 -0.706 -0.996 
   (2.87)*** (2.85)*** (3.39)*** 
CE3    0.196 0.105 
    (1.20) (0.56) 
lagMV3_1     0.064 
     (1.85)* 
_cons 0.957 0.940 0.938 0.935 0.915 
 (42.42)*** (31.59)*** (31.28)*** (30.35)*** (14.86)*** 
R-squared_within 0.113 0.117 0.114 0.114 0.085 
R-squared_between 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.027 
R-squared_overall 0.059 0.060 0.067 0.068 0.062 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 225 
Number of observations 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,412 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. BV3 represents the book value deflated by the opening market 
value. E3 represents the earnings deflated by the opening market value. D3 represents the dividends deflated by the opening market 
value. R&D3 represents the research and development expenditure deflated by the opening market value. CC3 represents the capital 
contributions deflated by the opening market value. CE3 represents the capital expenditures deflated by the opening market value. 
LagMV3_1 is the MV3 with one year lag. 
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                                Table 8.39: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) with firm-fixed effects- Opening market value as deflator 
 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 MV3 
BV3 0.565 0.534 0.479 0.468 0.517 
 (8.33)*** (7.68)*** (6.87)*** (6.60)*** (6.27)*** 
E3 1.079 1.164 1.129 1.133 0.888 
 (5.87)*** (6.18)*** (6.01)*** (6.01)*** (4.25)*** 
D3  2.006 2.222 2.172 2.512 
  (2.00)** (2.24)** (2.18)** (2.10)** 
R&D3   2.912 2.890 2.814 
   (1.70)* (1.69)* (1.49) 
CC3   -0.513 -0.505 -0.668 
   (1.93)* (1.91)* (2.21)** 
CE3    0.240 0.770 
    (0.69) (2.35)** 
lagMV3_1     0.067 
     (1.60) 
_cons 0.791 0.741 0.725 0.717 0.594 
 (20.90)*** (16.00)*** (15.21)*** (14.73)*** (5.97)*** 
R-squared_within 0.128 0.134 0.143 0.144 0.145 
R-squared_between 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.002 
R-squared_overall 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.044 
Number of groups 240 240 240 240 225 
Number of observations 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,412 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV3 represents the market value deflated by the opening market value. BV3 represents the book value deflated by the opening 
market value. E3 represents the earnings deflated by the opening market value. D3 represents the dividends deflated by the opening 
market value. R&D3 represents the research and development expenditure deflated by the opening market value. CC3 represents 
the capital contributions deflated by the opening market value. CE3 represents the capital expenditures deflated by the opening 
market value. LagMV3_1 is the MV3 with one year lag. 
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                               Table 8.40: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) - Closing book value as deflator 
 MV4 MV4 MV4 MV4 MV4 
E4 5.454 5.220 5.095 4.959 2.464 
 (6.30)*** (8.67)*** (8.09)*** (7.97)*** (2.62)*** 
D4  14.751 14.750 13.959 9.493 
  (11.47)*** (11.34)*** (10.13)*** (5.97)*** 
R&D4   2.635 2.704 1.232 
   (1.90)* (2.00)** (1.02) 
CC4   -0.695 -0.648 0.421 
   (2.21)** (2.06)** (0.85) 
CE4    1.571 0.658 
    (2.56)** (1.43) 
lagMV4_1     0.393 
     (7.61)*** 
_cons 2.717 1.386 1.298 1.142 0.631 
 (18.41)*** (9.00)*** (8.80)*** (8.14)*** (6.24)*** 
R-squared_within 0.148 0.379 0.384 0.392 0.309 
R-squared_between 0.443 0.689 0.678 0.670 0.853 
R-squared_overall 0.256 0.565 0.560 0.560 0.657 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 226 
Number of observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,462 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. E4 represents the earnings deflated by the closing book value. 
D4 represents the dividends deflated by the closing book value. R&D4 represents the research and development expenditure deflated 
by the closing book value. CC4 represents the capital contributions deflated by the closing book value. CE4 represents the capital 
expenditures deflated by the closing book value. LagMV4_1 is the MV4 with one year lag. 
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                                   Table 8.41: Ohlson Model – Baseline Models (1)-(5) with firm-fixed effects- Closing book value as deflator 
     MV4    MV4   MV4  MV4   MV4 
E4 4.783 4.762 4.577 4.464 2.740 
 (5.74)*** (7.78)*** (7.26)*** (7.06)*** (2.78)*** 
D4  13.445 13.190 12.464 9.583 
  (8.91)*** (8.61)*** (7.72)*** (4.92)*** 
R&D4   5.771 5.217 6.411 
   (2.60)*** (2.44)** (3.17)*** 
CC4   -0.453 -0.429 0.111 
   (1.23) (1.14) (0.21) 
CE4    1.726 1.368 
    (2.45)** (1.94)* 
lagMV4_1     0.178 
     (3.03)*** 
_cons 2.691 1.501 1.348 1.183 1.007 
 (28.58)*** (8.53)*** (7.89)*** (7.04)*** (6.06)*** 
R-squared_within 0.148 0.379 0.387 0.394 0.338 
R-squared_between 0.443 0.689 0.634 0.640 0.693 
R-squared_overall 0.256 0.565 0.534 0.541 0.575 
Number of groups 242 242 242 242 226 
Number of observations     1,746   1,746   1,746   1,746   1,462 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
MV4 represents the market value deflated by the closing book value. E4 represents the earnings deflated by the closing book 
value. D4 represents the dividends deflated by the closing book value. R&D4 represents the research and development 
expenditure deflated by the closing book value. CC4 represents the capital contributions deflated by the closing book value. CE4 
represents the capital expenditures deflated by the closing book value. LagMV4_1 is the MV4 with one year lag. 
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Table 8.42a: Factor analysis - Principal-Component Factors 
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative 
     
Factor1 2.21591 0.97603 0.3166 0.3166 
Factor2 1.23988 0.01255 0.1771 0.4937 
Factor3 1.22733 . 0.1753 0.669 
Number of obs 1,757    
Retained factors 3    
Number of params 18    
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) = 2502.67  Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Rotation: orthogonal varimax 
 
Table 8.42b: Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variance 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness  
     
BoardCloseCen 0.867 -0.0158 -0.0131 0.2479 
BoardAggCon -0.8341 0.2517 0.0409 0.2392 
PriorBoardExp 0.7118 0.1554 0.1585 0.4441 
BoardOrgTen -0.3344 0.0274 0.7284 0.357 
BoardAge 0.2585 -0.0734 0.8068 0.2768 
BoardEliteEdu 0.2877 -0.6468 -0.1035 0.4881 
BoardProfQual 0.0219 0.853 -0.0906 0.2637 
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Table 8.42c: Factor Rotation Matrix 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3  
    
Factor1 0.9605 -0.2783 0.0043 
Factor2 -0.0516 -0.1629 0.9853 
Factor3 0.2735 0.9466 0.1708 
 
 
Table 8.42d: Scoring coefficients (based on varimax rotated factors) 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3      
      
BoardCloseCen 0.40346 0.08753 -0.00987   
BoardAggCon -0.36059 0.11368 0.03485   
PriorBoardExp 0.35101 0.21427 0.13152   
BoardOrgTen -0.15229 -0.00891 0.59341   
BoardAge 0.11324 -0.02333 0.65704   
BoardEliteEdu 0.05911 -0.50803 -0.09032   
BoardProfQual 0.1094 0.71442 -0.06545   
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Table 8.43: Ohlson Model with firm-fixed effects -with SHC indices as other information 
  MV1 MV2 MV3 MV4 
     
BV 0.537 0.396 0.460 - 
 -1.56 -1.32 (6.65)*** - 
E 3.618 1.217 1.132 4.463 
 (5.87)*** (1.96)* (5.95)*** (7.09)*** 
D 6.447 7.409 2.277 12.532 
 (4.89)*** (3.02)*** (2.33)** (7.76)*** 
R&D 4.541 6.197 3.021 5.207 
 (1.96)* (1.78)* (1.79)* (2.48)** 
CC -2.226 -0.348 -0.518 -0.457 
 (2.16)** -0.37 (1.94)* -1.21 
CE 0.615 3.371 0.306 1.704 
 (1.82)* -1.65 -0.91 (2.43)** 
Network 0.335 0.03 0.021 -0.117 
 (2.79)*** -0.49 -1.02 -1.5 
Expertise -0.076 0.055 0.031 0.153 
 -0.58 -1.41 -1.4 (1.71)* 
Experience 0.08 0.039 -0.02 -0.108 
 -0.68 -0.79 -1.17 -1.46 
_cons 1.64 0.586 0.713 1.18 
 (2.79)*** (3.05)*** (14.88)*** (6.90)*** 
R-squared_within 0.392 0.1 0.147 0.398 
R-squared_between 0.600 0.409 0.011 0.632 
R-squared_overall 0.571 0.416 0.048 0.541 
Number of groups 242 237 240 242 
Number of observations 1,757 1,731 1,716 1,746 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01 
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MV represents the market value deflated by the number of shares, net sales, the opening market value and the closing book 
value respectively.  BV represents the book value deflated by the number of shares, net sales, the opening market value and 
the closing book value respectively.  E represents the earnings deflated by the number of shares, net sales, the opening 
market value and the closing book value respectively. D represents the dividends deflated by the number of shares, net 
sales, the opening market value and the closing book value respectively. R&D represents the research and development 
expenditure deflated by the number of shares, net sales, the opening market value and the closing book value respectively. 
CC represents the capital contributions deflated by the number of shares, net sales, the opening market value and the closing 
book value respectively. CE represents the capital expenditures deflated by the number of shares, net sales, the opening 
market value and the closing book value respectively. 
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Table 8.44: The Demand for Social and Human Capital at the Individual Level – Quoted Current Boards as the Dependent Variable 
 QuotedCurrent 
Boards 
QuotedCurrent 
Boards 
QuotedCurrent 
Boards 
QuotedCurrent 
Boards 
QuotedCurrent 
Boards 
QuotedCurrent 
Boards 
DegreeCen 125.953      
 (32.16)***      
AgeGroup 0.063 0.004 0.039 0.031 -0.009 -0.017 
 (2.88)*** (0.17) (1.75)* (1.34) (0.41) (0.75) 
EDNEDdummy 0.202 0.145 0.174 0.188 0.126 0.112 
 (3.56)*** (2.33)** (2.98)*** (3.06)*** (2.35)** (1.83)* 
OrgTenure -0.003 -0.017 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.020 
 (1.10) (6.06)*** (4.39)*** (4.18)*** (7.04)*** (7.26)*** 
ClosenessCen  1.548     
  (8.85)***     
BetweenCen   62.963    
   (23.76)***    
EigenvectorCen    0.002   
    (0.47)   
EffectiveSize     0.100  
     (36.70)***  
AggregateCon      -2.126 
      (20.46)*** 
_cons 0.979 1.900 1.800 1.950 1.717 2.911 
 (13.06)*** (26.10)*** (26.04)*** (27.15)*** (26.64)*** (37.84)*** 
R-squared_within 0.171 0.010 0.112 0.003 0.208 0.079 
R-squared_between 0.292 0.108 0.313 0.126 0.331 0.181 
R-squared_overall 0.286 0.103 0.308 0.112 0.336 0.177 
Number of groups 7,781 7,781 7,781 7,781 7,781 7,781 
Number of obs. 35,327 35,327 35,327 35,327 35,327 35,327 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
Quoted current boards is the number of listed firms a director sits in a particular year. 
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Table 8.45: The Demand for Social and Human Capital at the Individual Level – Quoted Boards to Date as the Dependent Variable 
 QuotedBoards 
toDate 
QuotedBoards 
toDate 
QuotedBoards 
toDate 
QuotedBoards 
toDate 
QuotedBoards 
toDate 
QuotedBoards 
toDate 
DegreeCen 63.446      
 (10.67)***      
AgeGroup 0.399 0.314 0.388 0.384 0.349 0.339 
 (14.56)*** (11.85)*** (14.10)*** (13.83)*** (13.55)*** (12.82)*** 
EDNEDdummy 0.513 0.396 0.497 0.507 0.452 0.436 
 (6.22)*** (5.04)*** (6.04)*** (6.04)*** (5.97)*** (5.50)*** 
OrgTenure 0.077 0.058 0.073 0.073 0.068 0.065 
 (18.95)*** (16.05)*** (18.67)*** (18.60)*** (18.29)*** (17.62)*** 
ClosenessCen  3.889     
  (17.83)***     
BetweenCen   36.776    
   (9.68)***    
EigenvectorCen    -0.010   
    (1.78)*   
EffectiveSize     0.085  
     (21.14)***  
AggregateCon      -1.950 
      (17.95)*** 
_cons 1.717 2.081 2.119 2.207 2.010 3.088 
 (17.53)*** (24.29)*** (24.63)*** (25.53)*** (25.18)*** (35.03)*** 
R-squared_within 0.155 0.156 0.150 0.121 0.240 0.172 
R-squared_between 0.195 0.153 0.179 0.100 0.269 0.207 
R-squared_overall 0.186 0.133 0.170 0.090 0.263 0.192 
Number of groups 7,781 7,781 7,781 7,781 7,781 7,781 
Number of obs. 35,327 35,327 35,327 35,327 35,327 35,327 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Quoted boards to date is the total number of listed firms a director sat in previous years.  
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APPENDIX II 
 
CURRENT ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PRACTICES FOR INTANGIBLES 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice in the UK (UK GAAP) 
In 2012 and 2013, the Financial Reporting Council75 (FRC) revised financial reporting standards in the 
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland. These revisions fundamentally reformed financial reporting, 
replacing almost all extant standards with three Financial Reporting Standards: (1) FRS 100 Application 
of Financial Reporting Requirements, (2) FRS 101 Reduced Disclosure Framework, and (3) FRS 102 The 
Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland. Although early application 
of FRS 102 is permitted for accounting periods ending on or after 31 December 2012, entities shall 
apply these revised financial reporting standards for accounting periods ending on or after 1 January 
2015. Since this chapter aims to shed light on the current accounting regulation and practices for 
intangibles, this thesis will expand on the content of accounting standards prior to the most recent 
revision, which are still in effect.  
In the UK, accounting treatment for “Goodwill and Intangible Assets” is regulated by FRS 10 whereas 
accounting for “Research and Development” (R&D) expenditures is described in SSAP 13. The 
objective of FRS 10 is to ensure that purchased goodwill and intangible assets are charged to the 
income statement in the periods in which they are depleted. The standard advocates the view that 
goodwill arising on an acquisition (the cost of acquisition less the aggregate of the fair value of the 
purchased entity's identifiable assets and liabilities) is neither an asset like other assets nor an 
immediate loss in value. It rather refers to goodwill as a bridge between the cost of an investment 
shown as an asset in the acquirer's own financial statements and the values attributed to the acquired 
assets and liabilities in the consolidated financial statements (FRS 10, Para. B). Although purchased 
                                                             
75 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) became the prescribed body for issuing accounting standards on 2 July 
2012; the prescribed body was previously the Accounting Standards Board (ASB). References in this section are 
made to the FRC and ASB, as appropriate in terms of the time period and context of the reference. 
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goodwill is not in itself an asset, its inclusion amongst the assets of the reporting entity, rather than 
as a deduction from shareholders' equity, recognises that goodwill is part of a larger asset, the 
investment, for which management remains accountable76.  
The standard requires positive purchased goodwill to be capitalised and classified as an asset on the 
statement of financial position (FRS 10, Para. 7). It also requires the purchased goodwill to be 
amortised over its useful economic life which should not exceed 20 years from the date of acquisition 
(FRS 10, Para. 19). An alternative approach to accounting for purchased goodwill is described in SSAP 
2277, which was outlawed by FRS 10. This standard requires the purchased goodwill to be capitalised 
and to be amortised on a systematic basis over a finite period. The underlying rationale is that the 
value of purchased goodwill diminishes over time as internally generated goodwill replaces purchased 
goodwill. On the other hand, FRS 10 does not permit the capitalisation of internally generated goodwill 
(FRS 10, Para. 8). 
In FRS 10, the standard-setting body also prescribes the accounting treatment for intangible assets. 
The standard states that an intangible item may meet the definition of an asset when access to the 
future economic benefits that it represents is controlled by the reporting entity, whether through 
custody or legal protection (e.g. licences, quotas, patents, copyrights, franchises and trademarks). The 
ASB acknowledges that intangible assets range from those that can readily be identified and measured 
separately from goodwill to those that are essentially very similar to goodwill. The basic principles set 
out in the standard for accounting treatment of intangible assets that are similar in nature to goodwill 
are, therefore, closely aligned with those set out for goodwill. 
The requirements of FRS 10 apply to all intangible assets with the exception of (1) oil and gas 
exploration and development costs, (2) R&D costs, and (3) any other intangible assets addressed by 
                                                             
76 See Nobes (1992) for the “hole in the balance sheet” argument.  
77 In 1984, the ASC issued SSAP 22 “Accounting for Goodwill”, which was later revised in 1989.  SSAP 22 allowed 
companies a choice of treatment of purchased goodwill. The preferred treatment was the immediate write- off 
to reserves. 
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another accounting standard. The standard requires an intangible asset purchased separately from a 
business to be capitalised at its cost (FRS 10, Para. 9). It is also required that intangible assets acquired 
as part of the acquisition of a business should be capitalised separately from goodwill if its value can 
be measured reliably on initial recognition (FRS 10, Para. 10). These assets should initially be recorded 
at their fair values78. If the value of such assets cannot be measured reliably, intangible assets 
purchased as part of the acquisition of a business should be subsumed within the amount of the 
purchase price attributed to goodwill (FRS 10, Para. 13). On the other hand, FRS 10 allows the 
capitalisation of an internally developed intangible asset only if it has a readily ascertainable market 
value (FRS 10, Para.14). Therefore, all internally developed intangible assets which do not have readily 
ascertainable market values are expensed. Like goodwill, the standard also requires purchased 
intangible assets to be amortised on a systematic basis over their useful economic lives, which are not 
to exceed periods of 20 years. 
The accounting treatment for R&D expenditure is set out in SSAP 13. In this standard, the term 
“research and development” is used to cover a wide range of activities, including those in the services 
sector. Classification of R&D expenditure is often contingent upon the type of business and its 
organisation. However, the statement recognises three broad categories of activity, namely pure 
research, applied research and development. Expenditure on pure and applied research (unless it is 
expenditure on fixed assets, which should be capitalised and amortised over their useful lives) should 
be written off in the year of expenditure through the profit and loss account. Development 
expenditure should also be written off in the year of expenditure except in certain strictly defined 
circumstances. In situations where all the relevant criteria are met (see SSAP 13 for details), it is 
allowed to defer development expenditure to the extent that its recovery can reasonably regarded as 
assured. Such deferred development costs must be amortised in future years. Furthermore, the 
standard requires disclosure on accounting policy (as required by SSAP 2), the total amount of R&D 
                                                             
78 FRS 7 “Fair Values in Acquisition Accounting” requires that where an intangible asset is recognised, its fair 
value should be based on its replacement cost.  
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expenditure charged in the profit and loss account, distinguishing between the current year’s 
expenditure and amount amortised from deferred expenditure, and the movements on deferred 
development expenditure during the year. 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
The IASB issued IAS 38 “Intangible Assets” in 1998 to outline the accounting requirements for 
intangible assets. Revisions and amendments to IAS 38 were completed in March 2004, May 2008, 
and April 2009 respectively. The board outlines the objective of IAS 38 as prescribing the accounting 
treatment for intangible assets that are not dealt with specifically in another IFRS (IAS 38.1). The scope 
of IAS 38 comprises all intangible assets other than those specified in IAS 38.2-3. Intangible assets 
covered by another IFRS, such as intangibles held for sale, assets arising from employee benefits, and 
goodwill are excluded from the content of IAS 38. Accounting requirements for Goodwill is prescribed 
by IFRS 3.  
The standard requires an entity to recognise an intangible asset if, and only if, certain criteria are met. 
Recognition criteria for purchased and self-created intangible assets are stated as: (1) it is probable 
that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the entity, and (2) the 
cost of the asset can be measured reliably (IAS 38.21). The probability recognition criterion is always 
deemed satisfied for intangible assets that are acquired separately or in a business combination (IAS 
38.33). IAS 38 requires all intangible assets to be initially measured at cost (IAS 38.24), subsequently 
measured at cost or using the revaluation model (IAS 38.72), and amortised on a systematic basis over 
their useful economic lives (unless the asset has an indefinite useful life, in which case it is not 
amortised). 
Comparing these recognition criteria with requirements under the UK GAAP, differences between IAS 
38 and FRS 10 are identified. Firstly, the requirement of FRS 10 is that internally developed intangible 
assets should be capitalised only where they have a readily ascertainable market value whereas IAS 
38 applies additional specific criteria for the recognition of internally developed intangible assets (IAS 
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38.5). Furthermore, IAS 38 does not recognise internally generated brands or other items similar in 
substance as intangible assets (IAS 38.63). Secondly, FRS 10 requires that an intangible asset 
purchased separately from a business should be capitalised at cost. Furthermore, the standard 
requires that an intangible asset acquired as part of the acquisition of a business should be capitalised 
separately from goodwill if its value can be measured reliably on initial recognition. IAS 38 applies 
specific recognition criteria on the initial recognition of intangible assets. With respect to amortisation 
of intangible assets, FRS 10 has a rebuttable presumption that the useful economic lives of intangible 
assets are limited to periods of 20 years or less, unless otherwise justified and the asset is capable of 
continued measurement (FRS 38 Para.19). IAS 38 requires that amortisation of an asset with a finite 
life be amortised on a systematic basis over its useful life, and provides examples of useful life for 
different types of intangible assets (IAS 38.97). 
The scope of IAS 38 also comprises accounting treatment for research and development costs. The 
standard requires all research costs to be expensed (IAS 38.54). IAS 38 requires the capitalisation of 
development costs only after technical and commercial feasibility of the asset for sale or use has been 
established. This means that the entity must have the intent and ability to complete the intangible 
asset to either use or sell it and be able to demonstrate how the asset will generate future economic 
benefits (IAS 38.57). The research phase of an internal project to create an intangible asset cannot be 
distinguished from the development phase; the entity treats the expenditure for that project as if it 
were incurred in the research phase only. A research and development project acquired in a business 
combination is recognised as an asset at cost, even if a component of that project is research. 
Subsequent expenditure on that project is accounted for as any other research and development cost 
(expensed except to the extent that the expenditure satisfies the relevant criteria described in IAS 38 
for recognising such expenditure as an intangible asset) (IAS 38.34).  
Accounting treatment for goodwill is prescribed in IFRS 3 “Business Combinations”. IFRS 3 (2008) 
superseded IFRS 3 (2004). IFRS 3 (2008) was issued as a result of IASB-FASB joint project. Based on 
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IFRS 3, goodwill is measured as the difference between the aggregate of (i) the acquisition-date fair 
value of the consideration transferred, (ii) the amount of any non-controlling interest (NCI, formerly 
called minority interest), and the net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets 
acquired and the liabilities assumed (measured in accordance with IFRS 3). If the difference is found 
negative, the resulting gain is recognised as a bargain purchase in profit or loss. The acquirer shall 
reassess the identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed, the non-controlling interest, and the 
consideration transferred before recognising a gain on a bargain purchase. In accordance with IAS 36 
(Impairment of Assets), goodwill should be tested for impairment annually. To test for impairment, 
goodwill must be allocated to each of the acquirer's cash-generating units or groups of cash-
generating units that are expected to benefit from the synergies of the combination, irrespective of 
whether other assets or liabilities of the acquiree are assigned to those units or groups of units. 
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